KI Media: “Sowing the seeds of a lengthy conflict” plus 24 more |
- Sowing the seeds of a lengthy conflict
- Thailand, Cambodia agree to border truce
- Sout Al Horeya صوت الحريه " The sound of freedom"
- Why the world’s youth is in a revolting state of mind [-The Middle East situation reflects very well the ripe condition in Cambodia]
- Repression sharpens hunger for change [- A lesson for the dictatorial regime in Phnom Penh]
- The J-curve hits the Middle East [- Will this be an inspiration for Khmer from all walks of life to get up and fight for freedom, liberty and justice?]
- Speak Truth To Power: Voices from Beyond the Dark
- My Rights, My Responsibility (ICCPR) Series
- Month of LOVE
- My Rights, My Responsibility (Constitution) Series
- Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia
- Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia
- Indonesia Reiterates Need For Peaceful Resolution Of Thai-Cambodia Row
- Thai army meets Cambodian generals
- [Thai] PM admits border tension has impacted case against Veera and Ratree
- SRP MP Saumura Tioulong at UN Meeting in New York
- Politiktoons No. 144: The Universal Town Square
- Sinatoons No. 18: ASEAN
- CACJE's Invitation for 18 March 1970 Anniversary
- European Parliament resolution: Cambodia and Thailand are to respect ICJ Judgment 1962
- How to be a rich dictator- A DIY (Do It Yourself) guide by HE. Samdach Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Hun Sen
- From Dictatorship to Democracy - APPENDIX ONE: The Methods of Nonviolent Action
- UN Rep Investigates Land Dispute
- Negotiate toward success, not stalemate
- Resolving border conflicts takes wisdom [-Thai opinion]
| Sowing the seeds of a lengthy conflict Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:58 PM PST
20/02/2011 Bangkok Post Ironically, Cambodia, which was one of the leaders on the convention to ban cluster mines, backed out of signing it in December 2008 citing the Preah Vihear border conflict. Cambodia argued it was in no rush to sign, as Thailand was not yet a signatory. Cluster bombs are considered a major threat to civilian populations as they spread across a large area and can lay dormant for long periods of time. ALLEGED CLUSTER BOMB ATTACK ''My base was shelled between 3:15-4:10pm on Feb 4,'' said Lt Col Sok Min of the Cambodian border police in Svay Chrum. ''I was standing at the gate looking at the mountain and I heard the sound of a bomb approaching, and made it just in time to the bunker. ''The only thing I could hear was BOOM, pop, pop, pop _ like popcorn _ and all I could see was smoke.'' Border policeman Kim Samnang said the bombs were distinctive by their sound. ''I suspected there was something different when I heard the pop-pop-pop,'' he said. ''I had heard about bomblets [cluster munitions] in other provinces. ''At 6pm the next day, we turned on the generator to pump water and decided to watch the Sunday boxing. ''Someone came in with this thing with a white string and I put my hand up and told him to put it down,'' he said. Policeman Cheng Mol put it on the table and it exploded - killing two, and injuring eight. Samnang and Mol both lost forearms. They now share a ward at Siem Reap provincial hospital. ''I was injured by cluster munitions,'' Samnang told the Bangkok Post Sunday ''Two days ago, an NGO showed us a photo. It had slightly different colouring, but it's the same kind of bomblet. It looked like a cow bell or something,'' Mol said. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) arrived on the scene the morning after the explosion. ''I had never seen anything like them before, they're not like the American War bomblets,'' said Saem Ponnreay, CMAC Demining Unit 3 manager. ''People were playing with the things, spinning them in the air by their cords. We sent photos to headquarters and they confirmed that they were M42/46 submunitions. ''We had recently cleared this area. Now we have to come back.'' CMAC issued a statement on Feb 10 claiming that: ''During the cross-fire there [was] identified evidence of heavy artilleries such as 105mm, 130mm and 155mm used by Thai military, and CMAC experts have confirmed that these artilleries contained cluster munitions including M35, M42 and M46 types.'' Cluster Munition Coalition member Sister Denise Coughlin surveyed the situation this week. ''I am saddened by the suffering and displacement of people from both sides of the border. I witnessed with my own eyes, cluster munitions on the ground,'' she said. ''I have also spoken to the victims who identified the M46 as the munition that injured them. ''The use of cluster bombs causes devastating consequences years after the conflict. A friend of mine lost both his arms in 2004, from cluster munitions left over from the 70s. ''I dont want that to happen to anyone else.'' In a statement issued on Feb 10, the coalition, which represents 350 civil groups worldwide, asked both Thailand and Cambodia to clarify whether their armies had used cluster munitions in the recent conflict. According to the coalition, both countries have stockpiles of cluster munitions, but little is known about their status or composition. Cambodia has cited an ongoing review of its defence and security situation as the reason for its delay in joining the treaty, while Thailand says it has concerns over its ability to destroy its stockpile although it has said previously it would not use the weapons. CMAC faces a huge task, even if the fighting stops tomorrow. ''We don't know how many shells landed around here. Some could have fallen in unpopulated areas. There are 72 bomblets in every shell,'' Ponnreay said. ''Before we can let civilians back in, we need to educate them. We have reached 4,000 families in the camps and told them not to touch them, and to call our hotlines if they see one.'' When he appeared before the UN Security Council on Monday, Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya categorically denied ''the groundless accusation by Cambodia that Thailand used cluster munitions during the recent skirmishes''. Mr Kasit added that Thailand has been actively supporting disarmament efforts, including the elimination of cluster munitions. ''We are seriously considering joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions,'' he said. The army also strongly denied the Cambodian cluster bomb allegation.  | ||||
| Thailand, Cambodia agree to border truce Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:54 PM PST
'ALL IS WELL' AS TROOPS SIGN CEASEFIRE 20/02/2011 Wassana Nanuam Bangkok Post Thai and Cambodian troops signed a ceasefire agreement effective from noon yesterday. "All is well," said Second Army commander Thawatchai Samutsakhon after the agreement was sealed at a restaurant at the Chong Sa-ngam Pass border crossing in Si Sa Ket province. The ceasefire is a breakthrough in the raging border conflict following clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops in a disputed area near Si Sa Ket's Kantharalak district earlier this month. However, it is unclear if the ceasefire will be permanent. A previous truce had been called on Feb 5 but violence flared up again the next day. An army source said Lt Gen Thawatchai was part of the ceasefire-signing delegation led by Army chief-of-staff Daopong Rattanasuwan, who represented the Army Chief Prayuth Chan-ocha. The delegation also included armed forces specialist Nipat Thonglek and Suranaree Taskforce commander Chavalit Choonprasarn. The Cambodian side was led by deputy army commander Hun Manet, the son of Prime Minister Hun Sen. The ceasefire was inked after more than two hours of meetings, which ended at 12.30pm yesterday. The ceasefire took effect yesterday and the agreement contains seven other binding points. The other points are; no more troops are to be deployed in the conflict zones and the existing troops stationed there must not move; no heavy armaments and artillery in the conflict areas may be moved; neither side may attack the other using heavy weaponry; no building or structure of any kind may be constructed inside the disputed 4.6 square kilometre border zone; no more military bunkers are to be built; no more road construction is allowed; and the senior military officers of both countries are to communicate via a dedicated mobile phone hotline in discussing border issues. The arrangements over troops and weapons under the ceasefire agreement are pending future border negotiations at government level or until the next Asean ministerial meeting on Tuesday, which will be attended by all 10 member nations' foreign ministers. "What the soldiers must do now is observe the ceasefire," said the source. "The longer-term problems are for the respective governments to solve." Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon and his Cambodian counterpart, Teah Banh, will meet at the Thai-Camobodian General Border Committee session in the middle of the year. Lt Gen Hun Manet's involvement has raised Thailand's confidence that the ceasefire will be respected. But Thai security authorities have not ruled out a breach of the ceasefire as Cambodian troops do not always obey orders, the source said. The source added both sides were in agreement that neither country benefits from the prolonged fighting. The ceasefire meeting yesterday highlighted concerns over the precarious state of border security on Phu Makhua mountain in Si Sa Ket, which was the hotspot in the recent troop clashes. The source said that during the meeting yesterday, Lt Gen Hun Manet asked why the Thai government has allowed certain media outlets to attack Cambodia over the border violence. The outlets were understood to be controlled by the People's Alliance for Democracy, which has been highly critical of Cambodia in recent months. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said yesterday Unesco was sending a special envoy to hear both countries' take on the border dispute. However, the envoy will not travel to the Preah Vihear temple due to "diplomatic sensitivity". The envoy is expected to arrive in Thailand next week, Mr Abhisit said after a telephone conversation with Unesco director-general Irina Bokova yesterday. He said the director-general felt the contentious management of the area around Preah Vihear temple, declared a world heritage site by Unesco, should not proceed until the border dispute is resolved.  | ||||
| Sout Al Horeya صوت الحريه " The sound of freedom" Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:28 PM PST  | ||||
| Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:25 PM PST February 18 2011 By Martin Wolf Financial Times In both cases, the young will raise a cry that has surely been heard throughout the ages: "It is not fair." They are right, no doubt. It never is. But they should remember that the young will win in the end. It is only a matter of time – just more of it. In Tunisia and Egypt, the young are rebelling against old rulers. In Britain, they are in revolt against tuition fees. What do these young people have in common? They are suffering, albeit in different ways, from what David Willetts, the UK government's minister of higher education, called the "pinch" in a book published last year. In some countries, the challenge is an excess of young people; in others, it is that the young are too few. But where the young outnumber the old, they can hope to secure a better fate through the ballot box. Where the old outnumber the young, they can use the ballot box to their advantage, instead. In both cases, powerful destabilising forces are at work, bringing opportunity to some and disappointment to others. Demography is destiny. Humanity is in the grip of three profound transformations: first, a far greater proportion of children reaches adulthood; second, women have far fewer children; and, third, adults live far longer. These changes are now working through the world, in sequence. The impact of the first has been to raise the proportion of the population that is young. The impact of the second is the reverse, decreasing the proportion of young people. The third, in turn, increases the proportion of the population that is very old. The impact of the entire process is first to expand the population and, later on, to shrink it once again. Contrast Egypt and the UK. Back in 1954, British life expectancy was 70 and the proportion of children dying between the ages of zero and five was 30 per 1,000. In the same year, an Egyptian could expect to live to 44, while infant mortality was a horrifying 353 per 1,000. Fast-forward to 2009: UK life expectancy was up to 80 and its infant mortality down to 5.5 per 1,000. But Egyptian life expectancy was up to 70 and its infant mortality down to 21; an astonishing transformation. The figures for the number of children per woman over these years are just as dramatic, falling from 2.3 to 1.8 in the UK, and 6.5 to 2.8 in Egypt. In Iran it has fallen even further, from 7.0 to 1.8. Religion simply does not determine fertility. These are revolutionary changes, and ones that are happening far faster in developing countries than in the old advanced countries. Above all, these are happy developments: people are freed from fear of premature death; parents are freed from watching their children die young; and women are freed from endless childbirth. Martin Wolf's Exchange Martin Wolf elicits readers' views on current economic issues Such great changes always bring huge social upheavals. Many developing countries are in the early stages of the demographic transition. This means they have more young adults than they might have expected; as recently as 1985 Egyptian mothers still had an average of six children. High-income countries, meanwhile, are entering the final stage of this transition. Their baby-boomers are ageing, with fewer young adults to support them. In 2011, half of Egypt's population will be under 25, while 36 per cent will be aged from 15 to 35. These latter are angry young adults looking desperately for employment, in order at least to hope for normal family life. Meanwhile in the UK, where female fertility has been close to two for much longer, only 31 per cent are under 25, but 35 per cent over 50 (against only 15 per cent in Egypt). Thus, the middle-aged and elderly rig political and economic life for their benefit in the UK: hence the way in which policies on housing or education finance are weighted against the young. In Egypt, the young could easily outvote the elderly. Hence the urgency of the forces behind a democratic revolution that should transfer more power into their hands. Egypt is not the first developing country, nor will it be the last, to be rocked by the youthful majority, at one and the same time idealistic and frustrated. This, too, will pass. On current trends, the Egypt of 2040 is going to look rather more like the UK of today. According to the US census bureau, 26 per cent of the population will be over 50. But the UK will have moved onwards, as well: 41 per cent of its people could be over 50. The future is grey. In today's high-income countries, it will be very grey. Indeed, some advanced countries could be older than the UK: Italy is forecast to have 50 per cent of its people over 50 by 2040, with as many as 9 per cent over 80. As Shakespeare's Miranda might say in response: Oh brave old world! That has such ancients in it! For the countries with a young population, the immediate challenge is to create a dynamic economy that brings hope of gainful employment. It is surely the failure to do this that most threatens rule by gerontocrats such as Hosni Mubarak. The Chinese leadership is well aware of this imperative. Rulers with resource wealth can try to buy off their young. Those without it cannot. They must at least offer jobs. If they fail, they will lose power – and rightly so. The political challenge is to harness the energy of their young, without succumbing to the catastrophes that hit high-income countries at a similar demographic stage: war, first and foremost. Meanwhile, in high-income countries, older people must work longer than they expected, without making the young believe their opportunities are blocked for what must seem like an eternity. These countries must also balance the fiscal books as the populations age. In both cases, the young will raise a cry that has surely been heard throughout the ages: "It is not fair." They are right, no doubt. It never is. But they should remember that the young will win in the end. It is only a matter of time – just more of it. martin.wolf@ft.com  | ||||
