KI Media: “Border row set to test Yingluck's leadership” plus 24 more

It has been widely speculated that Thai-Cambodian relations will bloom again now the Pheu Thai Party has won the election and is taking the helm of government.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has made it clear that Pheu Thai's victory will improve ties between Thailand and his country.

He said the election outcome marked the start of "a new era of cooperation" and differences between the countries should be resolved peacefully.

The Thai-Cambodian relationship has had more downs than ups over the past two years since the Democrats took office in December 2008. Ties went rapidly downhill in 2009 when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed Thaksin Shinawatra as his economic adviser.

The controversial appointment led Bangkok to downgrade its diplomatic relationship with Cambodia by recalling its ambassador to Phnom Penh. The situation improved a little after Thaksin resigned but became hostile again when seven Thais were arrested at the Thai-Cambodian border last December.

Among the seven were former Democrat MP Panich Vikitsreth and Thai Patriots Network coordinator Veera Somkwamkid and his secretary Ratree Pipattanapaiboon.

The Thai government succeeded in negotiating for the release of five but Veera and Ratree were sentenced to eight and six years jail, respectively, for espionage. Hun Sen said they would both have to serve two-thirds of their jail terms before a royal pardon or prisoner exchange programme could be sought.

Thai-Cambodian ties spiralled downward and turned deadly earlier this year when troops clashes several times between February and May.

Hun Sen always refused to deal with the matter bilaterally despite continuing efforts to reach a peaceful solution by both sides' armies. He eventually brought the issue to the international level, asking the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United Nations intervene.

It remains to be seen if the Pheu Thai-led government will be able to turn the sour relationship between the two nations into the sweeter one.

Since the issue is very sensitive, Pheu Thai's No.1 party list MP-elect Yingluck Shinawatra, who is tipped to become prime minister, should not hastily make public the country's position without fully vetting it with the Thai public.

Ms Yingluck's statement on Wednesday _ that the new foreign minister must be competent in negotiating the issue of Thai-Cambodia relationship and must be accepted by the international community _ may not be enough to make some people believe that the Pheu Thai government will be able to handle the Thai-Cambodian issue effectively.

To prove her true leadership in directing Thailand's foreign policy, Ms Yingluck must not allow Hun Sen to dominate the border talks or she might fail to create public confidence in handling of the Thai-Cambodian dispute.

Outgoing Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya will lead the Thai team to The Hague next week to hear the International Court of Justice's order on the request for provisional measures submitted by Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple.

The UN's highest court set July 18 to deliver its order on Cambodia's request for the Thai military to withdraw from around the Preah Vihear temple, while the ruling on the interpretation of the ICJ's 1962 verdict is due to be made at the end of this year.

Phnom Penh asked the UN's highest court on April 28 to interpret its ruling in 1962 which says the Preah Vihear temple belongs to Cambodia and has demanded the court order Thailand to withdraw troops from the Preah Vihear temple area, cease all military activity around the temple and refrain from any act or action which could interfere with the rights of Cambodia.

A public sitting will take place at the Peace Palace in The Hague, during which the president of the court, Judge Hisashi Owada, will read the court's order on the provisional measures at 10am (3pm Bangkok time).

The July 18 ruling will come over a month after the ICJ held two rounds of oral hearings on Cambodia's request for provisional measures on May 30-31.

Thai Ambassador to the Hague Virachai Plasai acted together with three foreign lawyers to defend Thailand's position.

Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong led his team at the oral hearing.

In his closing statement, Mr Virachai called on the court to drop Cambodia's Preah Vihear temple petition, saying that Phnom Penh's complaints against Bangkok were groundless and its petition is outside the scope of the court.

Mr Virachai told the court that Thailand has always been willing to support a joint listing of the Preah Vihear temple as a world heritage site.

It was Cambodia's constant refusal to make such a joint undertaking that had caused problems, said Mr Virachai.

Cambodia's call for the withdrawal of Thai troops was merely designed to clear the disputed land and create a buffer zone under its management plan for the temple, he said.

Thailand is willing to comply with the injunction or any provisional measures on the Preah Vihear case that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivers on July 18, foreign minister's secretary Chavanond Intarakomalyasut said yesterday.

"But for the sake of justice, we hope the court rejects Cambodia's request," Chavanond said after meeting with caretaker Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya on the matter.

Kasit will be present with a Thai delegation to hear the verdict at The Hague's Peace Palace, he said.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong will also be present, spokesman Koy Kuong said yesterday.

Phnom Penh has asked the court to clarify the scope and meaning of the 1962 ruling on Preah Vihear. As it awaits the interpretation, it has also asked the court to set provisional measures forcing Thailand to withdraw its troops, banning them from any military activities in the area or taking any action that could violate Cambodia's rights.

During a court hearing in May, Thai representative Virachai Plasai argued that the Kingdom had fully complied with the court's ruling since 1962, and thus the case had no grounds and should be removed.

In 1962, the court ruled that Preah Vihear Temple was on land that came under the sovereignty of Cambodia and ordered Thai troops and personnel to withdraw from the temple and its vicinity.

Though Thailand complied with the ruling, it continued insisting that the land surrounding the temple came under its sovereignty and hence Cambodia could not use the area in relation to Preah Vihear's World Heritage designation.

The two countries have been at loggerheads over the area adjacent to the temple since Cambodia got the temple listed as a World Heritage Site in 2008. The Abhisit government made several attempts over the past few years to block Cambodia from managing the ancient temple.

The dispute caused border skirmishes in the area near the temple in 2008, 2009, and again this year, which claimed more than a dozen lives on both sides. Even now, the troops are ready for a confrontation.

