KI Media: “Happy Independence Day America!” plus 24 more

KI Media: “Happy Independence Day America!” plus 24 more


Happy Independence Day America!

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 07:59 PM PDT


Monday, July 04, 2011: Today is Independence Day in America. Is your flag flying? It should be because Independence Day is America's birthday. Let see – 1776 to 2011 is 235 years. Wow! Happy Birthday America!

So, to you all in the US, as you go about your activities today with parade, picnics, ball game, etc.., be sure to remember "WHY" you are able to enjoy these festivities. And the WHY is because you are celebrating one of the most significant days in the history of mankind.

To learn more about why this day is so important, click here

Happy Holiday Americans (and Cambodian-Americans)!

KI-Media Team

០៤ កក្កដា ទិវាបុណ្យឯ​ករាជ្យ នៃសហរដ្ឋអា​មេរិក - 4th of July, the US Independence

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 07:58 PM PDT



Click on the control below to listen to the VOKK program:

The golden era of Cambodia - Dengue Fever, Cambodian Space Project release new albums

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 02:21 PM PDT

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ne0zPn8ajQU




5/07/2011
Excerpt from the Bangkok Post

Two bands playing music inspired by Cambodia's "golden era" of rock 'n' roll and pop music during the 1960s through to the mid-'70s, LA-based Dengue Fever and Phnom Penh-based Cambodian Space Project (CSP), recently released new albums.

Dengue Fever's Cannibal Courtship (Concord Music) is the band's fifth studio album and the first since the hugely successful Venus on Earth in 2008. Dengue Fever, led by the Holtzman brothers and fronted by Khmer singer Chhom Nimol, started by playing covers of songs by late stars like Sin Sisamouth, Ros Sereysothea and Pan Ron but over the past 10 years have slowly developed their own unique sound that takes Cambodian pop and blends its with edgy rock riffs, snatches of Ethiopian jazz and the sound of the Farafisa organ.

The band is very popular now on both the indie rock and World Music festival circuits, and the new album - on a new label and with a bigger budget - is likely to make them even more popular.


Cannibal Courtship is a mix of English- and Khmer-language songs, all of which were written by the band. The first thing I noticed about the album was the "wall of sound" the band has created. You can hear this on the title track, a surf guitar rocker about the travails of repressed love. The rock element is further explored on Family Business, Only A Friend and the hard driving final track, Durian Dowry.

While I like Nimol's singing throughout (for someone who couldn't speak English a few years ago, she now handles English lyrics with aplomb), it's the Khmer-language songs that I really liked, particularly the album's standout track, the dreamy, haunting Uku. But overall, this is Dengue Fever's most accessible album, full of interesting songs and musical detours. A band right on top of its game - highly recommended (http://www.denguefevermusic.com).

I reviewed the Cambodian Space Project's debut release, a vinyl maxi-single (the first vinyl released in Cambodia for more than 30 years) called I'm Unsatisfied, a Pan Ron classic, a few months back. Now, after a tour that took place in Australia, the US and Europe, the band, a fluctuating collective of up to 11 members, led by Aussie guitarist Julien Poulson and singer Srey Thy, has released its debut album titled 2011: A Space Odyssey, on the Hong Kong-based Metal Postcard record label.

In contrast to the established Dengue Fever, the CSP is just starting on its musical journey.

The songs on the band's debut go from Pan Ron and Ros Soreysothea covers like Love Like Honey to covers that take the song into uncharted waters like Love God and the anthemic and irrepressible Kangaroo Boy (a good one to pogo to). Singer Srey Thy is not such a smooth singer as Dengue Fever's Nimol, but her voice perfectly matches the more indie-rock approach the CSP has taken. And with the funny and moving Have Visa No Have Rice, she is also developing her skills as a songwriter.

The CSP covers perhaps the most famous '60s Cambodian pop song, Ros Sereysothea's I'm Sixteen, with a great deal of energy and some excellent blues harmonica playing from Ken White. Dengue Fever also covered this song some years back, but I like the CSP's version for its drive and edgy sound.

If they can keep going - it ain't easy being such a huge band in Phnom Penh - I think we can expect great things from the Cambodian Space Project in the future.

The CSP appears on a sampler compilation from the band's label, Metal Postcard Records, which is run by CEO Sean Hocking, who also operates a company producing podcasts for the Chinese market.

The Thai-based band Pussy & The Learjets is also on the record label (look for the band's download, Nothing/Itchy Skin).

The compilation's title is interesting - Dedicated to John Heartfield: Metal Postcard 2005-2010 - as it pays tribute to the pioneering German photomontage artist John Heartfield. It includes a track from the Cambodian Space Project's debut release, the maxi-single Knyom Mun Sok Jet Te (I'm Unsatisfied), as well as garage rock (DP from Hong Kong), minimalist rock from Perth-based rockers Erasers, electro from WOW, mutant disco from someone called "Dsico", and a strange cover of Woody Guthrie's classic US folk song, This Land Is Your Land. There is "attitude" on many of the songs, plus snatched media sound bites and a collage approach to creating music (perhaps this links with the photomontage of Heartfield) - but my favourite on this release is another band from Perth, singer songwriter Swoop Swoop, whose acoustic guitar-led songs Drive Into the Night and Your Blood Is My Blood are standouts.

The funniest title would have to go to the wonderfully named Bedford Avenue Mullet Girl; the song took me right back to the technopop of Human League from my hometown Sheffield. Check out 

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This column can be contacted at clewley.john@gmail.com.

"Ktorm Sbov Kamsott Nei Kakvei" a Poem in Khmer by Sék Serei

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 12:03 PM PDT

The Vietcongs congratulate its CPP lackeys

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:34 AM PDT

Communist Party of Viet Nam Central Committee congratulates Cambodian People's Party

(VNA - 27/6/2011) - The Communist Party of Viet Nam Central Committee has sent a congratulatory message to the Cambodia People's Party (CPP) Central Committee on the occasion of the 60th CPP founding anniversary (June 28).

The message wrote the CPV and Vietnamese people congratulated the CPP on its great important achievements and believed that the CPP will overcome difficulties and challenges to lead the Cambodian people to gain more greater achievements in national construction and development.

The Vietnamese Party, State and people will exert their best together with the Cambodian Party and people to preserve and constantly develop the fine neighbourliness, traditioanal friendship, comprehensive cooperation and long-term stability between the two Parties, States, and peoples for mutual interests and for peace, stability, cooperation and development in the region and the world, said the message.

Party General Secretary and National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong congratulated CPP Chairman Chea Sim, CPP Honorary Chairman Heng Samrin and CPP Vice Chairman Hun Sen./.

India to set up chair for Buddhist studies in Cambodia

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:26 AM PDT

New Delhi, July 4 (IANS) India will set up a chair of Buddhist and Sanskrit Studies at Cambodia's Preah Sihanouk Raja Buddhist University for four years from 2011 to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries, it was officially announced here.

The memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in Phnom Penh between visiting Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) president Karan Singh and Cambodian Religion Minister Min Khin on behalf of the ICCR and the university Monday, an ICCR statement said.

Karan Singh, who arrived in the Cambodian capital July 2, also met former king Norodom Sihanouk and his consort Monineath Sihanouk at the royal palace Monday.


During the meeting, Sihanouk, who had abdicated in favour of his son, and Karan Singh traced historical and civilizational roots between India and Cambodia.

The former king and the queen remembered their visits to India and their association with Jawaharlal Nehru. Karan Singh acknowledged the significant role played by Norodom Sihanouk as a great stabilising force in Cambodia.

The ICCR president was conferred an honorary D.Litt by Preah Sihanouk Raja Buddhist University in recognition of his contribution to the India-Cambodia friendship and intellectual achievements.

Cambodia Welcomes Newly Elected Thai Government

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:23 AM PDT

Political novice Yingluck Shinawatra says she has formed a coalition with four smaller parties, boosting her majority in parliament a day after being elected Thailand's first female prime minister. (Photo: AP)

Monday, 04 July 2011
Chun Sakada, VOA Khmer | Phnom Penh
"We believe the border dispute will have its tension reduced."
The Foreign Ministry on Monday issued congratulations to Pheu Thai party of Thailand, after it won an overwhelming victory in elections Sunday.

Foreign Minister Hor Namhong welcomed the party and its leader, Yingluck Shinawatra, who is the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, the populist prime minister ousted in a 2006 coup.

Yingluck is likely to be named the country's next prime minister.

"We hope that a new government formed by the Pheu Thai party will solve the border dispute with Cambodia more positively and more peacefully than the previous democratic government did," he said. "What we want is a peaceful border dispute resolution."


However, Son Chhay, a lawmaker for the Cambodian opposition Sam Rainsy Party, said the new Thai government would find it difficult to resolve the border dispute without international help.

The dispute, over a contested patch of land near Preah Vihear temple, has created a military standoff leading to a number of deadly skirmishes since 2008. Last month, Thailand withdrew from Unesco's World Heritage convention over a Cambodian proposal to manage the 11th-Century temple.

"We believe the border dispute will have its tension reduced" by the election, Son Chhay said. "But the solution will require the participation of the international community."

In a separate statement, the Sam Rainsy Party welcomed the results of Sunday's election, calling it a good example of fair elections for Cambodia.

Boeung Kak Lake Protesters Look to US for Help

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:19 AM PDT

Boeung Kak Lake protesters (Photo: CEN)
Monday, 04 July 2011
Heng Reaksmey, VOA Khmer | Phnom Penh
"We want the Cambodian government to offer what we need in order to prevent conflict."
Lake residents protesting over a Phnom Penh development delivered a letter to the US Embassy on Monday, asking for support in their ongoing dispute with the city and a development company.

The Boeung Kak villagers are asking the city to grant them a portion of land on the development site, rather than take buyouts and be removed to a resettlement site outside the city.

Fifteen representatives of 100 lake area residents thumb-printed the letter, addressed to US Ambassador Carol Rodley, requesting urgent intervention in their imminent eviction.


Developer Shukaku, Inc., has residential and commercial plans covering 133 hectares over Beoung Kak lake, which it has been filling in with earth dredged from the Tonle Sap river.