| Repression sharpens hunger for change [- A lesson for the dictatorial regime in Phnom Penh] Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:20 PM PST February 18 2011 By Roula Khalaf Financial Times The day after Egypt's Hosni Mubarak was forced out, the joke in Cairo was that the long-time leader next door, the eccentric Muammer Gaddafi, had abolished Fridays. Both Mr Mubarak and Tunisia's Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali were ousted on a Friday and, curiously, they were swept away after delivering exactly three speeches, the last one on the day before their fall. Every new dawn, however, marks a threatening day for the Middle East's remaining autocratic rulers In Libya, activists had called for a Thursday protest on an emotionally charged day – the anniversary of the killing of demonstrators in a February 2006 protest against a Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed. But two days earlier, clashes between police and demonstrators erupted in Benghazi, Libya's second city, and spread to nearby towns. Colonel Gaddafi, in power since 1969 and with no desire to relinquish control, launched a brutal crackdown, leaving at least 24 people dead, according to New York-based Human Rights Watch. No sooner had Egyptians celebrated their revolution than the protests in Yemen intensified, posing the most serious challenge to President Ali Abdullah Saleh's 33-year rule; Algerians too were encouraged to step up demonstrations against the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. In Iran, the opposition Green movement, whose revolt in 2009 had been the envy of Arab populations from Cairo to Riyadh, was suddenly reinvigorated, sending massed crowds on to the street on Monday to remind the Islamic regime of their existence. It was in the small Gulf state of Bahrain, however, where the Shia majority ruled by a Sunni minority regime had been agitating long before Tunisia's revolt erupted, that the new-found confidence of the Arab public appeared to erupt most powerfully this week. Shia protesters took over the Pearl roundabout in the capital, Manama, to create their own mini Tahrir Square, the centre of Egypt's revolt, in what Bahrain's ruling Sunni al-Khalifa family might have seen as a challenge to its rule's existence. Security forces attacked sleeping activists and fired on protesters, further enraging the Shia community. Sadly, the Middle East's autocratic rulers are still deaf to the message of Tunisia and Egypt, incapable of understanding that their survival depends not on the use of force but on swift political progress that gives the disgruntled public a share of power. In the changing Middle East, Bahrain's al-Khalifas cannot continue to rule through denial, ignoring that Shia grievances are the product of real discrimination. Col Gaddafi too cannot govern Libya under the pretence that it is a "people's Jamahiriya". True, every country has its circumstances, and the outcome of popular protests is not guaranteed. As Peter Ackerman, founder of the US-based International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict, says, there is no formula for success but there are "better ways of doing things". Some of the key elements are the unity of the protest movement and its non-violent nature, its planning, and the ability to shift the loyalty of the regime's pillars. In the case of Libya, a vast country with a dispersed population of 6m and where Col Gaddafi has kept people quiescent by bribing tribal leaders and playing them off against each other, it is not clear that disparate groups can produce a sustainable movement. Libya's leader, flush with oil revenues, already offered this week to double salaries, according to news reports. The biggest challenge of Bahraini demonstrators, meanwhile, is the sectarian divide. Shia protesters face a Sunni minority regime that can count on the loyalty of its constituency and, most importantly, on security forces deliberately built up to exclude Shia. In Iran as well, the crackdown is led not by the traditional army, which is the least loyal to the Islamic republic, but by the Basij militia and the riot police of the Revolutionary Guard. Putting down protests by force might buy time but does not secure long-term protection. The more repressively governments in the Middle East behave, the more radicalised is the opposition they face. By Friday in Bahrain, as families were burying their dead, earlier calls for constitutional reform had given way to the clamour for regime change.  | ||||
| Posted: 19 Feb 2011 12:14 PM PST  Ian Bremmer Financial Times No one could predict that the death of a Tunisian vegetable vendor would spark revolts across the Middle East, threatening regimes from Libya to Iran. But while these shockwaves might seem chaotic, they are in fact only the latest example of a powerful political phenomenon: the J-curve, or the dip in stability as countries move from closed to open societies. The concept also explains why many of the region's governments are now caught in what may prove to be an inescapable trap. The theory goes like this. If you plot the relationship between a country's stability (on the vertical axis) and its social and political openness (on the horizontal axis) the points that mark every possible combination of openness and stability will produce a pattern that resembles the letter J. Most countries start off closed and stable (think: North Korea). Many end up open and stable (like Britain). But in between there is a turbulent transition. Some governments, such as post-apartheid South Africa, survive this transition. Others – the Soviet Union, Iran under the shah and the former Yugoslavia – do not. This presents a dilemma for the Middle East. In recent years, globalisation has provided more young Arabs with access to education, media and travel – innovations that make it more difficult for a ruling elite to control information and power. If governments, such as Egypt's, relax their grip to stoke economic growth (by opening their societies to deeper integration with the outside world) they risk sharp social and political upheaval. Yet if they keep things closed, they sharply limit the power of their economies to generate the prosperity on which longer-term political legitimacy will depend. And that too creates instability. The J-curve is a controversial idea. When I first floated it in 2006, it was used – in some ways hijacked – by those seeking to explain the unstable postwar environment in Iraq. But an intervention bringing democracy by force was always a poor example of the theory. The current upheavals in the Middle East, the result of internal dynamics of populations trapped between economic hardship and increasing political openness, make a much better test. Most regimes in the Middle East and north Africa have tried to remain stable by cutting off their citizens from the modern world. Globalisation's progress has been slow across the region. But over the past decade these efforts have come undone. People have taken up mobile phones, watched satellite television and switched on Facebook and Twitter. Autocratic governments, in turn, have had to expend more and more effort containing these potent weapons of free expression. It is true there are obvious counterexamples to this trend. Some strongly authoritarian regimes have avoided significant domestic pressures, because strong economic growth has effectively pushed up the entire J-curve. After 30 years of state-directed growth, China is under much less internal political pressure than the Middle Eastern regimes. Nonetheless, China's leadership is keenly aware that economic success is required to maintain the regime's survival – an implicit admission that openness and