On April 28, Cambodia asked the court to clarify the 1962 ruling because bilateral mechanisms had failed to settle the conflict.

Chavanond anticipates that the court will issue one of the following temporary measures: granting Cambodia's request; rejecting it; or delivering a different order that both countries are legally obliged to comply with.

Even though Pheu Thai won a landslide victory on July 3, garnering 265 MPs out of the total 500 MPs in the House of Representatives, the honeymoon period may be short as there are impending problems within and outside the party waiting for Yingluck Shinawatra's coalition government, notes Post Today.

Though Pheu Thai can form a single-party government, Ms Yingluck is opting to form a coalition government with five other small parties to reach a total of 300 MPs for political stability.

However, the political situation is still very divisive as Pheu Thai has won the hearts of the poor people in the North and Northeast but has failed to convince the middle classes that the party is good for them.

Countrywide the Pheu Thai Party won 265 seats but lost 10-23 to the Democrats in Bangkok.

This is a bad omen that if Ms Yingluck administers the country and fails to solve economic problems as promised, the frugal acceptance of Bangkok's middle classes of the election result could turn hostile quickly.

To rule the country for a long time, every government must cater to all classes, not only the grass roots but the middle classes and the elite as well. On this point, former premier Thaksin Shinawatra has already had an expensive lesson. The main challenge for the next government is Ms Yingluck herself. Having no political experience is a huge handicap in trying to steer the government through its four-year term. Let's take a look at two nominee premiers: Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat. Both had extensive experience in dealing with the Thai bureaucracy. The late Samak was a political veteran with unmatched oratorical skill. Yet after administering the country for only nine months, he was stripped of his post by the Constitution Court for hosting a cooking show and earning an income while still being Thailand's prime minister. Thaksin's brother-in-law Somchai fared worse. After only three months in office, he was stripped of his post along with the dissolution of People Power Party by the Constitution Court, prompting the switch of political alliances and the Democrats coming to power.

With no political experience, can Ms Yingluck withstand all the political pressure? She may have used her female charm of being modest and compromising to win a landslide election. But these seemingly strong traits may become her weakness if she is perceived as being indecisive and wishy-washy when she leads the next government.

It is true that the present political situation is unlike the times of Thaksin, Samak and Somchai, but opposition figures including the People's Alliance for Democracy and the armed forces are still there. The most important issue that can ignite the divisiveness again is a political amnesty, even though Ms Yingluck has insisted all along that it is not for Thaksin alone. This is true and the proposed amnesty law should cover all political offences on both sides since the coup of Sept 19, 2006. It is possible that a constitution drafting council can be established to draw up a new constitution and that the amnesty law is an appendix to the new constitution.

Apart from the hot issue of a political amnesty, Ms Yingluck has to face competing interests within the Pheu Thai Party itself. Over the past few years, Thaksin used so many core leaders of Pheu Thai and the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship to try to seize back power, resulting in several red shirt leaders being incarcerated and facing criminal/terrorism charges. Now that Pheu Thai has won, it is payback time.

After giving a few ministerial posts to coalition partners, there will be 27-28 ministerial posts left, and it is an axiom in Thai politics that factional fights result when the cake is not divided satisfactorily. It was the case with Samak's regime and the Somchai administration. This is one of the reasons that we see version II of Cobra politics when Newin Chidchob led a faction to defect from Pheu Thai to form a new party Bhumjaithai and allied it with the Democrat Party to form a new coalition government.

If Thaksin grants UDD or Pheu Thai leaders who are charged with criminal offences cabinet posts in the new government, it will shake the goodwill the party gained in the landslide. People who voted for the Pheu Thai Party expect it to place capable people in the cabinet and that the party should avoid re-igniting the social division between the people in Bangkok and the provinces.

Another thorny point is the relationship between Pheu Thai and strongman Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha who stands opposite Yingluck and Thaksin politically. If Yingluck and Thaksin rush to seize control of the army, the opposition will intensify.

Meanwhile Thaksin and Pheu Thai's core leaders are trying to salvage his sullied image about loyalty to the monarchy. If Ms Yingluck does what she promises to organise the 84th birthday celebration of His Majesty the King in a very grand manner, this may create conflicts within the UDD and Pheu Thai. Some leaders criticised Bhumjaithai as being spendthrift in organising HM the King's birthday celebrations in the past, saying the festivities wasted money.

Another issue that might be a time bomb is the insistence of UDD leaders not to compromise with the elite (amataya), which is not the position of the official Pheu Thai Party which wants to move forward on this issue. If Pheu Thai succeeds in pushing for political amnesty for all including army leaders who suppress the red shirts, it may incur the wrath of red shirt leaders who insist all along that those who killed the people must be punished.

So Ms Yingluck's administration may not have a long honeymoon period, judging from conflicts within and outside Pheu Thai. This does not count how the new government implements several populist policies promised during the election campaign which likely will rattle the country's fiscal stability. If Pheu Thai fails to implement all of the promises, the party may not last long, come the next general election.

The first female prime minister of Thailand does not have it easy. She must be wary and tread carefully if she wants to survive the full term.

The overwhelming victory of Pheu Thai gladdened the party's supporters while the defeat of the Democrat Party has saddened its loyalists, notes Thai Rath.

It is a new phenomenon that the victors are not ridiculing the losers in various social media, while the losers are not expressing so much anger and frustration. No one can guarantee such a tone of reconciliation can last forever.

The Democrat Party leaders may wonder why it lost so much. Thai Rath does not think that the party's 159 seats in the House of Representatives is too bad because the party has still been successful in Bangkok and the South.