Residents say they are not happy with buyout or resettlement offers and have instead proposed they be given a corner of the development for their own homes instead.

Tep Vanny, a representative of the villagers, told reporters Monday they now had "no choice" but to appeal to the US, "a democratic country that has donated a lot to Cambodia."

"We've tried to find a solution from all relevant authorities, but we never get a response," said Sous Nary, a 44-year-old resident of the area. "We want the Cambodian government to offer what we need in order to prevent conflict."

Villagers have staged a number of demonstrations in front of City Hall, often clashing with police as a result.

Embassy officials were not immediately available to comment Monday, which is a US holiday. City officials declined to comment.

March blocked from PM’s house

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:14 AM PDT

CCU president Rong Chhun speaks to June Textile garment workers during a protest yesterday at Freedom Park. (Photo by: Heng Chivoan)

Monday, 04 July 2011
Meas Sokchea
The Phnom Penh Post

More than 300 protestors, demanding their former employer respect an arbitration council ruling to pay them severance pay, were blocked by police from marching to Prime Minister Hun Sen's Phnom Penh residence yesterday.

The former June Textile workers, who assembled at Phnom Penh's Freedom Park, had planned to deliver a petition to the premier calling on him to force the company to respect the arbitration council's ruling.

The ruling, which came after 1,000 workers were laid off when one of the company's factories burned down in March, found that June Textile should pay workers for a "pre-notice" period ahead of their dismissal of up to three months' salary, as well as other benefits.


Rong Chhun, president of the Cambodian Confederation of Unions, said yesterday June Textile had failed to respect that ruling, requiring the urgent intervention of Hun Sen.

"The workers face problems such as paying rent, water and electricity bills," he said, adding that only the premier had the authority to resolve the dispute.

June Textile has previously said it does not have enough money to pay the workers compensation in line with the ruling, but Rong Chhun claimed yesterday the company was ensured for US$16 million.

Neither Ken Loo, president of the Garment Manufactures' Association in Cambodia, nor representatives of June Textile could be reached for comment yesterday.

Though the protestors were blocked from demonstrating outside the prime minister's house, Pal Chandara, an official from Hun Sen's cabinet, said yesterday he had met with 10 of the group's representatives and would forward their petition to the premier.

"This issue cannot be resolved at once as we would want. I would like [all workers] to rest first, then once it has reached me I will resolve it for you," he said, adding there was no exact schedule to deal with the dispute.

Vietnam: Friend or Foe?

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 09:00 AM PDT

Sihanouk is being greeted by Pham Van Dong. Ieng Sary can be seen in the background.
Monday, July 04, 2011
Op-Ed by MP

The KR movement was created by and for North Vietnam with the aim of enabling Hanoi to replace France as the master of Indochina.

The idea of Indochinese Federation sought (and still being pursued) by Hanoi is modelled on colonial France's Confederation of Indochinese states consisting of Tonkin (North Vietnam), Cochin China (South Vietnam, including former Cambodian territory known as Kampuchea Krom or the Mekong Delta), the Kingdom of Laos (later taken over by the Prathet Laos, another instrument like the Khmer Rouge minus the mass killings, both created by Ho Chi Minh to implant North Vietnamese political influence across the rest of the Indochinese peninsula) and the dwindling Kingdom of Cambodia.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea (dubbed 'Red Khmers' or 'Khmer Rouge' by French-speaking Prince Sihanouk) had not clearly been formed with Cambodia's national interests in mind. Communism was ill-suited to the Cambodian condition at the time despite a sense of unease among the peasantry (and sections of urban population) towards exploitative colonial regime and subsequently the autocratic self-styled rule of Sihanouk who in his heyday was loathed by educated Cambodians in the same measure as Hun Sen is frowned upon by many educated Khmers today.

I could expand on the similarities between these 2 idiosyncratic personalities, but I am aware many of you are not fond of lengthy discourses!


The reasons that led to the KR leadership turning against their mentors and comrades-in-arms i.e. Hanoi, is a subject worth exploring by a chapter or more. But, to be brief, all the major events are inextricably woven and interlinked or intertwined together in such a manner that separating the black from the white is virtually impossible. The said events encompass the promulgation of the umbrella Communist Party of Indochina (The Indochinese Workers' Party) of which the Prathet Laos and the Communist Party of Kampuchea (KR-DK, PRK and current CPP) are its off-shoots or constituents; the historic Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954 marking the first sign of a split between the Kampuchean communists (or a faction among them) from their North Vietnamese allies, even if this discord had been kept under the surface for the time being; the open rift between Cambodian communists now led by Pol Pot sometime prior to their coming to power in April 1975; the decision taken to evacuate the towns and cities in Cambodia following this historic event; the motivations behind that decision (remember that the Communist Party of Kampuchea was a creature created by Hanoi, and whilst Pol Pot may have command over the overall body of this creature, it is far from certain he was in control over all the cells that had been implanted in that body, hence, the pre-emptive move to empty Phnom Penh and other urban centres of populations which would have provided ideal incubators for these active or sleeping cells to foment); the frenzy killings, mainly of former urban dwellers and educated Cambodians under Democratic Kampuchea, and later on the purging of that regime's internal hierarchy involving party cadres and the armed forces (how much had all this pattern of internal cleansing been spiralled out of control as a result of Pol Pot's paranoia and madness, and how much had Hanoi's moles and agents exploited to the maximum this pervading fear and paranoia?, who would have gained the most from targeting the educated middle classes for executions, or from the erasing from collective memory of Khmer culture and history?, who indoctrinated the Cambodian communists with this elementary Marxist doctrine?); the ousting of Democratic Kampuchea and its replacement by the People's Republic of Kampuchea; the supplementary treaties signed between the PRK/CPP and Vietnam (Cambodia acceded to Hanoi's demand not to raise territorial issues over the territories of Kampuchea Krom, ceded to Vietnam under unhappy circumstances); the Most-Favoured Nation status granted to Vietnam to usurp Cambodia's market and natural resources; and so forth . . .

Cambodians are generally a grateful and noble 'race'. The word 'Khmer', according to scholars, translates as 'noble' or one of noble soul or bearing. Compassion, a strong sense of ethic, simplicity, a tendency to avoid confrontation, forgiveness; are among the qualities that can be said to be deeply imbedded in that soul.

This is part of the reason why Khmers allow themselves to be divided over most of the issues affecting their nation. Not because these qualities are deficient or wrong, but rather because of the hard work done over the past half century to enfeeble and cripple the best part of that soul. One could still find incessant effort made even today to cause confusion and discord among Khmer people, even via this forum, although their arguments are often so polished and persuasive that not every Cambodian can see through their actual intentions and machinations.

I will discuss the emotional subject of Vietnamese 'liberation' of KR victims at another time. For now, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that this historical event, good or bad, is another piece in the jigsaw in the same chain of events described above.

Petition to Leader of Liberal Internatio​nal

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 08:53 AM PDT

LI petition ញតáŸ'តិគាំáž'áŸ'ážš


http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-preview.aspx?doc_id=83582615

LI Petition


http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-preview.aspx?doc_id=83582708

Harvard University's JUSTICE with Michael Sandel - Episode 8

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 06:06 AM PDT

 

Episode 08

Part 1 – WHAT'S A FAIR START?

Rawls argues that even meritocracy—a distributive system that rewards effort—doesn't go far enough in leveling the playing field because those who are naturally gifted will always get ahead. Furthermore, says Rawls, the naturally gifted can't claim much credit because their success often depends on factors as arbitrary as birth order. Sandel makes Rawls's point when he asks the students who were first born in their family to raise their hands.

Part 2 – WHAT DO WE DESERVE?

Sandel discusses the fairness of pay differentials in modern society. He compares the salary of former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ($200,000) with the salary of television's Judge Judy ($25 million). Sandel asks, is this fair? According to John Rawls, it is not.


Closing Order of Case 002 against Senior KR Leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 06:02 AM PDT

In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002. The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges). Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues. Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956). Available in Khmer and French. Contact the ECCC for a free copy.


CLOSING ORDER
of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010 

Functioning

Structure and Personnel 

302.            Prior to 1975, the subdistricts of Tram Kok District were for the most part populated by local villagers. However, after the movement of the population from Phnom Penh, many former city residents were settled in Tram Kok District. Former Tram Kok District Chairman, [REDACTED], remembers being instructed by the Sector to prepare to receive the influx of people. He recalls sending approximately 3,500 to 4,000 families to the villages and subdistricts where they were organised into local cooperatives.1239 As time went on, those people who settled in Tram Kok were occasionally moved en masse from area to area within the District.1240 

303.            The precise organization of the population in each cooperative depended on its leadership.1241 However, in accordance with CPK policy nationwide, members were officially divided into three categories: full-rights, candidate and depositee members. These categories determined the degree of their involvement in the functioning of the cooperatives.1242 The depositee category seems to have been broadly synonymous with the people moved from Phnom Penh and other locations which were under Khmer Republic administration up until 17 April 1975. This group was widely known as "new people"1243 or "17 April people".1244 "New people" lacked political rights and could not be unit chiefs within the cooperatives.1245 Cooperative members known as "base people"1246 could hold either full-rights or candidate status. The candidate category was for those with alleged family or other connections or links to the enemy.1247 In mid-1978, this three-fold categorization was proclaimed abolished.1248 However, this abolition may have been mere pretence.1249 

304.            Several witnesses recall that in their cooperatives full-rights, candidate and depositee people were separated into different labour units designated one, two and three, respectively.1250 In which unit people were placed depended on what facts they revealed about themselves in their biographies.1251 The depositee unit was controlled by members of the full-rights and candidate units pursuant to the original policy that "new people" were not permitted to be unit chiefs.1252 In the Nheng Nhang Subdistrict, these three groups lived and worked apart until 1978, at which time they were integrated.1253 This may have been in accordance with the CPK's nationwide abolition of the three categories.1254 Each unit had several sub-units such as a carpenter unit, canal digging unit and cart unit.1255 The head of each unit was a chairman who reported to the secretary of the subdistrict committee. In turn, the subdistrict committee reported to and received its orders from the district committee.1256 Usually, messengers carried communications between the different levels, including invitations to meetings.1257 