order remain in tension underneath. Given the Middle East is unlikely to see a new economic miracle, what should its pressurised leaders do? They face two options. Those with the most isolated populations can repress them, hoping to stay on the left of the curve. Leaders of Algeria, Iran and Yemen now ride to and fro upon tigers that they dare not dismount, as Winston Churchill once put it. Ultimately, that is a dangerous ride – as Tunisia's Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali can attest. But opening up reform – the Jordanian route – is risky too. It costs King Abdullah little to replace one prime minister, but new faces alone will not create jobs or prosperity. Real reform will be much riskier, as it requires a surrender of some state control. King Abdullah must now calculate whether he is more likely to survive as a real reformer or as the man who kept the genie in the bottle for another year. No countries are watching Jordan more keenly than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and a currently restive Bahrain. Unrest in their neighbour will make all three more cautious about allowing citizens to speak their minds. With oil and gas to export – and smaller populations with which to share the spoils – these three are actually better placed to begin sweeping reform. But, looking back to Tunisia, even the region's richest now know a single spark can ignite a country. Even those who can best afford the instability that accompanies the depths of the J-curve may be too fearful to begin the journey. The writer is the president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market.  | ||||
| Speak Truth To Power: Voices from Beyond the Dark Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:35 AM PST The Play by Ariel Dorfman, performed by famous celebrities.  | ||||
| My Rights, My Responsibility (ICCPR) Series Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:32 AM PST International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Ratified, acceded by UN General Assembly in December 1966, entry into force March 1976. Cambodia ratified the ICCPR (thus, a part of Cambodia's body of laws) and is obligated to submit regular reports to the United Nations. PART IV 1. The [Human Rights] Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected. 2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, that: (a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum; (b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.  | ||||
| Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:27 AM PST Love begins by taking care of the closest ones— the ones at home.
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| My Rights, My Responsibility (Constitution) Series Posted: 19 Feb 2011 02:24 AM PST Constitution of Cambodia (Sept. 1993) CHAPTER V: ECONOMY The State shall ban and severely punish those who import, manufacture sell illicit drugs, counterfeit and expired goods which affect the health and life of the consumers.  | ||||
| Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:45 AM PST Activists urge Thai govt not to sign permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Activists of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) who have been holding a rally in the Thai capital for nearly a month demanding the ouster of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government for mishandling the Thai-Cambodian border conflict demanded on Saturday that the government must not sign a permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia, saying that conditions proposed earlier by his counterpart Hun Sen were "insincere," said PAD spokesman Panthep Puapongpan. Mr Hun Sen on Thursday said in Phnom Penh that Cambodia would urge Thailand to agree to a peace deal during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting, to be held in Jakarta next Tuesday, and a ceasefire agreement be signed between foreign ministers of the two neighbouring countries under the witness of ASEAN or the ASEAN chair. The upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting will be held with an aim to finding ways to end the border conflict and clashes at the disputed border between soldiers of the two countries. But Mr Panthep said conditions proposed by Cambodia are "insincere because that country has accused Thailand on several occasions" and if an agreement has to be signed then Cambodian villagers and soldiers must move out of the disputed area or before memos by Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) are formally signed. PAD's long standing position is to oppose Thai parliamentary endorsement of the three memos by the JBC, claiming they may result in loss of Thai territory adjacent to the Hindu Preah Vihear temple. They have also demanded the revocation of MoUs signed between Thailand and Cambodia in 2000. The Yellow Shirt movement believes that the JBC documents will put Thailand at a disadvantage as the documents originating from the MoUs related to the survey and boundary demarcation recognising a French map, with a scale of 1:200,000 sq km, that puts Thailand at risk of losing territory. Another PAD core leader Prapan Koonmee said he had received a letter issued by the Royal Thai Police Bureau asking him and other core leaders to report themselves to Bangkok Metropolitan Police headquarters next Tuesday on charges of violating the Internal Security Act since PAD members have been holding the rally in Bangkok since January 25. Challenging the police order, Mr Panthep said the enforcement of the Act is tantamount to violating the constitution and the right to freedom of assembly.  | ||||
| Warmonger PAD Thais are not interested in peace with Cambodia Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:43 AM PST Activists urge Thai govt not to sign permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Activists of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) who have been holding a rally in the Thai capital for nearly a month demanding the ouster of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government for mishandling the Thai-Cambodian border conflict demanded on Saturday that the government must not sign a permanent ceasefire agreement with Cambodia, saying that conditions proposed earlier by his counterpart Hun Sen were "insincere," said PAD spokesman Panthep Puapongpan. Mr Hun Sen on Thursday said in Phnom Penh that Cambodia would urge Thailand to agree to a peace deal during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting, to be held in Jakarta next Tuesday, and a ceasefire agreement be signed between foreign ministers of the two neighbouring countries under the witness of ASEAN or the ASEAN chair. The upcoming ASEAN foreign ministers meeting will be held with an aim to finding ways to end the border conflict and clashes at the disputed border between soldiers of the two countries. But Mr Panthep said conditions proposed by Cambodia are "insincere because that country has accused Thailand on several occasions" and if an agreement has to be signed then Cambodian villagers and soldiers must move out of the disputed area or before memos by Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) are formally signed. PAD's long standing position is to oppose Thai parliamentary endorsement of the three memos by the JBC, claiming they may result in loss of Thai territory adjacent to the Hindu Preah Vihear temple. They have also demanded the revocation of MoUs signed between Thailand and Cambodia in 2000. The Yellow Shirt movement believes that the JBC documents will put Thailand at a disadvantage as the documents originating from the MoUs related to the survey and boundary demarcation recognising a French map, with a scale of 1:200,000 sq km, that puts Thailand at risk of losing territory. Another PAD core leader Prapan Koonmee said he had received a letter issued by the Royal Thai Police Bureau asking him and other core leaders to report themselves to Bangkok Metropolitan Police headquarters next Tuesday on charges of violating the Internal Security Act since PAD members have been holding the rally in Bangkok since January 25. Challenging the police order, Mr Panthep said the enforcement of the Act is tantamount to violating the constitution and the right to freedom of assembly.  | ||||