The trouble is the party did not gain a single seat from the new constituencies at all, but lost quite a few in some provinces including Chon Buri where the party won eight seats four years ago, but only a single seat this time.

Nonthaburi, Phathum Thani and Samut Prakan used to have Democrat MPs, but not even a single seat was won this time.

Though the Democrats won in Bangkok with 23 seats, they conceded 10 seats to Pheu Thai.

With such a dismal display, the party could only have hoped to come back if its partner Bhumjaithai was able to win big. But Bhumjaithai managed to score only 34 out of an expected 70 seats.

Some core leaders of the Democrats and Bhumjaithai are trying to blame the money factor but in reality the two parties know full well that money did not play a decisive role this time because of the popularity tide and the constant mass mobilising by Pheu Thai, especially its red shirt wing.

The Democrats must learn a lesson if they want to come back and win in the next general election. The party should not wait for Pheu Thai to commit political suicide as was the case with Thai Rak Thai and People Power Party in the past. The Democrats must overhaul its political organisation.

It is not enough to use the same old strategy of stumping and meeting the electorate only when a general election is due.

As the core leader in the government, the Democrats knew full well how Pheu Thai, especially its red shirt network, operates in Isan and the North to drum up support for Thaksin and Ms Yingluck.

With more than 11 million votes cast for its party-list candidates, the Democrats should be able to pin-point its strengths and weakness in various constituencies and adjust its campaigning style to build support.

This is possible when the party does not have to be worried about administering the country and has much free time to engage in boosting mass support for the party.

This the Democrats must do along with the strict monitoring of the Pheu Thai-led coalition government and that it must be carried out constructively as stated by the party's caretaker leader Abhisit Vejjajiva.

If the Democrats do not reform, the party's popularity will continue to wane. It is not enough to depend on its reputation as being the most established and oldest political institution in Thailand. It is also not enough to wait for Pheu Thai to stumble as Thaksin should have learned his lessons well.

If a terminally ill patient exercises his right to refuse treatment to prolong his life as allowed by the Public Health Ministry's regulation in compliance with Section 12 of National Health Act 2007, what should doctors do?

On this point Dr Phornthep Sirivanarangsan, deputy permanent secretary and chairman of a working committee to implement the regulation, states that after receiving such a letter, the team of doctors must verify that the letter is genuine and expresses the wish of the terminally ill patient.

Secondly, the team of doctors must verify that the concerned patient is terminally ill.

Third, the team of doctors must verify whether the patient's wish is in accord with his relatives.

If these three steps are followed, the health professionals should be relieved that they will not face malpractice suits in the future, reports Thai Rath.

Dr Prateep Thanakitcharoen, deputy secretary general of National Health Security Office, debunks the misconception that those patients who renounce the right to treatment to prolong their lives under Section 12 will not be entitled to basic monetary compensation in case of medical error according to Section 41 of the National Health Act.

He says that Section 12 and Section 41 are two different issues, not related. Section 41 is aimed at helping those who hold universal health cards (gold cards) who suffer from medical error with no need to prove who is at fault. The basic monetary compensation does help in reducing the law suits, good for both patients and medical personnel.

The Democrat Party of Friday initiated legal action seeking the dissolution of the Pheu Thai Party, filing a complaint with the Election Commission about the involvement of banned politicians.

The outgoing ruling party asked the Election Commission to recommend that the rival Puea Thai Party, which won the July 3 general election, be disbanded on the grounds that banned politicians were involved in its election campaign.

Democrat legal team member Wirat Kallayasiri said some of the 111 executive members of the dissolved Thai Rak Thai Party who were banned from politics for five years in 2008 - including ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra and Thai Rak Thai deputy leader Chaturon Chaisang - have been more involved in Pheu Thai's activities than the actual Pheu Thai executive members.

"Some members of 'House No.111' were involved in choosing party list and constituency candidates, and they also determine the policies of Pheu Thai, such as 'Thaksin Thinks, Pheu Thai acts'," Mr Wirat said.

Article 97 of the constitution clearly states that executives from any disbanded party are prohibited from being involved with any other party during the suspension period, he said.

The Democrats would like the EC to take action because if Thaksin and Chaturon were found guilty of breaching the charter, Thaksin and Chaturon should be banned from politics for five more years, he added.

Prime minister-apparent Yingluck Shinawatra today rejected as baseless reports that she planned to go to Hong Kong to meet elder brother Thaksin on Sunday to discuss the cabinet lineup.

Ms Yingluck said she was too busy working on drafting the policies of the incoming government to be delivered to parliament.

"I have no plan to go to Hong Kong and will remain in Bangkok," she said.

She also had no knowledge about reports that members of the Matchima faction would defect from the Bhumjaithai Party to join Pheu Thai in forming the government. Whether they would even be accepted would rest with the party executive, she said.

She was confident that the selection of cabinet members will not lead to internal rifts in Pheu Thai.

"The selection will be based on principles and I believe it will be acceptable by all parties concerned. There might be a difference of opinions among party members, but that does not mean conflict," Ms Yingluck said.

Pheu Thai deputy leader Plodprasop Suraswadi insisted that his party will not accept Bhumjaithai as its ally in the coalition government.

He said the party's executive committee had already made it clear that it would not work with the Bhumjaithai Party, so it was not possible that Bhumjaithai's Matchima faction, led by Somsak Thepsuthin, would be accepted if it wanted to defect.

Mr Plodprasop said Pheu Thai already has 300 of the 500 parliamentary seats.

"We don't like to steal MPs from other parties, like some parties did to Pheu Thai in the past.

"Right now our focus is on carrying out our policies and solving people's problems," Mr Plodprasop said.