305.            Every two weeks subdistrict committees met to discuss the "work plan". These meetings were led by District Committee cadre.1258 Following these meetings, the subdistrict chief would verbally disseminate the work plan to the cooperative members and urged them to strive towards three to four tons of rice, per hectare, per year.1259 One former cooperative member recalls attending small unit meetings three times a month. At these meetings members criticised each other and admitted what they had done wrong.1260


308. The subdistrict made regular verbal and written reports to the district regarding the implementation of the work plan.1261 Similarly, the district made monthly reports about the implementation of the work plan to the sector.1262 This vertical chain of reporting on the implementation of the work plan at the bases extended all the way up to the Party Centre.1263 Further, at least two witnesses recall the Zone Secretary, Ta Mok, visiting their cooperatives.1264 

309. A former member of the Sre Ronong subdistrict Committee recalls attending a meeting in 1977 or 1978 at which he was given instructions on "the purges of enemies within and outside the ranks, who had tendency for the Lon Nol people and as for the people in the party rank if they did not have good tendency, they were also purged.The enemies in the rank included cadres; as for the enemies outside the rank, they were ordinary civilians". 1265 He also recalls reading copies of the magazine Revolutionary Flag which were distributed by the district to certain people in the subdistrict. The Number 6, June 1977 edition of this magazine contained a letter from the Central Committee to various districts, including Tram Kok, awarding them the Red Flag Award for "achieving the tasks of defending the country and continuing and building socialist revolution with the speed of the great leap forwards in consecutive years".1266 In this letter, the Central Committee sets out a comprehensive and detailed work plan for the latter half of 1977 and includes instructions on defending the country, building socialism and achieving three to six tons of rice per hectare, per year.


Peou Sorpong: "Hun Sen's 1997 Pre-emptive Coup Causes and Consequences", Southeast Asian Affairs (1998)

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 02:19 AM PDT

Hun Sen's Pre-Emptive Coup 1997 Causes and Consequences
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/59275886?access_key=key-nki21euouao2aes6zk0


HUN SEN'S PRE-EMPTIVE COUP
Causes and Consequences


Sorpong  Peou
Southeast Asian Affairs (1998)

On 5-6 July 1997, troops loyal to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (of the Cambodian People's Party, or CPP) and those of First Prime Minister Norodom Randariddh (leader of the royalist party known as FUNCINPEC, or the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia) engaged in a fierce street battle in Phnom Penh. The fighting stunned the Cambodian people and the world. Within two days, the CPP force defeated its enemy, and then pushed the remnants against the northern Thai-Cambodian border into a tiny strategic area called O Smach. At year's end, Hun Sen still held high the trophy of victory.

This article seeks to explore the events of July 1997. At issue is whether or not what took place constitutes a coup; and, if it is a coup, what kind? I argue that the overthrow of Ranariddh was a coup, not a social revolution or putsch. Unlike coups in many other countries, however, it was not caused by factors such as ethnic or ideological antagonisms, socio-political turmoil, or military dominance. I take a structural approach, arguing that Hun Sen's actions must be explained in terms of his struggle for hegemonic preservation, as his party and adversaries braced themselves for the next election scheduled for 1998. (In this study, the term "hegemon" means "leader", and struggle for hegemony simply means struggle for political leadership.) Although the Second Prime Minister has now achieved political dominance, preventing bipolarity from emerging, he has also recreated Cambodia's old power structure, prone to coups, violence and war.

Prelude to a Pre-Emptive Coup

In the debate over whether Hun Sen's actions were or were not a coup, those who supported or sympathized with the Second Prime Minister viewed them as preventing Prince Ranariddh from staging a coup against the government. Those who put the blame on Hun Sen considered his actions a coup. It may be worth describing politico-military developments leading to the July events and then examining the two opposing perspectives more closely.

In May 1993, elections were organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which intervened in the country following the Paris Agreement in October 1991. This resulted in a coalition among four elected parties: FUNCINPEC; the CPP; the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (SPNLF) turned Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP); and Molinaka, a Sihanouk-aligned group that fought against the State of Cambodia (as the CPP was previously known) in the 1980's, but did not participate in the signing of the Paris Agreement. FUNCINPEC and the CPP emerged as the dominant parties, receiving respectively fifty-eight and fifty-one seats in a 120-member Constituent Assembly, which was transformed into the National Assembly in September 1993. Prince Ranariddh became First Prime Minister, and CPP leader Hun Sen Second Prime Minister.


The coalition was a strange one from the outset. All factions retained their own military forces, and each controlled discrete sections of the bureaucracy. Relations between the CPP and FUNCINPEC were difficult, and soon became much worse. Tensions between the two prime ministers emerged publicly when Ranariddh held his party's twice-delayed Congress on 21-22 March 1996. As FUNCINPEC President, Ranariddh took a tough line vis-à-vis the CPP, threatening to leave the coalition if FUNCINPEC were not given greater powers at the local level. He was quoted as saying the following: "Being First puppet prime minister, puppet vice-prime minister, puppet ministers, puppet governors and deputy governors and soon-to-be puppet chiefs of districts … being a puppet is not so good." He preferred to lead an opposition party against the CPP in the National Assembly.

The CPP reacted strongly to Ranariddh's challenge. On 26 March it issued a statement condemning the FUNCINPEC threat to abandon the coalition, claiming that it sapped the spirit of national reconciliation. Although the leaders were seen together for the first time since March at the inauguration of a renovated temple in Phnom Penh on 1 June, Hun Sen still came hard on FUNCINPEC, blaming the latter for the armed forces' failure to capture a Khmer Rouge stronghold in Pailin in late April and criticizing FUNCINPEC Minister of Education Tol Loah for having failed to resolve the shortage of teachers. In June, Hun Sen attacked the FUNCINPEC Minister of Public Works, Ieng Kieth, calling the latter the "worst minister of Public Works in the last 17 years."

The two prime ministers had no more joint meetings until August, after a Khmer Rouge faction led by Ieng Sary (formerly known as Brother number two in Khmer Rouge leadership) broke away from the so-called hard-liners led by Pol Pot (Brother number one). It was the Khmer Rouge breakaway announced by Hun Sen on 8 August that brought the two dominant parties back together again. On 23 August, they issued a joint statement seeking King Sihanouk's royal pardon for Ieng Sary. Despite their joint effort to get amnesty for Ieng Sary from the King, the two prime ministers soon began to take unilateral action to win Khmer Rouge defectors over to their own side. The tension between them worsened when their factional troops fought each other in Battambang province. FUNCINPEC Deputy Governor Serey Kosal, who had quarrelled with the CPP Governor Ung Samy, threatened to cut off the province from Phnom Penh. A top CPP leader, Heng Samrin, said on 18 November that the two coalition partners "cannot be allies".

Tensions between the two prime ministers continued to deteriorate in the first half of 1997. Early in the year Ranariddh moved to bu8ild a new political front known as the National United Front (NUF), comprising FUNCINPEC, the BLDP, the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) led by the former Finance Minister and senior FUNCINPEC leader Sam Rainsy, and the small Khmer Neutral Party. Amongst its declared policies was the objective of having only one prime minister after the next elections. Hun Sen immediately responded to the NUF by taking steps to build his own political alliance. In February, he signed agreements with the Liberal Democratic Party and a BLDP faction led by Information Minister Ieng Mouley (who had broken away from Son Sann in 1996).

The two prime ministers' political animosities intensified when a number of royalist members of parliament challenged Ranariddh's leadership in mid-April. Hun Sen was quick to extend his support for the renegades, thus upsetting the Prince. The National Assembly did not reconvene as the members of parliament refused to meet. Desperate, Ranariddh agreed to nominal Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan's plan to join the NUF when the latter declared that he wanted to form a new party called the Khmer Solidarity Party, which would break away from the notorious Pol Pot. In late May, troops loyal to Hun Sen seized an arms shipment intended for Ranariddh's use to build up his bodyguard unit. The Prince's top military man Nhek Bun Chhay (Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Armed forces) apparently continued negotiations with the Khmer Rouge remnants, which may have contributed to the breakup of the Khmer Rouge leadership (as evident in Pol Pot ordering his "defence minister" Son Sen, and his family members executed). On 17 June the Khmer Rouge radio denounced Pol Pot. In Phnom Penh, on the evening of that day, fighting between the bodyguards of Ranariddh and Hun Sen resulted in deaths of two royalist soldiers and one of Hun Sen's.

After the fighting in July, Hun Sen also made no attempt to turn the country back to the past by abolishing the parliamentary system and taking over the position of First Prime Minister from the FUNCINPEC. He instead encouraged the royalist remnants to choose a new leader to replace the deposed Prince as First Prime Minister. Royalist Foreign Minister Ung Huot was then "elected". Hun Sen also recognized, at least in principle and on paper, that FUNCINPEC was still his major coalition partner and made no move to turn Cambodia beck into a socialist state, as his People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime did in the 1980s.

The "Ranariddh Coup" Thesis

The CPP insisted that Hun Sen's action could not be considered a coup. If it were a coup, it was Ranariddh's. the official "Ranariddh Coup" version can be found in official documents issued by the post-coup leadership in Phnom Penh. In their joint letter to Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Human Rights in Cambodia), dated 18 November 1997, new First Prime Minister Ung Huot and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen objected to Hammarberg's "mischaracterization" of the 5-6 July events as a coup d'état. The letter stated: "You continue to refer to the events in a way that clearly indicates a bias toward the position of the former first Prime Minister and against that of the duly constituted Government in Phnom Penh." It added: "The facts demonstrate that the Royal Government saved the country from a coup; it did not lead one."