| Indonesia Reiterates Need For Peaceful Resolution Of Thai-Cambodia Row Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:36 AM PST TOKYO, Feb 19 (Bernama) -- Visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said Friday that Cambodia and Thailand must jointly reiterate their commitment not to use force amid ongoing border skirmishes, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported. At a news conference at the Japan National Press Club, Natalegawa said Thailand and Cambodia must "reinforce or reiterate the commitments that the two sides have repeatedly made that they will not wish to resort to the use of force in solving the problem between them." "Given the nature of the two countries today, I feel that this commitment must be made together, rather than simply made separately," he said. The remarks came ahead of a meeting in Jakarta next Tuesday that will bring together the foreign ministers of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations to discuss the dispute between the two countries. Indonesia currently holds the rotating chair of Asean. The latest round of a territorial dispute from Feb 4 between Cambodia and Thailand over 4.6 square kilometers of land around the Preah Vihear temple on the border has led to at least 10 deaths, dozens injured and over 25,000 displaced persons. Natalegawa visited Phnom Penh and Bangkok earlier this month in a bid to mediate in the conflict. The UN Security Council expressed "grave concern" Monday over the border skirmishes and called on both sides to establish a "permanent" cease-fire. The Indonesian foreign minister added that work must be done on "how to compromise (on) the two extreme ideas" to resolve the issue, one being to deploy a multilateral framework involving a third party and the other for bilateral negotiations. "Gone are the days when Asean swept things under the carpet, not addressing issues head-on. This time around we wish to confront issues head-on to bring peace and harmony whenever there are difficulties between Asean states as we are doing between Cambodia and Thailand," he said. To address the issue of territorial tensions among China and Asean members in the South China Sea, Natalegawa said Indonesia aims to finalise guidelines to strengthen the code of conduct, signed by the two sides in 2002 to ensure that the disputes are resolved diplomatically to avert military conflict. "The management of potential conflict of the South China Sea is one of the highest priorities for Indonesia," he said. "To finalise the guidelines, it would require a lot of efforts and especially cooperation by all the parties, including China." He also emphasised Indonesia's bid in creating a maritime forum for the East Asia region, where countries can discuss various maritime challenges such as security, militarisation of fishing vessels and environmental issues and also transparency in military procurement. Natalegawa met with Prime Minister Naoto Kan before completing his two-day visit.  | ||||
| Thai army meets Cambodian generals Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:34 AM PST 19/02/2011 Bangkok Post Army-chief-of staff Gen Daopong Rattanasuwon had on Saturday morning held ceasefire talks with Cambodian Deputy Supreme Commander Gen Jia Dara at Chong Sangam in Surin province, reports said. The meeting was held about 10.30am today, but it was kept secret, the reports said. Top brass attending the meeting were commander of Army Region 2 Lt-Gen Thawatchai Samutsakorn and Cambodia's Army Region 4 commander Lt-Gen Jia Mon, according to the reports.  | ||||
| [Thai] PM admits border tension has impacted case against Veera and Ratree Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:28 AM PST BANGKOK, Feb 19 (MCOT online news) -- Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva admitted that Thai Cambodian border tension has affected legal proceedings to help two Thais jailed in Cambodia while affirming that the government is still exploring ways to help free them. The Cambodian court on Feb 1 ruled that Veera Somkwamkid, Thai Patriots Network coordinator, and his secretary Ratree Pipattanapaiboon were guilty of espionage, illegal entry, and trespassing in a military zone. They were sentenced to an eight-year jail term and a 1.8 million riel (US$450) fine for Mr Veera and a six-year jail term and a 1.2 million riel (US$300) fine for Ms Ratree. An appeal could be filed within 30 days. Mr Abhisit said the government has to study options to help them and that as far as he knows, the families of Veera and Ratree have not yet submitted a request to seek a royal pardon from the Cambodian King. The premier said he had told their two families to think carefully before making a decision whether to appeal or request a royal pardon. The border tensions had also affected the case, he added. Asked whether the leaders of the two nations could hold talks to speed up help for Veera and Ratree, Mr Abhisit said he would try, but the situation should be evaluated carefully as the political situation in Thailand and Cambodia was also affecting the case. He also urged the Thai Patriots Network to think twice before making decisions on movement, as it may have effect on Veera and Ratree. He said the government would do its best to help but steps must be taken with caution and good timing and not affect ties at the national level. China's Xinhua news agency quoted Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen as saying that there would be no royal pardon for Mr Veera. "Don't come to persuade me to ask King Norodom Sihamoni for royal pardons. It is impossible at this time," said the Cambodian premier. He added, "Complying with the law properly, the two must serve at least two-thirds of their jail terms before being considered for royal amnesty." Meanwhie, Mr Abhisit also denied reports that ASEAN was asked to send forces to prevent more border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia. He said Thailand reaffirmed its commitment to resolving any pending boundary issues peacefully through existing bilateral mechanisms. The prime minister added that he was unaware Cambodia might take the disputed border case before the International Court of Justice for clarification on its 1962 ruling. The Court then ruled that the 11th century Preah Vihear temple belonged to Phnom Penh, but both countries have since been in dispute over a 1.8-square-mile (4.6-square-kilometre) tract of land near the temple.  | ||||
| SRP MP Saumura Tioulong at UN Meeting in New York Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:19 AM PST  | ||||
| Politiktoons No. 144: The Universal Town Square Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:15 AM PST
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| Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:08 AM PST   | ||||
| CACJE's Invitation for 18 March 1970 Anniversary Posted: 19 Feb 2011 01:05 AM PST   | ||||
| European Parliament resolution: Cambodia and Thailand are to respect ICJ Judgment 1962 Posted: 18 Feb 2011 10:39 PM PST | ||||