Pheu Thai core member Pongpan Sunthornchai took the same tone, saying Pheu Thai should not bring a "snake" from Bhumjaithai into the party.

Earlier, Mr Somsak urged Bhumjaithai to elect Pheu Thai's top party list candidate Yingluck as the country's 28th and first female prime minister.

On 06 July 2011, the Cambodian ministry of DIS-Information issued an announcement forbidding all administrators of radio, TV stations, websites, newspapers, magazines or bulletins from using the word "coup d'état" to designate the [Hun Xen] coup d'état which took place on 05-06 July 1997.

The content of the announcement which RFA received on 08 July showed that, recently, a number of news media have published information on the 5-6 July 1997 event by calling it a coup d'état. The min. of DIS-Information indicated that the use of this word can lead to misperception from the public.

The letter stressed that, regarding the 5-6 July event, the government already published a book about this event and that it was caused by internal dispute in the government that led to the armed clash. In addition to the "white paper" issued by the Cambodian ministry of Foreign Affairs, it also published a paper titled "Crisis in July" on 09 July 1997 as well.

Nevertheless, Khieu Kanhchharith, the min. of DIS-Information requested that all news media pay attention and publish properly on the 5-6 July 1997 event according to the truthful situation in Cambodia.

Regarding this issue, Hang Chakra, the editor of the Khmer Machas Srok newspaper, said that, in the past, his newspaper also published information on the 5-6 July 1997 by labeling it a "coup d'état", however, later on he had to issue a correction because he did not want to face a legal lawsuit with the government. According to Hang Chakra, all reporters should allow the public to make their own judgment on the 5-6 July event.

Hang Chakra added: "I have no reaction against this, whether it is a coup d'état or not, we should leave it to the public and the national and international communities to reflect on it and to value it."

Similar to Hang Chakra, Moeun Chheanrith, the director of the Cambodian Institute for Information Study, indicated that, for the 5-6 July event, reporters should publish comments made by political party VIPs on this event, but that they should not evaluate this event on their own.

He added that, regarding the event which took place on 05-06 July or similar other events, reporters must be careful in what they write in order to avoid any legal lawsuit against them: "News organizations should pull ourselves far from or be above this event and we should only quote the source of information or politicians. If a politician call this a coup d'état, it is fine for reporters to quote this word, there is nothing wrong with that."

Regarding this issue, a high-ranking Funcinpec official refused to comment on what to call the event which took place on 05-06 July 1997.

An official of the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) declared that the government should not comment on this event.

Pen Sangha, spokesman for the NRP, said that Cambodians inside the country and overseas, as well as the international community, already knew about the cause of the 05-06 July event.

Pen Sangha added: "Regarding 05-06 July, I believe that the label for it already existed since the day of the event. Therefore, I believe that there should not be all these set terms, and the people already know a part of this problem also."

Nevertheless, the letter from the min. of DIS-Information signed by Khieu Kanhchharith, did not indicate any legal pursuit or penalty on publishing media which continue to call the 05-06 July 1997 a coup d'état, it only call for an end to the publications that label the event a coup d'état.

TWO villagers from the Boeung Kak lakeside were arrested following a scuffle with police yesterday as about 200 villagers submitted a petition after their request for onsite resettlement was rejected by municipal authorities on Tuesday.

Tep Vanny, representative of village 22 and Nun Sokheng, representative of village 23, were arrested and sent to the Municipal Police Commissioner's Office in Russei Keo district after protesters submitted a petition to British ambassador Andrew Mace. The petition requested intervention after villagers' request for 4x16-metre houses for more than 1,000 families living at Boeung Kak lakeside was rejected in a letter signed by municipal governor Kep Chuktema on July 5.

"We will make a request to the government to allow you all to live [at Boeung Kak] … after municipal officials finish their measurement [of the land]," the letter said.

Tol Srey Pao, a representative of residents from village 24, said yesterday: "Why did authorities arrest us as we just protested for residents to live ... in the Boeung Kak area?" Villagers said that the two representatives had not yet been released.

City Hall issued a statement on its website yesterday afternoon accusing villagers of pressuring municipal authorities.

Local developer Shukaku Inc was granted a 99-year lease to develop land around the Boeung Kak lakeside in 2007.

Municipal deputy police commissioner Hy Prou yesterday referred questions to municipal police chief Touch Naruth, who could not be reached for comment.

AN advisor to Senate President Chea Sim is allegedly raising money to build a US$5.53 billion Angkor Wat-style temple in Svay Rieng province, officials said yesterday. However, a number of people claim the project is a fraud.

Chhoem Mono acts as both an advisor to Chea Sim and president of the Community Buddhist Supporting for Cambodia Organisation, an NGO seeking financial support from "various international donors" to build the temple, said CBSCO Deputy President Chan Sokeath.

He claimed his organisation was approved by the Ministry of Interior in 2003 and planned to build 13 temples in the model of Angkor Wat.

The temples will be built from "cement and brick, not from the original stone such as that from an ancient temple", he said, though construction has not yet started on the project.

"We will take a very long time to finish the construction of the temple, and after that we will hand it over as a national asset for the government," he said. Chan Sokeath said CBSCO so far has built only a Buddhist school on the site in Andong Trabak commune in Svay Rieng's Romeas Hak district.

District police chief Shum Ry confirmed the presence of the school, adding that intermittent construction of some kind at the site has been going on for at least three years.

Chhoem Mono claimed he had received money from Chinese donors, Shum Ry said, though "he did not mention whether it was Chinese business or government officials" who made the donations.

Chhoem Mono is said to be touting a number of apparently fake documents, seen by The Post, including a letter of support from the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts and a blueprint of the temple with the ministry's seal, to convince potential donors his project is real.