Both Ung Huot and Hun Sen reminded Hammarberg of the two major public documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation: White Paper Background ON THE July 1997 Crisis: Prince Ranariddh's Strategy of Provocation (9 July 1997), and Crisis in July Report on the Armed Insurrection: Its Origins, History, and Aftermath (22 September 1997). The documents provide detailed accounts from Hun Sen's perspective, but fall short of characterizing the overthrow of Prince Ranariddh as a coup. The White Paper argues that it was Ranariddh who was at fault because of his 'reckless strategy of provocation, which has only served to destabilize Cambodia.' It provided a brief background to FUNCINPEC's failure to build itself as a political party, while claiming that the CPP 'was sure to win the next election' because 'it was active in every province of the country'. Consequently, 'Prince Ranariddh … knew that something drastic had to be done in order to bolster flagging fortunes' and since early 1996 his senior advisers 'followed a strategy of confrontation and provocation'. According to the White Paper, the strategy of provocation emerged at the royalist party Congress in March 1996, when Ranariddh 'openly broke with the CPP' by attacking the coalition government. Ranariddh's claim that the CPP refused to share power with FUNCINPEC is dismissed as a 'phony issue'.

Moreover, the White Paper characterized Ranariddh's attempts to rebuild his power base as part of his strategy to undermine the CPP. His new 'political alliance' (the NUF); his 'military guild-up' policy, aimed at including Khmer Rouge soldiers in the royalist army; his 'illegal importation of weapons' in My; his army's 'use of violence and intimidation'; and his attempt to destabilize the government by 'embracing the Khmer Rouge hard-liners' – these were all part of Ranariddh's provocative strategy. Secret and unilateral negotiations with the 'remnant of Khmer Rouge hard-liners; are described as 'the most dangerous tactic of all', an 'action tantamount to announcing that the coalition government was being terminated. The military build-up and the alliance with the Khmer Rouge was virtually a declaration of war'.

The Crisis in July provided more evidence to substantiate the argument that Ranariddh was the one who attempted a coup. Ranariddh acted, it argued, when Hun Sen and his family were still in Vietnam. Hun Sen had informed the government that 'he would be on vacation from 1 July 1997 until 7 July 1997'. Ranariddh, however, changed his plan to visit France, leaving Phnom Penh on 4 July instead of waiting until 9 July as previously scheduled. While Ranariddh was aware of the pending coup one day before his departure, Hun Sen was still unaware of what was going on in the country until after the crisis had already erupted on 5 July. Thus, the paper stated, 'if it had been Hun Sen's intention to stage the coup, he hardly would have been on vacation abroad'. Ranariddh had started the fight while he was inside the country and Hun Sen outside. Hun Sen had not returned to Phnom Penh until mid-morning of 5 July. Upon his arrival, he appealed for calm. It was not until 1.30am on 6 July that

it was decided that a general 'mopping up' operation should be carried out that day, starting at 5.30am. The targets included the Tang Krasaing Barracks, Pochentong area and the houses of General Nhiek Bun Chhay and General Chao Sambath.

What Hun Sen had brought about was not a coup, but a 'mopping-up operation' aimed at preventing Ranariddh's coup and restoring 'law and order' in the country.

Hun Sen's Pre-Emptive Coup

There is no logical and empirical foundation for the 'Ranariddh Coup' thesis. The fact that Hun Sen ordered the 'mopping-up operation' to deal with the problem of anarchy, as the official documents claimed, proves that what he had brought about was indeed a coup. The fact that he had stayed outside the country before the crisis occurred is irrelevant. Like many coup leaders before him, Hun Sen justified his actions by claiming he would stabilize the political system through a 'mopping-up operation'.

It may be helpful to discuss what a coup is and what is not. Often the term is confused with a putsch or social revolution. A putsch may be defined as an action directed at overthrowing a political leader by a small group of leaders from outside the existing power establishment, but with some degree of mass following. 'Revolution' generally means a deliberate, intentional, and potentially violent overthrow of a government, almost invariably by the military or with the help of the military'. Power is seized by a group within the system, who make no attempt to change society as a whole, but are only interested in removing political leaders from power.

It should be recalled that Prince Ranariddh was the legitimate leader of FUNCINPEC, which garnered the most seats in the Constituent Assembly and was internationally as well as domestically recognized as the winner of the May 1993 elections. In any mature liberal democracy, Hun Sen would never have been appointed as prime minister at all. At best he would have been deputy prime minister, or receive a ministerial portfolio. Thus, the claim that Hun Sen's action was to prevent Ranariddh's imminent coup is illogical, since the Prince as First Prime Minister could not overthrow himself as leader of the government.

It is also unclear as to who provoked whom. The Crisis in July sheds light on some of the CPP's own provocative measures. It describes how two royalist generals (Nhek Bun Chhay, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Cambodian Armed Forces, and Chao Sambath) refused to co-operate with the CPP's top general Keo Kim Yan (Chief of the General Staff of the Cambodian Armed Forces). Keo Kim Yan asked Nhek Bun Chhay to close down a FUNCINPEC military post at Wat Phniet. This was hardly a reasonable request, and the latter refused to obey. Then, according to the paper,

General Keo Kim Yan ordered that Wat Phniet be surrounded, and at 6.30 [on 5 July] the RCAF [Royal Cambodian Armed Forces] entered the camp and met no resistance. The RCAF forces began disarming the illegal soldiers. They arrested 154 illegal troops and seized 236 firearms and two armoured personnel carriers.

The paper also confirmed that before the fighting broke out at Chao Sambath's residence, CPP First Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh Chea Sophara (one of Hun Sen's close allies) called on the Military Police (MP) to negotiate 'a surrender of illegal weapons' with the royalist general. This let to the MP approaching Chao Sambath's residence at about 3pm on 5 July. The paper does not tell how many MP officers were there, but only describes how they were fired on by Chao Sambath's troops. If this violent incident can be juxtaposed with the one at What Phniet early that morning, Chao Sambath and his troops may have had reason to question the MP's political motives and to start reacting violently to the latter's move. This again raises the question of who provoked whom and who had the right to define what was legal or illegal; after all, the royalist troops still belonged to the First Prime Minister, not to any illegitimate faction.

While the CPP may have had legitimate concerns for its own security, it is clear that Hun Sen was not innocent either. The fact that Ranariddh launched the NUF and then negotiated with the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng can be explained by the fact that he had grown vulnerable to Hun Sen. In March 1997, a top royalist leader said a large number of FUNCINPEC members of parliament were afraid to sleep at home and chose to stay at the party head-quarters at night. Royalists felt vulnerable to the CPP's growing intimidation. As elections scheduled for 1998 approached, FUNCINPEC leaders recalled their bitter experiences with the CPP in the last elections: until May 1993, around 450 royalist party members in forty-six places died at the hands of CPP loyalists. The CPP's violence against opposition party members is confirmed in the works of former UNTAC officials. Judy Ledgerwood wrote: "The CPP's efforts to win the elections included several tactics that involved the use of coercive state power.' She also wrote:

The violence against FUNCINPEC and other legitimate opposition parties was accompanied, whipped up, justified, explained, and covered up by a highly orchestrated propaganda campaign carried out in CPP/SOC media.

David Ashley also confirmed that '[from] November 1992 to January 1993 there were repeated attacks against opposition party offices (primarily those of FUNCIPEC) … in virtually every district of Battambang'.

Further evidence suggests that the royalist military build-up and the attempt to strike a peace deal with the Khmer Rouge was in all probability defensive or balancing in nature. According to a document alleged to have belonged to General Nhek Bun Chhay and included in one of the two official documents discussed earlier, the CPP provoked FUNCINPEC. FUNCINPEC's fear was further reinforced by the royalist party's internal crisis in mid-April, when a number of its parliamentarians rebelled against the political leadership of Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen was quick to lend his helping hand to the renegades. This new development was seen by Ranariddh as the Second Prime Minister's unwanted interference in his party's 'internal affairs'. A Western diplomat also believed that the royalist army's move on 5 July to take over Pochentong international airport was only aimed at capturing half of Phnom Penh and forcing Hun Sen to negotiate with FUNCINPEC.

Hun Sen's decision to launch a 'mopping-up operation' was not inconsistent with what he had wanted to do long before the crises. Apparently, Hun Sen had seriously contemplated a coup around June 1997. According to a well-placed CPP source, Hun Sen had asked CPP Minister of Interior Sar Kheng if the latter would go along with his plan to remove Ranariddh from power by force. Sar Kheng did not support the idea and refused to get involved. Since 1 July, a few days before the fighting on 5-6 July broke out, CPP troops began to round up opposition party members in eastern provinces and shot anyone found resisting. This evidence confirms a U.N. report that summary executions started on 2 July – three days before the coup. According to a U.N. report, '[most] of the 41-60 instances … occurred between 2 [and] 6 July 1997 or in the following two weeks'. This again suggests that the royalists only reacted to the CPP's onslaught before the 5-6 July coup. The U.N. report presents concrete evidence of summary executions, torture, and missing persons after 2-7 July 1997, confirms the incineration of a large number of corpses. Those hastily cremated were not even part of the 41-60 cases of execution in custody.

Hun Sen's swift, decisive seizure of power from Prince Ranariddh at a time when the latter (who had been democratically elected) was no longer in office, therefore, does not theoretically satisfy that action as 'coup prevention'. It was Hun Sen's pre-emptive coup: he did not act against Ranariddh because the latter had attempted a coup against him, but because the Prince fought back to keep himself in power.

How is all this to be explained? This article does not place emphasis on the role of ideology as the main cause of the July coup. It would also be too simplistic for anyone to make the case that Hun Sen was ruthless simply because he was a 'communist dictator'. General Lon Nol, who ousted Prince Sihanouk in 1970, was anti-communist, but was no less a dictator. Nor do Hun Sen's actions justify anyone who may be tempted to argue that he was a democrat at heart. Even defenders of communist regimes in Indochina like Michael Vickery recognizes Hun Sen's violent behaviour: '[whatever] Hun Sen's personal qualities … at worst he is no more murderous than his enemies'. Neither of the ideological arguments, therefore, explains his pre-emptive violence. The explanation lies in Cambodia's fragile hegemonic power structure.

Factionalized Armies and the Imbalance of Military Power

The factionalization of the armed forces is a variable that can help explain the coup, though military forces were not leading actors in the July events. Military leaders did not act independently. The CPP's military leaders helped Hun Sen drive Prince Ranariddh out of power, but did not aim at grabbing power for themselves. Military leaders remained loyal to their faction heads.