| How to be a rich dictator- A DIY (Do It Yourself) guide by HE. Samdach Dr. Dr. Dr. Dr. Hun Sen Posted: 18 Feb 2011 10:29 PM PST  18 Feb 2011 James Thomson BusinessSpectator (Australia) Let's just get this clear from the start. It is extremely unlikely that deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak is worth anywhere near $70 billion and he isn't close to being the richest person in the world. The basis for his valuation, which has been carried across the world in various media reports, appears to emanate from an article in Britain's Guardian newspaper, which referenced "middle east experts" as having made the snap evaluation. On closer inspection, Amaney Jamal, a political science professor at Princeton said an estimate of $40-70 billion for the Mubarak family fortune was "comparable with the vast wealth of leaders in other Gulf countries". But as Forbes pointed out in a blog last week, the worth of the richest ruler in the region, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, has been put at $15 billion, which is a long way from $70 billion. Nevertheless, it is clear that Mubarak did very well out his time in charge. Despite receiving a salary of just $808 a year, Mubarak and his family – specifically his sons Gamal and Alaa – amassed billions of dollars by establishing a system of endemic corruption. Exactly how much they squirrelled away in banks around the world (the Swiss banking system has already frozen the Mubarak's family assets) is unlikely to ever be revealed, but a sense of the regime's money-making ability can be gleaned from research by Global Financial Integrity, a not-for-profit organisation that tracks illicit financial flows. It says a staggering $57 billion flowed out of Egypt between 2000 and 2008. Regardless of the size of his fortune Mubarak joins a long list of dictators who have become fabulously wealthy on the back of their time in power. According to Paul Barry's Dictator Watch on Crikey, the pack is led by former Indonesian president Suharto, who was crowned in 2004 by Transparency International as the world's most corrupt leader, with a fortune of $35 billion. But it should be noted that building a fortune from political rule is no mean feat. Straight-out bribes are simply too obvious and dictators instead use their far-reaching power to build up a system from which they can siphon off money at multiple points. Here are some of the steps that dictators must take to turn an iron grip into a giant fortune. Get long-term control Destroying all opposition is a key plank of any dictator's strategy, but it's also a key part of a corrupt ruler's money-making plans. Building a corrupt system and moving money out of the country takes time, so the longer you can remain in power the better your chances of getting rich. Cancel elections, get friendly with the military and settle in for the long haul. Put cronies in place A money-making dictator needs to surround himself with people he can trust. Installing relatives in key posts is essential – Mubarak's sons Gamal and Alaa served as the president's key contacts with business in the latter years of the reign, with brothers-in-law and other relatives also given plum posts. If you're really serious about turning a buck from politics, stacking parliament with business people – a classic Mubarak trick – is a great idea. Regulate everything And we mean everything. The more things a government can control the more ways it can make money. In Mubarak's Egypt for example, many businesses need a license to operate and then had to apply to get government quotas of raw materials. An entrepreneur wanting to set up a bakery might need to pay a bribe to secure a licence and another bribe to secure a quota of wheat. As the business grew so would the bribes. Controlling access rights and production levels in major industries is particularly important, especially in nations rich in minerals assets. Share the wealth Under the baker example above the bribes would go to local officials and not to Mubarak. But making sure that corruption is widespread – and that the little people get their palms greased – is essential if you want to ensure you remain in office and can pull off major deals. Turn public assets into private wealth The best way to raise cash is to sell stuff. And when you're a dictator you don't need to differentiate between your stuff and the country's stuff – just sell whatever you want. As Samer Soliman, a professor of political economy at American University in Cairo, told the New York Times, the key to Mubarak's fortune was the sale of hundreds of public assets to private companies. "The corruption of the Mubarak family was not stealing from the budget, it was transforming political capital into private capital," Soliman says. Mubarak's privatisation campaign began in the 1990s with the goal of selling 314 companies. According to a report from a USAID-sponsored monitoring program, by June 2002 there were 190 state assets owned. The program paused during the GFC and was stopped in 2010, when there were 149 companies still under state control, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal. The Mubarak family and its cronies made money from privatisation, selling assets in sweetheart deals with mainly foreign business people. A great example is a company called Tanta Flax & Oils Company, which was acquired by Saudi investor Abdellah El-Ka'aky in 2005. The price was just $14 million, but Egyptian labour expert Mostafa Bassiouni told local newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm the business was actually valued at more than $500 million. In some cases the assets were sold lock, stock and barrel to foreign investors – with appropriate "facilitation" payments no doubt extracted from the buyers. In other cases the buyer was forced to take on an Egyptian joint venture partner who would take a stake between 20 per cent and 50 per cent. According to reports, Mubarak had interests in many of those Egyptian-partner businesses, thereby completing the transfer of public assets into his private wealth. Stash the loot The Mubaraks are said to have favoured parking profits in property in London, New York and Paris, and in foreign bank accounts. Suharto liked art and jewels. Personally I'd lean towards gold bars, which are universally accepted, hold their value and best of all are handily portable if you have to flee into exile. Beware the backlash The protests against Mubarak were mainly focused on bringing democracy to Egypt, although it could be argued that they had their origins in a long series of protests against the privatisation program. In March 2010, almost 12 months before Mubarak's departure, Al-Masry Al-Youm said more than 1.7 million workers had engaged in more than 1900 strikes between 2004 and 2008. Protests started at Tanta Flax & Oils in February and sparked a series of protests that forced the government to can the program in mid 2010. In hindsight that's when Mubarak should have taken his cue to pull the plug. Imagine how much more cash he could have taken with him.  | ||||
| From Dictatorship to Democracy - APPENDIX ONE: The Methods of Nonviolent Action Posted: 18 Feb 2011 09:46 PM PST KI Media's series on From Dictatorship to Democracy by Gene Sharp whereby a chapter from this book in both English and Khmer is published every 2-day interval, with prior chapters listed in the menu bar for easy recall. The emphasis is that of KI Media. For its original complete text go to: This book has been translated into KHMER and its full version is available at: Be inspired! Be coordinated! And take action! - KI Media . . . . . From Dictatorship to Democracy APPENDIX ONE The Methods of Nonviolent Action The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion Formal statements 1. Public speeches 2. Letters of opposition or support 3. Declarations by organizations and institutions 4. Signed public statements 5. Declarations of indictment and intention 6. Group or mass petitions Communications with a wider audience 7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols 8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications 9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books 10. Newspapers and journals 11. Records, radio, and television 12. Skywriting and earthwriting Group representations 13. Deputations 14. Mock awards 15. Group lobbying 16. Picketing 17. Mock elections Symbolic public acts 18. Display of flags and symbolic colors 19. Wearing of symbols 20. Prayer and worship 21. Delivering symbolic objects 22. Protest disrobings 23. Destruction of own property 24. Symbolic lights 25. Displays of portraits 26. Paint as protest 27. New signs and names 28. Symbolic sounds 29. Symbolic reclamations 30. Rude gestures Pressures on individuals 31. "Haunting" officials 32. Taunting officials 33. Fraternization 34. Vigils Drama and music 35. Humorous skits and pranks 36. Performance of