Among the documents, which are fraught with misspellings, is a list of projects planned by CBCSO. Those include the Svay Rieng temple, "premary schools", a "drincing wateir well", and a "wasted treatment plant facility", among others, totalling $19.63 billion.

Also included is an apparently forged letter of intent from Barclays Bank to release billions of euros to a person named as Bradley L Heinrich. There is no information as to how Heinrich is connected to Chhoem Mono, and Barclays said it was company policy not to disclose information about clients.

Chhoem Mono also reportedly carries with him an "award contract" that implies $500 million has been transferred between someone named Tony Nin Thorng, an alleged 70-year-old Cambodian holding a Canadian passport, and an account at ANZ Royal Bank held by Chhoem Mono.

The letter, dated April 2007, is from an organisation called the Tofic Foundation in Montreal, Canada. The Post could find no proof of such a foundation, and a man speaking Mandarin who answered the listed number said he had no knowledge of the organisation.

ANZ Royal Bank Chief Executive Officer Stephen Higgins said the project, and the documents used to legitimise it, were a fraud. "The common feature to a lot of these scams is using implausibly large

numbers, which seems to convince some people that it is a legitimate transaction," he said.

He said that, to his knowledge, no Cambodian bank has ever received a one-time transfer of $500 million and only four banks had total deposits of more than that amount. "The Cambodian economy could not cope with a one-off cash infusion of that size. It is an out and out fraud," he said.

Higgins said fraudsters often use ANZ Royal's name to lend legitimacy to their transactions, "but we simply don't get associated with people such as this".

ANZ Royal first heard of the alleged scam when a man who said his family had been duped into investing in the project brought the documents to one of the bank's Phnom Penh branches. The man declined to speak with the press, as he feared for the safety of his family.

Chhoem Mono could not be reached for comment. Officials at the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts said they were unaware of the construction in Romeas Hak district, while officials at the Ministry of Cults and Religions said they did not know of CBSCO. Khieu Sopheak, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, also said he had not heard of CBSCO.

Cambodia has seen 369% rise in processed rice exports in 1-H of this year, compared to the same period last year, showed the statistics from the Ministry of Commerce's Camcontrol Department Thursday.

From January to June 2011, the country had exported 80,442 tonnes of milled rice to European markets and other countries, up 369% from 17,144 tonnes at the same period last year, while the export value jumped to US$45.7M, 241% up from US$13.4M.

Khuon Savuth, Chief of the Camcontrol Department's statistics division, said the sharp rise was due to the tax exception for Cambodian rice by the European countries and Cambodia's improvement of processed rice quality.

"In addition, drought and flood in some European countries also leads to increasing demand of rice from Cambodia," he added.

Cambodia has 3.9 million tonnes of rice paddies, in equivalent to 2.5 million tonnes of milled rice, left over for exports this year, according to the government report.

However, this country can export only the small amount of its milled rice due to the lack of sophisticated post-harvesting technology.

The country needs roughly US$350M to invest in hi-tech post harvest technology and to purchase rice paddies from farmers for processing in order to achieve its self-imposed target of 1-Million-Ton rice exports by Y 2015.

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A senior official at the UN-backed tribunal said Thursday the Trial Chamber of the court will hold a hearing in August to determine whether three of four jailed regime leaders will be healthy enough to stand trial.

Judge Nil Nonn, head of the Trial Chamber, said in a statement the court had received confidential health reports on Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, who are charged with atrocity crimes alongside Khieu Samphan.

The extra hearing will be held just one month before the trial is scheduled to begin in September.

The declining health of the aging leaders is an ongoing concern for Cambodians who have waited decades for them to have their day in court.

Ieng Sary, who will soon be 86, has heart problems. His wife, Ieng Thirith, 79, has insomnia, along with eye problems. And Nuon Chea, who is 85, has high blood pressure.

Their defense lawyers have sought to have them excused from detention, or even trial, on health grounds.

Tribunal spokesman Lars Olsen said the court will inform the public after it decides on how their failing health may affect a trial.

An interview on Candle Light Radio.

Mention Asia and many people immediately think of China and India—giants that are powering the world economy. But Southeast Asia, a sub-region of ten countries that lives in the shadow of its two large neighbors, is also a thriving trade and economic hub.

At first glance, the countries of Southeast Asia—bound by many regional trade and political agreements—seem to make no sense together. After all, the region includes a small, rich, oil kingdom (Brunei); a post-conflict society (Cambodia); and a wealthy entrepôt economy (Singapore). In addition, there is an autarkic country that has been under military rule since 1962 (Myanmar); a poor, landlocked economy blessed with hydropower and minerals (Laos); and a populous nation whose growth rates rival China's (Vietnam), not to mention four diverse middle-income economies that aspire to join the ranks of advanced countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand).1

Nevertheless, the countries share a strategic location and access to plentiful natural resources. Furthermore, their diversity and increasing integration lie at the heart of the region's rapid and resilient economic growth. Politically, the region provides stability in a part of the world that is rapidly reshaping the global balance of power. As a result, its continued development—which depends on investments in infrastructure and education, as well as improvements in business climate—is important for the rest of the world.

Southeast Asia's ten countries have a combined GDP of $1.9 trillion (bigger than India); a population of almost 600 million people (nearly twice that of the United States); and an average per-capita income near that of China. Over the last decade, the countries have averaged a growth rate of more than 5 percent per year. If Southeast Asia were one country, it would be the world's ninth largest economy. It would also be the most trade-dependent, with a trade-to-GDP ratio in excess of 150 percent, and one of the world's consistently good performers.