Before the May 1993 elections, the four major factional armies – FUNCINPEC, the CPP, the Khmer Rouge and the BLDP – were unequal in strength. The non-CPP factions had formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in the early 1980's. Although the exact figures may never be known, the CPP was said to have 131,000 troops, compared with 27,000 for the Khmer Rouge, 27,8000 for the BLDP, and 17,500 for FUNCINPEC. Together, the combined resistance force had only about 72,300 men. In terms of police, the CPP numbered around 47,000, compared with 9,000 Khmer rouge, 400 KPNLF, and 150 FUNCINPEC officers. The CPP thus far outnumbered the resistance groups both individually and collectively. However, while the resistance coalition was not in a position to topple the CPP, neither did it face imminent extinction. What these figures also foreshadowed was that the CPP would continue to enjoy military preponderance after the elections.

Although it may not have been intended to enhance the CPP's dominant status, the Paris Agreement signed in October 1991 widened the imbalance of military power between the resistance forces and the CPP. This was brought about by the CGDK's disintegration into three political parties competing for seats in the Constituent Assembly. UNTAC failed to create a truly neutral political environment, giving further advantages to the CPP. Two major UNTAC failures were its inability to disarm each of the factional armies by 70%, as agreed to by the four Cambodian signatories is Paris, and its ineffective control over Cambodian civil administration. Violations of the cease-fire, particularly by the Khmer Rouge, and UNTAC's inability to allow the non-Khmer Rouge factions keep their own remaining troops for self-defence. In terms of civil administration, '[what] UNTAC supposedly controlled, it did not' and the CPP 'simply administered around UNTAC'. In subsequent dealings with the CPP after the Khmer Rouge's defection from the peace plan, UNTAC became 'too much' dependent on the CPP's co-operation, 'which ruled 80% of the country'.

After the elections, the CPP continued to enjoy military advantages. Reintegration of the factional armed forces by four parties (FUNCINPEC, CPP, BLDP, and Moulinaka) that had competed in the 1993 elections was attempted after they agreed to form a coalition government. On 2 July 1993, the Co-Commander-in-Chief of the National Armed Forces was appointed, followed by the creation of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the National Armed Forces of Cambodia, and the General Staff Headquarters of the National Armed Forces on 14 July, and by the appointment of two co-defence ministers from the CPP and FUNCINPEC on 24 September. The government also adopted a policy of reforming the armed forces. In reality, these integration and reform initiatives failed as factional troops later clashed in provinces, particularly in Battambang. By late 1996, top military officers belonging to the CPP and FUNCINPEC engaged in verbal attacks. In late December, they clashed during press conferences, accusing each other of assassination plots as both tried to woo Khmer Rouge defectors into joining their own force. Armed clashes spilled into 1997. By April, as the situation worsened, Hun Sen threatened publicly to assassinate three royalist leaders. Nhek Bun Chhay was a target. (The other two were apparently General Ho Sok, executed in custody during the coup, and General Serey Kosal, former Deputy Governor of Battambang). In short, then, failure in military reintegration efforts resulted in the continued factionalization of the armed forces and the military preponderance enjoyed by the CPP.

Hun Sen versus Ranariddh, and Their Struggle for Hegemony

Factionalized armies and the growing imbalance of military power alone might not have led to the coup. But as top dog, the Second Prime Minister sought further to solidify his control over the government and the National Assembly6, apparently in the hope that Prince Ranariddh would be unable to challenge him in the next elections. Growing tensions between the royalist and the CPP armies resulted from growing hostilities between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. Hun Sen was not wrong when he put the blame on his rival co-premier for launching the NUF and for dealing with Khmer Rouge, who had agreed to joint the Front. But the Second Prime Minister forgot or chose to ignore the fact that his bid for political hegemony forced the Prince to adopt these desperate measures. Although FUNCINPEC emerged the winner in the 1993 elections, the CPP refused to accept anything less than an even distribution of political power. In Cambodia's seventeen provinces the number of royalist and CPP governors and deputies was equal, each with thirty-six. Immediately after the elections, the twenty-seven cabinet ministries were made up of thirty-four royalist co-ministers, ministers, and vice-ministers, and thirty-three from the CPP, with Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen being co-prime ministers.

The balance of political power between the two dominant parties later tilted in favour of the CP. FUNCINPEC became internally divided and allowed the CPP to take advantage of the divisions. The royalist party was weakened after its Minister of Finance, Sam Rainsy, was expelled from the Cabinet in 1994 and from the National Assembly in 1995, and after Prince Norodom Sirivudh (King Sihanouk's half-brother and Ranariddh's uncle) resigned from his post as minister of foreign affairs. While Sirivudh was replaced by another royalist, Ung Hout, Sam Rainsy was replaced by a CPP member, Keat Chhon. FUNCINPEC was further debilitated by the arrest of Prince Sirivudh, for allegedly plotting to assassinate Hun Sen in late 1995. He was then expelled from the country and went to live in France. Hun Sen even threatened to shoot down the plane that would carry Sirivudh when the latter announced that he would return to Cambodia in late 1996.

Hun Sen also sought to weaken the NUF. On 30 March 1997 a vicious grenade attack was unleashed on a peaceful demonstration led by a major NUF alliance member, the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) headed by Sam Rainsy. Hun Sen's bodyguards were implicated. According to a U.N. report, the KNP had received written authorization for the demonstration from the Ministry of Interior on the morning of 29 March. Copies of the authorization letter were also sent to the Municipal Police, the Royal Gendarmerie, the District Police, and the Office of the Protection Police. While no protection was given to the demonstrators,

there were heavily armed soldiers in battledress positioned since early that morning [30 March] at about two hundred metres from where the demonstrators were to assemble.

The report adds that

[these] soldiers, who were armed with AK-47's and B-40 rocket launchers belonged to the Second Prime Minister's personal bodyguard unit, as he himself later confirmed

and that 'this was the first time ever that these soldiers were dispatched to a demonstration'. Ironically, these soldiers provided no protection to the demonstrators after the grenade attack. Instead of coming to the victims' rescue, they 'took battle position and beat injured demonstrators who were fleeing towards them'. according to eyewitnesses, the soldiers 'made no attempt to arrest any of those who were seen throwing the grenades' but 'protected the escape of two perpetrators'.

Another blow to Ranariddh occurred in mid-April 1997, when a number of royalist party members rebelled against his party presidency and when Hun Sen lent support to these royalist revisionists, who were unhappy with the power status quo within the party. While Hun Sen had conspired with Ranariddh to expel Sam Rainsy and Sirivudh, respectively, from the National Assembly and from Cambodia, Hun Sen refused to let Ranariddh expel royalist party members who challenged his party leadership. This shows clearly that Hun Sen was mainly interested in weakening FUNCINPEC internally 0 and he succeeded in doing so. His actions had nothing to do with legality. While he publicly threatened to assassinate three top royalist leaders in April 1997, FUNCINPEC's Sirivudh was arrested in late 1995 and finally exiled to France simply because a Cambodian journalist reported that the Prince was talking (or joking) about killing Hun Sen.

Renewed Challenges and Rational Expectations

Still, even the overall imbalance of politico-military power between Hun Sen and Ranariddh does not by itself explain the coup. One has to look beyond power as the only explanatory variable and examine the timing of the coup. If power were the only relevant factor, a coup could have been executed earlier because Hun Sen had already achieved politico-military preponderance well before July 1997. Late May and June have to be seen as a turning point and early July as a breaking point.

Beginning in mid-May and continuing throughout the month of June, peace negotiations between royalist military officials and the Khmer Rouge remnants in Anlong Veng (the only Khmer Rouge stronghold left) were under way. By 1 June, progress had been made; Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan and Prince Ranariddh met at a site near the Thai border and agreed to meet again on 10 June. At this time, however, the Khmer Rouge began to disintegrate as Pol Pot ordered his own 'defence minister', Son Sen, and his family slaughtered. Arriving in Anlong Veng on 12 June, Nhek Bun Chhay found the Khmer Rouge at war with itself, an event that led to the arrest of Pol Pot on 19 June. The royalist-Khmer Rouge negotiations continued after that. But it was not until 22 June that the Khmer Rouge leadership agreed to stop calling itself a 'provisional government' and join Ranariddh's NUF.

Early July was the decisive moment. According to Thayer, by 3 July, 'both sides had hammered out all the details and signed the final agreements'. He goes on to say:

[Negotiators] flew to Phnom Penh to tell [Ranariddh] that everything was done. Ranariddh signed a statement that would be announced first by radio and then read by Khieu Samphan at a July 6 press conference. Negotiators returned to Anlong Veng on July 4 to inform the Khmer Rouge to proceed with the ceremony.

The 5-6 July coup was in part to pre-empt a politico-military alliance between the royalists and the Khmer Rouge that might help Ranariddh to rebound and would pose a new challenge to Hun Sen's hegemony.

The international circumstances were also favourable to Hun Sen's move. Just before the coup, the anti-Khmer Rouge donor community also put pressure on the Cambodian Government to get its house in order and to restore political stability for economic development. On 1 and 2 July, at the second Consulative Group Meeting (CGM) in Paris, donors presented their views on what Cambodia needed to do to improve the political environment for economic development. The two U.N. Special Representatives to Cambodia jointly supported 'Cambodia's own efforts to establish the Rule of Law, respect for human rights and a free market economy'. The push for political stability necessary for economic development was echoed by the major donors who expressed disappointment at the lack of Cambodia's progress towards political stability. Germany warned:

Serious downside risks, stemming mainly from political instability, internal insecurity, weak institutions and other deficiencies … are threatening the achievements reached and the prospects for further improvements.

Australia argued that what was lacking in Cambodia was, among other things, a 'stable political framework'. Japan, Cambodia's largest donor, also said it was deeply concerned about the public peace getting worse even in Phnom Penh. The U.S. representative, while calling for free, fair, and peaceful elections, warned:

we cannot move forward with effective assistance programs … in the face of political polarization, fears of a return to violence and the reduction in government effectiveness that results.

International financial institutions also raised similar concerns about Cambodia's domestic political instability and wanted to see more action directed at restoring law and order.