plays and music 37. Singing Processions 38. Marches 39. Parades 40. Religious processions 41. Pilgrimages 42. Motorcades Honoring the dead 43. Political mourning 44. Mock funerals 45. Demonstrative funerals 46. Homage at burial places Public assemblies 47. Assemblies of protest or support 48. Protest meetings 49. Camouflaged meetings of protest 50. Teach-ins Withdrawal and renunciation 51. Walk-outs 52. Silence 53. Renouncing honors 54. Turning one's back The Methods of Social Noncooperation Ostracism of persons 55. Social boycott 56. Selective social boycott 57. Lysistratic nonaction 58. Excommunication 59. Interdict Noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions 60. Suspension of social and sports activities 61. Boycott of social affairs 62. Student strike 63. Social disobedience 64. Withdrawal from social institutions Withdrawal from the social system 65. Stay-at-home 66. Total personal noncooperation 67. Flight of workers 68. Sanctuary 69. Collective disappearance 70. Protest emigration (hijrat) The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: (1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS Action by consumers 71. Consumers' boycott 72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods 73. Policy of austerity 74. Rent withholding 75. Refusal to rent 76. National consumers' boycott 77. International consumers' boycott Action by workers and producers 78. Workmen's boycott 79. Producers' boycott Action by middlemen 80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott Action by owners and management 81. Traders' boycott 82. Refusal to let or sell property 83. Lockout 84. Refusal of industrial assistance 85. Merchants' "general strike" Action by holders of financial resources 86. Withdrawal of bank deposits 87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments 88. Refusal to pay debts or interest 89. Severance of funds and credit 90. Revenue refusal 91. Refusal of a government's money Action by governments 92. Domestic embargo 93. Blacklisting of traders 94. International sellers' embargo 95. International buyers' embargo 96. International trade embargo The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: (2) THE STRIKE Symbolic strikes 97. Protest strike 98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike) Agricultural strikes 99. Peasant strike 100. Farm workers' strike Strikes by special groups 101. Refusal of impressed labor 102. Prisoners' strike 103. Craft strike 104. Professional strike Ordinary industrial strikes 105. Establishment strike 106. Industry strike 107. Sympathetic strike Restricted strikes 108. Detailed strike 109. Bumper strike 110. Slowdown strike 111. Working-to-rule strike 112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in) 113. Strike by resignation 114. Limited strike 115. Selective strike Multi-industry strikes 116. Generalized strike 117. General strike Combinations of strikes and economic closures 118. Hartal 119. Economic shutdown The Methods of Political Noncooperation Rejection of authority 120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance 121. Refusal of public support 122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance Citizens' noncooperation with government 123. Boycott of legislative bodies 124. Boycott of elections 125. Boycott of government employment and positions 126. Boycott of government departments, agencies and other bodies 127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions 128. Boycott of government-supported organizations 129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents 130. Removal of own signs and placemarks 131. Refusal to accept appointed officials 132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions Citizens' alternatives to obedience 133. Reluctant and slow compliance 134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision 135. Popular nonobedience 136. Disguised disobedience 137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse 138. Sitdown 139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation 140. Hiding, escape and false identities 141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws Action by government personnel 142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides 143. Blocking of lines of command and information 144. Stalling and obstruction 145. General administrative noncooperation 146. Judicial noncooperation 147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents 148. Mutiny Domestic governmental action 149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays 150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units International governmental action 151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation 152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events 153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition 154. Severance of diplomatic relations 155. Withdrawal from international organizations 156. Refusal of membership in international bodies 157. Expulsion from international organizations The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention Psychological intervention 158. Self-exposure to the elements 159. The fast (a) Fast of moral pressure (b) Hunger strike (c) Satyagrahic fast 160. Reverse trial 161. Nonviolent harassment Physical intervention 162. Sit-in 163. Stand-in 164. Ride-in 165. Wade-in 166. Mill-in 167. Pray-in 168. Nonviolent raids 169. Nonviolent air raids 170. Nonviolent invasion 171. Nonviolent interjection 172. Nonviolent obstruction 173. Nonviolent occupation Social intervention 174. Establishing new social patterns 175. Overloading of facilities 176. Stall-in 177. Speak-in 178. Guerrilla theater 179. Alternative social institutions 180. Alternative communication system Economic intervention 181. Reverse strike 182. Stay-in strike 183. Nonviolent land seizure 184. Defiance of blockades 185. Politically motivated counterfeiting 186. Preclusive purchasing 187. Seizure of assets 188. Dumping 189. Selective patronage 190. Alternative markets 191. Alternative transportation systems 192. Alternative economic institutions Political intervention 193. Overloading of administrative systems 194. Disclosing identities of secret agents 195. Seeking imprisonment 196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws 197. Work-on without collaboration 198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government ___________________________________________________ 16 This list, with definitions and historical examples, is taken from Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action.  | ||||
| UN Rep Investigates Land Dispute Posted: 18 Feb 2011 06:35 PM PST
Radio Free Asia A UN official visits the site of a land dispute as part of his inquiry into human rights in Cambodia. A United Nations human rights representative visited a Cambodian village community embroiled in a land dispute on Friday as part of a fact-finding mission for a set of wider reforms he is recommending to the country's leadership. The visit by Surya Subedi, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Cambodia, came on the fourth day of a 10-day trip to the country, and followed a meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen where he expressed concerns about the country's court system and a new law on nongovernmental organizations. Subedi told RFA that it is important to take the complaints of Cambodia's rural population into consideration in addition to speaking with high-level officials while forming an overview of the country's human rights situation. "I wanted to speak to people from all walks of life in Cambodia, and I wanted to see the villagers for myself to listen to them directly—their grievances—and then see for myself the area where they are living now and the conditions there as well. This is purely a fact-finding mission and … [for] information gathering," Subedi said. He traveled to the site, in central Kompong Chhnang province, to investigate a land dispute case in which NGO worker, who represented the villagers, had been jailed. The dispute was with a company owned by Lauk Chumteav Chea Kheng, the