In the 1970s, several of the region's countries were singled out for their economic promise. Singapore was deemed an "Asian tiger" (along with Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), while Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand were dubbed "tiger cubs." All five countries have since lived up to those names, with Singapore now a high-income economy and the four cubs all middle-income economies. The latest member of Southeast Asia's middle-income group, Vietnam, has adopted China's economic model and enjoyed similarly explosive growth and poverty reduction, albeit combined with episodes of overheating.

Though the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis briefly stalled their steady progress, the cubs have averaged an impressive 7 percent annual growth rate since 2000. And, despite being hit hard by the Great Recession, the middle-income countries recovered smartly in 2010. In fact, the entire sub-region performed impressively, growing at over 8 percent, as rapid policy adjustments helped soften the blows of the crisis and enabled a quick rebound that also helped the broader global recovery.

In part, Southeast Asia owes its success to geography. The countries sit astride the Malacca Straits, the world's second busiest shipping channel (after the English Channel) and second most popular oil tanker route (after the Straits of Hormuz). Well over half of the world's merchant fleet capacity uses the channel each year, and closing the Straits would be highly disruptive and possibly even catastrophic for world trade.

The sub-region is also a cornucopia of natural wealth, replete with oil, hydro- and geothermal power, various minerals, timber, rice, palm oil, cocoa, and coffee. Over the centuries, these resources have attracted traders, colonists, and, most recently, foreign investors. The resources have also pushed the region into commodities trading, giving its countries some of the world's highest trade-to-GDP ratios.2

Southeast Asia's abundant natural resources also provided the springboard for industrialization in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the tiger cubs. These countries adopted the export-oriented policies of their successful northern neighbors—Japan, Korea, and Taiwan—helped by trade, finance, and foreign direct investment from the advanced economies. Additionally, sound macroeconomic management, relatively open trading systems, high savings rates, and a rapidly growing, young labor force permitted high levels of investment and sustained rapid growth for three decades. Vietnam's industrialization started later, in the 1990s. Today, all these economies are part of the famed and highly competitive East Asian production network, along with China.

Southeast Asia's natural resources have also helped its services sector. Singapore's location in the Malacca Straits has made it the world's largest transshipment port, strengthening its logistics, finance, and business services. Meanwhile, the four tiger cubs have developed a large tourism industry, accounting for the bulk of Southeast Asia's foreign visitors (67 million in 2010, outstripping China's 56 million). More recently, exciting new services trends have emerged there, with Singapore pushing to become a global biomedical sciences center and Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, establishing itself as a global center of Islamic finance.

In addition, all ten Southeast Asian nations belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a 45 year-old regional organization that has promoted economic integration and aims to create an Economic Community—a single market for goods, services, investments, and skilled labor—by 2015. While many observers question the feasibility of this deadline, ASEAN has already lowered trade tariffs and established a Free Trade Area among its members. Ironically, trade within ASEAN has grown less rapidly than ASEAN's trade with China, a trend that the China-ASEAN free trade agreement, which came into effect in the beginning of 2010, will only accentuate.

Perhaps even more importantly, ASEAN has also played a pivotal stabilizing role in both the region and the world, confounding critics who have periodically predicted its imminent demise since its founding in 1967. Since that time, no war has erupted among its members, as the organization has mediated conflicts.3 The organization has also worked to resolve the dispute over the resource-rich Spratly Islands, which could block U.S. access to the Indian Ocean as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim land.

ASEAN's political and economic usefulness has drawn in other countries. In 1999, China, Japan, and Korea institutionalized their partnership with ASEAN through ASEAN+3. The expanded group's successes include a new mechanism for providing liquidity during a financial crisis (a reaction to the perceived heavy-handedness of the IMF during the Asian financial crisis) and a pledge to establish a regional 720,000-ton rice reserve facility after the 2011 international food crisis. Both initiatives are important building blocks for enhancing the sub-region's economic stability. And, by including Japan and China, ASEAN+3 has helped lower the tensions between the two countries.

ASEAN is engaging with even more countries through the East Asian Summit (EAS), first held in 2005, which brings ASEAN+3 together with Australia, India, and New Zealand. This group has been less successful in introducing concrete initiatives, but both the United States and Russia have lobbied hard to join the next summit in October, providing proof of the group's perceived potential. The United States, in particular, is interested in Southeast Asia, given its potential to help America maintain access to the Indian Ocean and serve as a counterweight to China. Additional reasons include the U.S. role as the sub-region's largest foreign market and investor, and the pivotal role Indonesia plays in the global war on terror.4

Of course, no region is devoid of challenges and risks. For Southeast Asia, China's emergence in the next two decades as the world's largest economy poses arguably the biggest challenge. While this will bring enormous opportunities, it will also bring equally important risks. As China confronts economic, social, environmental, and international challenges, Southeast Asia will undoubtedly be buffeted by any instability that may emerge. Equally important, Southeast Asian policymakers view China's regional dominance as a possible security risk—a concern that has been highlighted by recent incidents near the Spratly Islands.

The tiger cubs' economic development presents another worry. In the last half-century, few countries have made the transition from middle- to high-income on the strength of their manufacturing and services. They must move up the value chain, but competing with the advanced economies requires many prerequisites—a highly educated and innovative workforce, a culture of excellence, entrepreneurial skills, access to finance and infrastructure (needed especially in Indonesia and the Philippines), and a competitive business environment. Southeast Asia's middle income economies are gradually putting these in place, but their efforts will need to be more vigorous and coordinated if genuine progress is to be achieved.