This is not to suggest that the donors had a direct interest in seeing Hun Sen remove Ranariddh from power. Nonetheless, the donors' strong demand for law and order may have encouraged Hun Sen to act. At the CGM meeting, CPP Minister of Economy and Finance Keat Chhon simply conceded that there had been 'some violent incidents in the last few months' and that

some criminal elements can and do exploit … freedom in order to destabilize law and order or to discredit one group or another. Regrettably, certain self-serving and politically motivated sections use such events to malign the country and vilify the leadership.

In his review of the donors' pressing demand, the minister wrote: 'The issues of security and political stability remain as the main prerequisites for the development of Cambodia.' Hun Sen perhaps had not expected the world to react to his violence against Ranariddh as negatively as it did because he was working to restore political stability.

In short, then, Hun Sen's concern about his political vulnerability led him to view the emerging royalist- Khmer Rouge politico-military alliance as a challenge to his hegemonic standing. He may also have believed that the action he would take against Ranariddh would not upset the world too much: after all, he laid claim to preventing Khmer Rouge remnants returning to power, and thus restoring political stability for the country's economic development.

The Coup's Consequences and the Country's Commotions

The coup that ousted Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 plunged the country into civil war. After that, the Khmer Rouge regime began it reign of terror. A Vietnamese invasion and a U.N. – sponsored election failed to break the vicious cycle. Is the victorious Second Prime Minister now in a position to do what his predecessors had not been able to, namely, achieve political stability? His success in executing the coup may help to keep him in power for a long while, but he may still be vulnerable to coup plots and attempts in the future because of the structural fragility of the state.

Immediately after the coup Hun Sen ordered his troops to push the royalist remnants north towards the Thai-Cambodian border. He sent 800 troops to the new front lines west of Siem Reap province and then mobilized another 1,600 troops, of whom 1,400 came from Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham provinces. By late July the royalists found themselves barely holding on to the key town of Samrong, approximately 330 kilometres northwest of Phnom Penh and 30 kilometres from the Thai border.

By August the royalists were making a quick retreat, and found themselves desperately defending their last stronghold in O Smach on the northern Thai-Cambodian border. The battle for the royalists' last bastion began on 13 August. In the following weeks, there were many conflicting reports on who cont6rolled the area. As the CPP troops closed in on Smach, more than 40,000 Cambodians took refuge in Thailand. Resistance leaders admitted that O Smach might fall at any time, but claimed that their 3,000 troops were resolved to fight back. At year's end, however, the CPP troops had still failed to capture the area. The royalist force's ability to withstand the CPP's onslaught depended heavily on the Khmer Rouge troops from Anglong Veng, who came to areas in O Smach.

Will the Cambodian adversaries be willing to reach a cease-fire? Definitely, as the inferior forces, the royalists and the Khmer Rouge may not find it too difficult to accept any agreement that would prevent them from being slaughtered by the CPP army. But the CPP cannot be expected to accept any conditions from the resistance groups unless the latter agree to disarm and voluntarily subject themselves to government control. Hun Sen has succeeded in punishing his rivals and pushing them against the Thai border. He would not, in all probability, demand anything less than the latter's total surrender. This kind of condition will in all likelihood keep the conflict protracted.

CPP officials now claim that their party rules unchallenged. And according to one top CPP official, 'no one can challenge Hun Sen. The only way to keep Hun Sen down is for those inside the party to soften him up from within.' The CPP is apparently divided: Chea Sim (CPP President) and Sar Kheng (CPP Minister of Interior), and former party President Heng Samrin now belong to one faction; Hun Sen and his supporters belong to the other. However, Hun Sen has emerged as the undisputed leader despite the apparent schism. Chea Sim was said to fear Hun Sen as he feared a tiger. Sar Kheng could not do anything against Chief of the National Police Hok Lundy (one of Hun Sne's reliable allies) despite the fact that the latter was under his authority. After the coup, Sar Kheng urged U.N. Representative Hammarberg to put more pressure on Hun Sen.

Unlike the CPP, whose political alliance with other small parties remained intact, the NUF automatically disappeared after the coup. FUNCINPEC as a political party has also disintegrated past the point of no return. Most of its members chose to bandwagon with Hun Sen for short-term security or for rewards. After being 'elected' as first prime minister, Ung Huot joined Hun Sen in calling for legal action against Ranariddh and Pol Pot for their crimes against humanity. Other royalist leaders not only competed to take over the job of the overthrown Prince Ranariddh, they also moved to form their own political parties.

The anti-CPP Union of Cambodian Democrats (UCD), formed in Thailand after the coup, seems to be growing weaker and weaker as its members became fragmented. The internal weaknesses were exposed by Son Chhay, a member of parliament (the BLDP Son Sann faction), who said that exiled politicians disliked Ranariddh's management style and even blamed him for creating the events in July. Son Chhay himself had fundamental differences with other members of the UCD.

Seeds of Decline?

Despite a superficially impregnable position, Hun Sen's 'unipolar world' might collapse one day if he does not adopt a strategy of benign hegemony. Compared with previous leaders, such as Sihanouk, the Second Prime Minister does not enjoy widespread legitimacy. Hun Sen is not a prince as Sihanouk was. In Cambodian society, popularity still irrationally rests on traditional thinking that 'without a king, the kingdom will be shattered'. Hun Sen was a peasant, a former Khmer Rouge fighter, and came to power after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978. Unlike Sihanouk, who had driven the French out of Cambodia, Hun Sen is viewed by his enemies as someone who invited Vietnam into the country. The fact that the CPP lost the 1993 elections further reveals that Hun Sen was not highly popular despite his military preponderance and hi party's use of violence. If Prince Sihanouk could be ousted in early 1970, Hun Sen cannot be invincible.

Beside his lack of traditional legitimacy, Hun Sen has failed to gain a clear sense of performance legitimacy. He still presides over a weak state and a relatively strong society. The bureaucracy is incompetent and corrupt, and administrative reform has so far failed. The government's commitment to an initial 20 per cent reduction in the 144,000-strong civil service by the end of 1997 failed to meet its goal; by the end of 1996 the public sector had increased to 163,206. Even with large budgetary support from foreign donors – about half the state budget – the government remained cash-strapped.

With meagre financial resources and a grossly inefficient bureaucratic structure, Hun Sen's preponderance has depended on, and will continue to rely on, the military and security establishment. Will his general fight for him? As long as he continues to indulge their corruption, he will certainly obtained their loyalty. Such indulgence, however, will frustrate his reform efforts and jeopardize his attempts to build the state. Cambodian history has shown that a corrupt military leadership is ultimately self-destructive. President Lon Nol (who led the country from 1970 to 1975) ws defeated at the hands of the Khmer Rouge because he had turned a blind eye to his generals' rampant corruption. If Hun Sen is unwilling to discipline his generals, for the purpose of maintaining their loyalty to him, he will jeopardize his own efforts to reform the public administration. Moreover, if Hun Sen does not have adequate financial means to meet the military and security apparatus needs – a situation becoming more difficult because of reduced foreign aid – they would rebel against him. Growing military dissatisfaction during the second half of the 1960's, rooted in the termination of U.S. aid to Cambodia, contributed to Sihanouk's eventual demise.

While he may now enjoy the absence of subversive foreign interference, he does not have a foreign patron who is willing and able to lend massive financial and military support as the Soviet Union and Vietnam did for the PRK/SOC during the 1980's. donors continued to give humanitarian aid to Cambodia, but Hun Sen no longer receives military aid from Western states such as Australia and the United States. Cambodia also failed to gain admission into ASEAN in July, and the United Nations left the Cambodian seat vacant in September.

Growing poverty and potential military dissatisfaction are a recipe for coup plots and attempts. Hun Sen might be able to beat back his challengers a few more times, but he would not have the capability to win all the time. A future coup, however, will not be of a pre-emptive nature, but will be a 'rear-end collusion' kind of coup. That is, those who have now chosen to remain silent or bandwagoned with Hun Sen – either out of fear or for short-term rewards and security gains – may one day decide to bring him down because they feel threatened by his unchecked power.

Conclusion

This article contends that what happened in early July was Hun Sen's Preemptive coup. The coup arose from a situation where Hun Sen wished to enforce his hegemonic position by preventing enfeebled challengers bouncing back.

Although Hun Sen seems to have achieved a degree of political stability, what he has done still keeps Cambodia highly vulnerable to coup plots and attempts, largely because his successes resulted from the use of force that temporarily drove his opponents out of power and frightened others into bandwagoning with him for short-term protection and rewards. Hun Sen and his rivals still operate within an environment where the 'politics of survival' prevails over concern for morality and justice. Unless Hun Sen and other Cambodian leaders learn that a violent struggle for hegemony at all costs will not pay in the long run, but will only keep them in a state of perpetual war, they will never agree to compete for legitimate power through the ballot-box in a free and fair manner.

Appeal letter on ceremony to the spirit and soul of Cambodian people in coup d'état

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 02:07 AM PDT

Dear SRP Supporters,

Here is the attachment file of the appeal letter on dedication ceremony to the spirit and soul of Cambodian people in coup d'état on July 05-06, 1997. The ceremony to be held on July 6, 2011 at SRP Headquarters in Phnom Penh.

SRP Cabinet


The Khmer People, Like The Thai People, Want A Regime Change

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 12:40 AM PDT

4 July 2011

THE KHMER PEOPLE, LIKE THE THAI PEOPLE, WANT A REGIME CHANGE

The Sam Rainsy Party congratulates the Puea Thai Party on their landslide election victory and sends its best wishes to Thailand's first government led by a female Prime Minister.

The opposition's victory in Thailand, a country geographically and culturally close to Cambodia, constitutes a strong encouragement for the opposition forces in this country.