In the next year or two, Southeast Asian economies will face a bumpy ride as growth slows to a more sustainable 5 percent a year—not just because the international economic environment is becoming more sluggish, but also because inflationary pressures in the sub-region are prompting tighter macroeconomic policies, and commodity prices have become more volatile.

Just as importantly, Thailand and Malaysia are expected to see continuing political tensions. The victory of the Pheu Thai Party in Thailand's general elections last weekend has opened a new phase of uncertainty there. And Malaysia's national elections, expected within a year, could bring ethnic and political tensions to the surface again.

Still, Southeast Asia's overall long-term economic prospects remain bright. The same forces that fueled growth in the past—sound macroeconomic management, open trading systems, favorable demographic trends, and relatively high savings rates—will re-emerge. Rapid and steady growth in India and China will also help. Already, the sub-region is proving to be an indispensable source of energy, raw materials, and parts and components for China's rapidly growing manufacturing sector, and its production linkages with India are growing apace.

Most importantly, however, the sub-region's middle-income economies must move up the value chain to further their economic prosperity. If they accomplish this, Southeast Asia, now in the shadow of its two giant neighbors, could well become home to full-fledged tigers and dragons.

Vikram Nehru is a consultant for the East Asia Region of the World Bank and will soon join Carnegie as a Senior Associate.

Yingluck Shinawatra will soon emerge as Thailand's first female prime minister. Her election victory clearly indicates that the majority of Thais disapproved of politics à la Abhisit Vejjajiva. The past 30 months under Abhisit's rule were marked by bloody protests and brutal crackdowns on demonstrators. Yingluck surely wants to get her priorities right so as to avoid the mistakes made by the previous regime as well as her own brother, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

Yingluck's top priority will be to heal the rift in Thai society. She is expected to concentrate on the ongoing reconciliation process. But this focus must not overshadow other equally significant priorities, including the necessity to promote Thailand's role on the international stage. Yingluck will need to exercise her leadership both within and outside the country. It is now time for Thailand to reinvent itself and to regain a deserved global stature. In other words, she urgently needs a new kind of diplomacy.

When Thaksin served as prime minister from 2001-2006, Thai diplomacy underwent a series of overhauls. Some of these changes were cosmetic, while others were substantial. Thaksin launched a number of unambiguous foreign policy initiatives. He obviously wanted to conquer the world with his ambitious programmes, ranging from the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Ayeyawady-Mekong-Chao Phraya Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), and the conclusion of several free trade agreements.

Inside the walls of the foreign ministry, Thai ambassadors were appointed as CEOs of their embassies. They could still sip a glass of champagne under an opulent chandelier, but they also had to perform as the country's salesmen. The overwhelming power in the hands of Thai envoys along with the business-centric diplomacy reflected Thaksin's troubling view of governance. He was accused of exploiting diplomacy to enrich his family business. The soft loans offered to Burma exemplified how foreign policy could be used for accumulating personal wealth, and not national interests.

During the early days of the Abhisit administration, it seemed that the foreign ministry under the leadership of Kasit Piromya, an anti-Thaksin figure, was keen to steer away from the flawed Thaksin system. I was led to believe that the Abhisit regime would recognise the benefit of promoting principles, rather than just pure profit as far as Thai diplomacy was concerned. As it turned out, Thailand under the Abhisit-Kasit axis lost both principles and profits. Diplomacy was this time employed to undermine political opponents. The Preah Vihear issue was testimony to how diplomacy was hijacked by the narrow interests of Thai power-holders.

This is an opportunity for Yingluck to repair the tainted image of Thai diplomacy. As Yingluck has no prior experience in the field of diplomacy, we are unlikely to see any grandiose foreign policy initiatives under the Pheu Thai government. But this fact does not necessarily prevent Thailand from acting as a responsible nation or a responsible member of regional society.

First, Yingluck could look into rejuvenating the Thai position in Asean. Asean used to serve as a cornerstone of Thai foreign policy. Yet, both the Thaksin and Abhisit regimes paid little attention to this regional organisation. During the Thai chairmanship of Asean (2008-2009), regional affairs were eclipsed by domestic violence in Thailand. The Abhisit government failed to stop the red-shirt protesters from interrupting the Asean summit in Pattaya in April 2009. That embarrassing incident showed the extent to which both sides of the Thai crisis expressed their disrespect for Asean.

Let's assume that the Yingluck administration will complete its full four-year term. She will then witness Asean achieving its community-building goal in 2015. Yingluck is therefore obliged to ensure that Thailand fulfil all the requirements necessary to meet that goal. To strengthen the political and security community, for example, Thailand under Yingluck may want to rebuild a meaningful dialogue with Cambodia on the conflict over Preah Vihear both through bilateral and regional mechanisms.

Yingluck must restore Thai faith in Asean, and in particular, its existing dispute-settlement mechanisms. Abhisit's insistence on a bilateral approach was surreal. Thailand and Cambodia are not the only two nations in Southeast Asia. Conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border has impacted negatively on the whole region, particularly on regional peace and security.

Indeed, Thai-Cambodian relations have been erratic over the past few years. In 2008, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) politicised the Preah Vihear dispute so as to undermine the Samak Sundaravej government. The PAD stirred up a sense of nationalism to achieve its political objective, at the expense of worsening Thai ties with Cambodia.

Kasit then launched a personal crusade to tarnish the dignity of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. As a result, the Thai-Cambodian relationship has been left in a messy, and somewhat dangerous, state.

Yingluck must mend these ties, bearing in mind the fact that we can choose our friends but not our neighbours. The so-called elitist regime under Abhisit found it hard to be nice to its next door neighbour; perhaps this was a part of playing to the snobbish Thai elite. A responsible nation, however, will not jeopardise foreign relations to satisfy its domestic agenda. Yingluck has two choices here: either being another snobbish elite or a responsible nation that deserves respect from its Cambodian neighbour.

HCM CITY — EVN International Joint Stock Company, a subsidiary of Electricity of Viet Nam Corp (EVN), is hastening work on its hydroelectric projects in Cambodia and Laos.

The projects include the 400-MW Lower Se San 2 Hydro-power Project in Se San District of Cambodia's Stung Treng Province, which has been approved by the Cambodian Government.

EVN International Co (EVNI) contributed a 51 per cent stake and the local Royal Group a 49 per cent stake of the project, which will be carried out under the BOT (build-operate-transfer) investment form.

The Ministry of Industry, Mining and Energy of Cambodia has agreed to purchase 50 per cent of output from the Lower Se San 2 Plant, construction of which is scheduled to begin in 2012 and to be completed by the end of 2016.

EVNI are conducting negotiations on electricity selling prices and power purchase agreements (PPAs) with Cambodian authorities.

The company will also build a transmission line to sell the remaining 50 per cent of the plant's output to Viet Nam.

EVNI has completed a feasibility study on the 96-MW Lower Se San1/Se San 5 hydro-power plant in Ozdao District of Cambodia's Rattana Kiri province and Duc Co District in Viet Nam's Central Highlands province of Gia Lai.

The company also signed a memorandum of understanding with Cambodia's Ministry of Industry, Mining and Energy on jointly conducting a study on the 190-MW Sekong hydro-power project which requires investment of US$407 million.

In addition, EVNI is preparing for the 70-MW Nam Mo 1 Hydro-power Project in Laos' Sieng Khouang Province, which has a total investment of $119 million.

Phnom Penh - A Cambodian official claiming to raise money for a multibillion-dollar replica of Angkor Wat has been basing his campaign on dubious documentation, a newspaper said Friday.

Chhoem Mono, an adviser to Senate President Chea Sim, has been seeking support to build replicas of 13 of the temples in the 12th-century Angkor complex at a cost of 5.53 billion dollars, the Phnom Penh Post reported.

Questions have arisen in connection with some of the documents used in the campaign by his organization, the Community Buddhist Supporting for Cambodia Organisation.

The ANZ Royal Bank (Cambodia) Ltd also denied its alleged involvement with the project. Chhoem Mono claimed 500,000 dollars had been transferred into his account there as part of an 'award contract,' the report said.

But the bank's chief executive Stephen Higgins was quoted as saying that this claim could not be true because the bank has never handled such a large transaction.

The overall figures of the project have also prompted questions, the report said. They compare with Cambodia's gross domestic product, estimated as 10.45 billion dollars for 2009. But Higgins said 'implausibly large numbers' can sometimes 'convince some people that it is a legitimate transaction.'

ANZ Royal became suspicious when a man brought documents into one of its branches in Phnom Penh, saying his family had been duped into investing in the project, Higgins said.

The paper quoted Chan Sokeath, deputy president of Community Buddhist Supporting for Cambodia Organisation, as saying that the replica monuments in the south-eastern province of Svay Rieng would be handed to the state as a 'national asset' once finished.

Local police confirmed construction of some sort has been going on at a site linked to Chhoem Mono for at least three years, the paper said.

BANGKOK, July 8 (Xinhua) -- The International Court of Justice will on July 18 rule on Cambodia's request to have Thailand withdraw its soldiers from the land surrounding the ancient Preah Vihear temple.

"On Monday 18 July 2011, the International Court of Justice ( ICJ) ... will deliver its Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Cambodia in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear," the court said in a statement released on its website Thursday.

Following the latest fatal border fighting, Cambodia, on April 28, submitted a petition for interpretation of Court's 1962 judgment along with a request for the indication of provincial measures.

The provisional measures include immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Thai troops from the area around the 11th century temple, a ban on all Thai military activities in the area and refraining from interfere with Cambodia's rights.

The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April 1946. The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

In 1962, ICJ awarded the 900-year-old temple to Phnom Penh but both sides have laid claims over the ownership of a 4.6-square- kilometer (1.8 sq miles) scrub of land surrounding the ruins. Preah Vihear has been a flashpoint for both neighboring countries for decades, triggering several skirmishes along Thai-Cambodian border.

A leading local rights organization has issued a sharp warning to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, urging him to take a hard stance on the Khmer Rouge tribunal, which has come under increased scrutiny for its handling of a controversial case at the court.

The Cambodian Human Rights Center urged the UN not falter in handling trials of senior leaders, especially after Prime Minister Hun Sen told Ban in a meeting this year he would not allow more indictments at the court.

"The UN should not step backward on human rights and succumb to threat," Ou Virak, president of the rights group, told "Hello VOA" Wednesday. "It should work closely with the government and tell them that the role of the UN is not to help the government, but its people, through the cooperation with the government and civil society."

The UN-backed tribunal has come under increased pressure in recent months, after investigating judges concluded their work in Case 003, which has two suspects whose indictments Hun Sen objects to. Ban said in a statement last month that the UN was not ignoring that case and another, to refute media reports and concerns the UN was not fully pursuing trials against former Khmer Rouge.

Ou Virak said he asked the international agency to "send a message to the government that the UN can only work with the government so long as the cooperation is for the benefit of the people."

Cambodia's relations with the UN office have been strained in recent years. Cambodia threatened to expel the UN's country head earlier this year for comments he made over the anti-corruption law.

Koy Kuong, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said "some" UN representatives were working under their own "personal views," and not under the agreements the UN has made with the government. "Therefore, we only remind them to perform their work under the terms of agreement," he said.