It is obvious that
  • The Thai people, like the Khmer people, reject the status quo and want to see a regime change.
  • The Thai people and the Khmer people loathe the conservative and heavy establishment in their respective countries (*).
  • The Khmer people and the Thai people want social justice. They want to see a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor and between the cities and the countryside. They call for the implementation of effective pro-poor policies.
  • If the next elections scheduled for 2012 and 2013 in Cambodia were as transparent and as honest as those held on 3 July 2011 in Thailand, the opposition in this country would also win a landslide victory.
  • For any opposition leader who consistently defends the poor but has been forced into exile and prevented from taking part in election campaigns in his country, physical presence is not as important as virtual presence in securing victory for his party, with the use of modern information and communication technologies.
SRP Members of Parliament

(*) The establishment in Thailand has been described in many reports and press articles. In Cambodia it is represented by the Samdechs and the Oknhas, the omnipotent and arrogant CPP government officials and army generals, the CPP-affiliated heartless tycoons and other unscrupulous businessmen, the land grabbers and destructive loggers, the corrupt judiciary, and those brainless members of the royal family who have nothing to sell to the CPP but their royal names.

Fabled Cambodian 'puzzle' temple reopens to public

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 12:32 AM PDT


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOT7eZydSms&feature=player_embedded

[The Bangkok Post Editorial urges Thailand to] Walk back in to the WHC

Posted: 04 Jul 2011 12:30 AM PDT

4/07/2011
Bangkok Post
EDITORIAL

One of the first jobs of the new government must be an urgent reassessment of the Cambodian border problems. The outgoing government under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has not handled this issue well. The dead, the wounded and the homeless testify to that. The new government must reverse the walkout at the World Heritage Committee meeting in Paris by Natural Resources and Environment Minister Suwit Khunkitti.

Border relations with Cambodia, attention to our heritage and history and the country's image, all have been harmed in recent months.

It will be an effort to repair this damage and move ahead, but a determined government can handle the problem.

The faint praise and arm's-length "backing" that Mr Abhisit gave to Mr Suwit is instructive. Deeply involved in an election campaign, the premier sensed that the public had little sympathy for the walkout from Paris. Indeed, it was wrong on many levels.


The only saving grace for now is that Thailand has not signed anything, and it is only a walkout and not, as originally reported, a Thai decision to leave the World Heritage Convention.

An early act by the next prime minister should be to make it clear to the public and to Unesco that Thailand will be back, full of facts and fight, as soon as the WHC meets again.

From the beginning, the entire dispute over the border has seemed somewhat artificial. Even granting that the dispute over 4.6sqkm of territory is serious, there never seemed to be a real reason for military conflict. Cambodia has often been unreasonable and stubborn, but that is not a justification for mortal combat, with the death and destruction which always results.

In retrospect, sending Mr Suwit to Paris was probably a mistake. The World Heritage Commission is not a place for politicians. It is where technocrats and experts carefully watch and debate placement of commas and relevance of old maps. The head of the WHC delegation should be a highly qualified expert in Thai history and events in neighbouring countries.

One cannot blame Mr Suwit for acting like a politician; that is what he is.

Which brings us to the other politician deeply involved in this unnecessary problem. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen would do better to get over both his infatuation with ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra, and his personal animosity towards outgoing Prime Minister Abhisit. The Khmer leader has not only allowed his personal feelings to intrude into the serious business of international diplomacy, he has relished the event.

In goading Thailand, especially through attacks on Mr Abhisit and Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, Mr Hun Sen has exacerbated the passions which led to so many deaths and so much spilt blood.

Mr Suwit's claim is that Cambodian-sponsored documents under discussion at the WHC meeting "could have led" to a loss of territory. That has also been the singular claim of the People's Alliance for Democracy.

Yet the head of Unesco, Irina Bokova, has disputed this. And in truth, the WHC has never taken up the Cambodian plan for management of the temple, nor scheduled a meeting to discuss it.

It is thus unfortunate but inevitable that Mr Suwit's actions have been characterised as a political gambit, designed to get votes for his Social Action Party.The next government should handle this affair differently, and better.

CCHR issues report titled "False Promises - Exploring the Citizenshi​p Rights of the Khmer Krom in Cambodia"

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 11:52 PM PDT

Dear all

The Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) today, 4 July 2011, releases a report titled "False Promises – Exploring the Citizenship Rights of the Khmer Krom in Cambodia".

The Report explores and analyzes the contradiction between the Royal Government of Cambodia's public confirmation that the Khmer Krom, ethnic Khmer from South Vietnam, are Cambodian citizens, and the practical difficulties faced by the Khmer Krom who try to access the benefits of their Cambodian citizenship by applying for citizenship identity cards which are required to unlock the rights and benefits that are attached to citizenship/nationality such as employment, education, and property rights land rights. The central and overriding recommendation of the Report is for the RGC to put an immediate end to the uncertain situation that faces Khmer Krom who arrive in Cambodia by confirming their Khmer citizenship/nationality through the creation of a coherent framework that is specifically designed to facilitate Khmer Krom applications for ID cards.

Please find the report in English and the Executive Summary and Recommendations in Khmer. Also attached is a press release outlining the release in English and Khmer.

Thank you and kind regards
--
The Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) is a non-aligned, independent, non-governmental organization that works to promote and protect democracy and respect for human rights throughout Cambodia. For more information, please visit www.cchrcambodia.org.


http://www.box.net/shared/8lnu1l9latntqx08bttb


http://www.box.net/shared/zoaq3a6psh0lur1og84c


http://www.box.net/shared/u58nc2148sg36n0idq02


http://www.box.net/shared/m5xg6fi7c8pre5ncnho6

ASEAN must include US in talks on South China Sea

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 11:45 PM PDT

Mon, 07/04/2011
Jessica Brown, Sydney
The Jakarta Post

Chastened by its failure to successfully negotiate a settlement in the recent border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia has been noticeably silent on the recent explosion of tensions in the South China Sea.

Only a few months ago, Indonesia was positioning itself as an 'honest broker' in the South China Sea dispute. Now it appears much more circumspect. Jakarta knows that only through wider regional discussions, which must include the US, can the quarrels be resolved.

Indonesia took up the rotating chair of ASEAN at the beginning of the year with a great sense of confidence. The largest country in the region, with a booming economy and flourishing — if messy — democracy, Jakarta saw the ASEAN chair as a good opportunity to solidify its credentials as the region's de facto leader.


In January Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa signaled that the long-running series of territorial disputes in South China Sea, which had again flared up during 2010, would be a key focus of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts.

Since then, Natalegawa has been distracted by another territorial spat closer to home.

Following an outbreak of fighting between Thailand and Cambodia around the disputed Preah Vihear temple in February, which resulted in 10 deaths, Natalegawa flew to Bangkok and Phnom Penh attempting to negotiate a solution.

In its capacity as ASEAN chair, Jakarta agreed to send unarmed Indonesian observers to monitor the situation on both sides of the border.

Yet despite months of frantic diplomatic effort, including a crisis meeting on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in May, the dispute remains unsolved. In spite of Indonesia's efforts at a regionally brokered solution, Cambodia has now taken its case to the International Court of Justice.

If ASEAN can't resolve a territorial quarrel between its own member states, can it expect to broker a solution in the high-stakes South China Sea?

The Cambodia-Thailand border dispute is a reminder of the limited role that ASEAN can realistically play in assuring regional security.

The only real option available to ASEAN in the South China Sea disputes, and to Indonesia as its chair, is to continue encouraging the US to play an active role in the region to counterbalance to China's growing weight.

This does not mean ASEAN is irrelevant. China maintains that the South China Sea disputes should be settled on a bilateral basis. But the ASEAN states involved – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – recognize that only by acting in concert can they hope to stand up to their powerful northern neighbor.

Strength in numbers has long been ASEAN's raison d'être. Formed in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, the founding five members thought that sticking together would give them the best chance of standing up to the circling superpowers.

A pact of non-interference in each other's internal security affairs enabled them to put their own animosities aside. But it also meant that security cooperation always lagged well behind economic integration. It has been through the US-led 'hub and spokes' system of bilateral relationships, rather than formal multilateral agreements, that security cooperation in Southeast Asia has largely taken place. ASEAN's key role has been to bring the major players together.

This should again be its role in the South China Sea.

Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, could push for the issue to be resolved in a wider ASEAN-led multilateral forum such as the East Asia Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum, where the presence of the USA might force China to moderate its behavior. Jakarta understands that keeping both China and the USA inside the ASEAN tent is crucial.

Last year Indonesia welcomed US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's offer to mediate the dispute, made in response to China's claim (which it has since backed away from) that Beijing would now consider the South China Sea a 'core interest' on par with Taiwan and Tibet.

ASEAN's subsequent invitation for America (along with Russia) to join the East Asia Summit was widely interpreted as an attempt to dilute China's growing influence in the grouping, giving the Southeast Asian states more bargaining power in areas such as the South China Sea.

Jakarta's failure to broker a deal between Cambodia and Thailand is a reminder that settling territorial quarrels is not ASEAN's strong suite. It is a cautionary warning against institutional overreach. ASEAN is not the best forum in which to tackle the South China Sea disputes.

Where ASEAN can play a role is in bringing the major regional powers together, and giving the smaller Southeast Asian states a bigger voice than they could muster alone.

Indonesia's recent silence on the issue suggests it has realized this.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) in Sydney and author of Jakarta's Juggling Act, published by the CIS

Abhisit resigns leadership

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 11:40 PM PDT

4/07/2011
Bangkok Post

Prime Minsiter Abhisit Vejjajiva announced his resignation as leader of the Democrat Party on Monday morning.

The outgoing premier made the announcement after the Pheu Thai Party crushed his party in the 2011 general election yesterday.

"I've decided to resign because I could not lead my party to victory in the election," Mr Abhisit said.


Democrat executive members will meet to select a new party leader within 90 days, as the law requires, he said.

Before the election, Mr Abhisit said he would step down as Democrat leader if his party won fewer seats than in the previous general election.

The unofficial election result shows that the Democrats won 159 seats yesterday. In 2007, the party won 164 seats.

Thai military 'accepts' opposition polls landslide

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 11:37 PM PDT

Mon, Jul 04, 2011
AFP

BANGKOK - Thailand's powerful military will respect a landslide election win by allies of Thaksin Shinawatra who it toppled five years ago, the defence minister said Monday, easing fears of another coup.

Thaksin's sister Yingluck Shinawatra, a 44-year-old political newcomer who is set to become the kingdom's first female prime minister, was scrambling to form a coalition after leading the Puea Thai Party to victory Sunday.

The election and its aftermath is a major test of Thailand's ability to emerge from a long political crisis triggered by Thaksin's 2006 overthrow, which last year saw the country's worst civil violence in decades.


The Puea Thai Party - masterminded by Thaksin from his self-exile in Dubai - won a majority of 265 seats out of 500 in the lower house, the election commission said Monday after the vote count was completed.

That is well ahead of the 159 secured by outgoing premier Abhisit Vejjajiva's establishment-backed Democrats, who have conceded defeat after two and a half years in power. Abhisit resigned as party leader Monday.

The crushing win by Thaksin's allies has reshaped a fractured political landscape, but the party must tread carefully if it wants to avoid alienating other key players such as the military.

Puea Thai has already vowed not to seek revenge over a deadly military crackdown on Thaksin's "Red Shirt" supporters in Bangkok last year that claimed the lives of more than 90 people and left major downtown buildings in flames.

Thailand's outgoing defence minister, himself a retired general, told AFP that the army accepted the election outcome, easing fears of fresh military intervention in a country that has seen almost as many coups as elections.

"I have talked to military leaders. We will allow politicians to work it out. The military will not get involved," General Prawit Wongsuwon told AFP.

"The people have spoken clearly so the military cannot do anything. We accept it."

Observers say a key issue for the Bangkok-based elite is whether the opposition will seek to bring Thaksin back from Dubai, where he lives to avoid a jail term imposed in his absence for corruption.

But even more important may be whether the new government pursues legal or other steps against the generals over the bloody crackdown against last year's mass opposition demonstrations in the heart of Bangkok.

"I believe the military leaders are more concerned about their fates... than about Thaksin's return," said Thongchai Winichakul, a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

"The Thaksin issue is a smoke-screen to hide their real concern - whether they would be investigated and possibly punished."

Although Puea Thai has secured an absolute majority in parliament, it is courting other parties including Chart Thai Pattana - which won 19 seats - to bolster its hold on the legislature.

"We brought Chart Thai Pattana in to protect against possible defections but it is still uncomfortable in terms of seats and stability," Puea Thai deputy leader Plodprasob Suraswadi said.

The Election Commission is already studying complaints over irregularities, which could see candidates given disqualified and potentially whittle down Puea Thai's majority.

The populist Thaksin is loathed by the nation's elites who see him as corrupt and a threat to the revered monarchy.

An amnesty for the billionaire telecos tycoon would risk infuriating many in the Bangkok-based establishment in government, military and palace circles and could prompt protests by the royalist "Yellow Shirt" movement.

Thaksin, who despite being hugely divisive in Thailand has presided over victories in the nation's last five elections, called on all sides to respect the result and said he did not "want to cause trouble" by returning home.

"I think people want to see reconciliation. They want to move forward," he said. "We will not seek revenge," the former telecom tycoon told Thai television Sunday.

Vietcamlao Federation sings and dances in Yiek-nam (sic!)

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 10:58 PM PDT


Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia Song and Dance Festival to open

04/07/2011

(VOV) - The Vietnamese Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism has decided to organise the Song and Dance Festival of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Quang Tri province in July.

The ministry authorized the Performing Arts Department (PAD) to work with the Quang Tri Provincial Department of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the International Cooperation Department and the Vietnam Musicians' Association to host the event.

The ministry also asked the PAD to be responsible for developing prorgammes and training performance troupes at the festival.

The festival will provide a good chance for art troupes from the three countries to meet and exchange experience, contributing to strengthening the ties of friendship between the three countries.

Cambodian Women Speak Up on Dam's Threat

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 10:53 PM PDT

Monday, July 4, 2011
By Amy Lieberman
WeNews correspondent

In Cambodia's rural northeastern province, the Sesan River is the primary source of food and income for fishing and farming communities. But hydropower dams are encroaching and village women say their daily life is hit the hardest.

RATANAKIRI PROVINCE, Cambodia (WOMENSENEWS)–-The Cambodian government has not yet secured funding for Lower Sesan 2, a 750 megawatt, $650 million dam that would export electricity to Vietnam and become the largest hydropower dam in Cambodia.

With plans underway, though, some women in the deeply spiritual nine ethnic indigenous communities of Ratanakiri Province, 10 hours north of Phnom Penh, are braced for the worst.

Ratanakiri residents along the Sesan river support themselves by fishing and farming, both subject to drastic disruption by the project. The dam is expected to impinge on fish migration and flood surrounding farmland.


On Si Kan is "spirit chief" of her community of about 250, a position typically held by Lao ethnic women who channel male spirits. She has already given up any thought of fighting the dam, planned for 80 miles downstream.

"I tell people we can do nothing to stop the project. The government will build the dam," said On, 57, through a Khmer translator. "So the people can wait for the dam to come and they can die in the floods it will cause, or they can move away from the river."

At the same time as women such as On are resigned, others are leading community opposition, says Ian Baird, a University of Wisconsin, Madison, professor of geography and fisheries. Baird has worked in the region for more than 25 years.

"When people from Ratanakiri come down to Phnom Penh to talk, many of them are really intimidated," he said. "But it's the women who are asking the most powerful questions, even as everyone is 100-percent afraid to speak out."

Ratanakiri representatives attended a national consultation on Sesan 2 at the end of May in Phnom Penh where the environmental minister, Prach Sun, highlighting project benefits.

"It will help bring Cambodia development and reduce poverty," Prach said. "This will contribute to the resources of Cambodia and to its people. That is the most important thing."

Distrusting the Process

Hor Voy South, a 56-year-old mother of eight, is a community organizer for 3S Rivers Protection Network, or 3SPN, which supports communities threatened by hydropower dams in northeastern Cambodia. She attended the consultation in Phnom Penh and says she doubts the meeting will help.

"The community talks and the government listens, but nothing changes," she said. "We say, 'We don't want the government to build the dam here,' but we think they will build it anyway."

The sense of powerlessness among communities of Ratanakiri Province, 10 hours north of Phnom Penh, derives from what happened after another dam was built on the same river.

Yali Falls, a 720 megawatt hydropower dam, was established in 1996 on a part of the Sesan that is in central Vietnam, approximately 100 miles upstream from Ratanakiri.

The Yali construction caused flooding of land hundreds of miles away and hindered the migratory passage of the fish locals depended on for food and income.

Hydropower dams are sprouting up across Southeast Asia. Twenty seven are now operating in China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia; nine are being built and 14 are proposed. Hydropower dams produce one of the most common forms of renewable electricity, while releasing a very low rate of greenhouse gas emissions.

They also create havoc to traditional livelihoods. Upstream, the rivers back up and cause flooding. Downstream, the water volume is constrained, threatening aquatic life.

Water around hydro-dams is also prone to producing algae that can be poisonous or degrade water qualities in other ways.

Spirit Chief Moved to Higher Ground

After Spirit Chief On's property flooded multiple times following Yali's construction, she moved several miles away inland from the river in 2006.

Displacement like this, she said, was particularly hard on women who may have to seek out new, unfamiliar sources of food for their families inland and travel farther to find water.

While male villagers customarily do the fishing, women clean clothes and bathe children and draw water from it. After a dam, the river's flows become unstable and threatening. Women say their constant contacts with the river are now riddled with anxiety, especially when they consider the possibility that a giant dam could break.

"The floods come and destroy the farms and it becomes difficult for women, who have to do all of the work. Then we have to move to high land, and there we don't know where to find food," said the spirit chief.

On her dry patch of land it's difficult to grow food and there isn't always enough to feed the five people in her house. But at least she's not worried about flooding.

Im Yim Krub, 35, by contrast, still worries about flooding. She lives about 20 feet from the river, a few miles away from the spirit chief's land. In 2009 the river filled her house and attached convenient store with 4 feet of water. She fled on motorcycle with her husband and four children and stayed with relatives in the mountains for weeks.

"I think always if that could happen again this year. I have become afraid of the river and how it can rise so quickly," said Im, who does not let her children play in the river unsupervised.

Im sells bottled water for 25 cents, though she herself relies on a nearby well for drinking water. But many residents, like Hor Voy South, a 56-year-old mother of eight, drink from and bathe in the dirt-colored river.

Hor and one of her sons have developed skin infections in the past 10 years and often suffer diarrhea. She, like more than 40 percent of all Cambodians, lives on less than $1.25 a day.

More than 1,000 people in Ratanakiri have died since 1996 as a result of poor water quality, according to University of Wisconsin's Baird.

Yali Falls' downstream impact in Cambodia has caused serious ecological and social-economic problems for approximately 20,000 Ratanakiri residents and tens of thousands of people farther down the river. Aside from flooding and health problems, loss of fish and vegetables have also lowered people's regular incomes and food intakes. People in Ratanakiri have not received financial compensation for their health problems or income losses.

If Lower Sesan 2 is built, Ratanakiri residents will receive a one-time lump-sum payment to cover a single year for fish losses.

Cambodia congratulates Pheu Thai Party on election win [-Rubbing salt on the Thai military's wound?]

Posted: 03 Jul 2011 10:45 PM PDT

PHNOM PENH, July 4 (Xinhua) -- Cambodia is happy to see Pheu Thai Party's landslide victory in the Thai parliamentary election and looking forward to working with the new Thai government on solving the border dispute, said Cambodian deputy Prime Minister and foreign minister Hor Namhong on Monday.

"We are delighted with the victory of Pheu Thai Party, we hope that the new government formed by the Pheu Thai Party will resolve border issues with Cambodia more positively than the previous government," he told reporters.

"Cambodia wants a fair and peaceful solution on border conflict, based on international laws, good neighborhood and friendship between Cambodian and Thai peoples, and the judgment of the International Court of Justice in 1962," he said.


Thailand's opposition Pheu Thai Party's candidate for prime minister Yingluck Shinnawatra declared victory while the ruling Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva conceded his party's defeat shortly after voting ended on Sunday.

Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, is set to become the country's first female prime minister.

Cambodia and Thailand have had sporadic border conflict over territorial dispute near the Preah Vihear temple since the UNESCO listed the 11th century temple as a World Heritage Site on July 7, 2008.

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