wife of Cambodia's mining minister. Land grab Sam Chankea was convicted in January of "defamation" against KDC International Co. after he told RFA in a 2009 interview that the company had committed an "act of violation" when it confiscated land from the villagers, because the provincial court had yet to rule on the disputed property. The dispute dates back to 2002 when KDC International took possession of some 184 hectares (455 acres) of land from more than 100 families in the area. "I now have a much better idea and information about the plight of the villagers and the disputed land," Subedi said. "I will try to speak to government authorities about what they have been doing about this dispute and what the response of the other party has been and what other avenues there are to look after the interests of the villagers," he said. "I will consider whether I will need to intervene at certain levels of government authorities, and if I decide to do so, I will not hesitate to do so." Subedi said that he had a number of meetings scheduled with various ministers and that he planned to use the Pursat land case as an example of how the government must work to improve its human rights record. Fact-finding meetings In addition to meeting with the prime minister, Subedi has been busy since arriving in Cambodia on his fourth mission for the U.N., meeting with officials from the ruling party and from the opposition, observing trials, and speaking with NGOs. On Wednesday, the special rapporteur met with Thun Saray, director of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC) to discuss the concerns of domestic NGOs operating in the country. "The problems include a land crisis that adversely affects the people. We propose a swift and satisfactory solution for those who have been affected by the land conflict," Thun Saray said in an interview recounting their conversation. The land issue in Cambodia dates from the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime, which forced large-scale evacuations and relocations throughout the country. This was followed by mass confusion over land rights and the formation of squatter communities when the refugees returned in the 1990s after a decade of civil war. Housing Cambodia's large, young, and overwhelmingly poor population has posed a major problem ever since. Judicial reform Thun Saray also advised Subedi that Cambodia's notoriously ineffective judicial system is in dire need of restructuring. "The justice system should be reformed. We all see the shortcomings and flaws in the system. The reform should start by looking into the flaws point by point. For example, the flaws happen in the process of trials and court proceedings which result in unjust rulings," he said. "The public is unsatisfied with the current process of court trials. We have to look, investigate these shortcomings, and fix them." More than one-quarter of Cambodian court defendants reported being tortured or coerced into confession, and ordinary people said they lack faith in the justice system, according to a 2009 judicial review released by Cambodian anti-corruption organization The Center for Social Development. Poor training of the judiciary, bribery, torture, underfunding, a lack of independence, and frequent pre-trial detention of prisoners for terms exceeding the legal limit of six months are among problems with the judiciary often cited by rights organizations. At the end of his last visit in June, Subedi said the judiciary faced "tremendous challenges in delivering justice for the people of the country, especially the poor and marginalized," adding that some judges were simply not interested in upholding the law. NGO law Thun Saray also discussed a controversial draft law put forth by Cambodia's National Assembly which would severely curtail the ability of foreign and domestic NGOs operating in the country to carry out their work. Last month a U.S. State Department spokesman said the United States had "serious concerns about the law as drafted and strongly opposes the enactment of any law that would constrain the legitimate activities of NGOs." The State Department urged Phnom Penh to consult with NGOs on the substance of the draft law and to "reconsider whether such a measure is even necessary." Cambodia's government has long had an antagonistic relationship with human rights groups and NGOs operating in the country. Last year, Hun Sen said he wanted the U.N. human rights office in Cambodia closed and its representative, Christophe Peschoux, sacked. Subedi is expected to hold a press conference in Phnom Penh on Feb. 24 during which he will review some of the key issues raised during his visit before compiling a report for the United Nations. He last presented his findings to the U.N. in September 2010. Reported by Pon Bun Song and Khe Sonorng for RFA's Khmer service. Translated by Vuthy Huot. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.  | ||||
| Negotiate toward success, not stalemate Posted: 18 Feb 2011 06:31 PM PST
William Roth Bangkok Post The saga over the Temple of Preah Vihear continues to drag on, seemingly without an end in sight. Blood has been spilled and lives lost on both sides of the border, with the United Nations Security Council now calling for a "permanent ceasefire". Yet Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva "has rejected Cambodia's proposal for the two countries to sign a ceasefire agreement", because "it was too early to talk about such a move". The Security Council further asked that the parties negotiate an end to their dispute, but the current imbroglio is further complicated by opposing views on the form negotiations should take. Thailand insists that any talks be strictly bilateral, although allowing for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations "facilitation", but rejects Cambodia's desire for third-party mediation or active involvement by other countries or any "regional framework". But what is the objective of the negotiations? Presumably it is "the demarcation of land boundary" between Thailand and Cambodia, for which the Joint Boundary Commission was established in 2000. Indeed, Thailand has been strenuously urging the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation not to proceed with its listing of Preah Vihear as a World Heritage site until the border there has been demarcated. But, like the proverbial elephant in the room, what no one seems able to mention is that no amount of negotiation, however it might be structured, will ever result in an agreed upon demarcation of the border in the area of Preah Vihear. The reason is quite straight-forward: each country has an extremely good argument for why the so-called 4.6-square kilometre disputed area is theirs, and political and emotional considerations on both sides of the border make it absolutely impossible for either country to budge from their respective position. Thus, any further negotiation to demarcate that border will only prove fruitless. But is demarcation really necessary? The border in the temple area has been in dispute for well over 100 years, but for much of that time both sides have co-existed along it in relative peace. Demarcation of land boundaries is, in fact, primarily a Western (read "colonial") concept. As Canadian scholar Andreas Buss pointed out in a 2010 article about Preah Vihear and regional customary law, "Traditionally, the king was a king over people rather than over a defined area of territory; territorial jurisdiction could not be strictly defined by permanent boundaries, but was characterised by fluidity and flexibility, dependent on the power of the central government." An earlier Bangkok Post article about the temple dispute, "A fine line" on May 22, 2008, reported comments by anthropologist and archaeologist Srisakra Vallibhotama. According to him, "Watershed lines were traditionally considered by ancient people as no man's land, belonging to no one. Crossing the areas required the performing of rituals... People from both sides came to Preah Vihear to perform rituals, as they do to this very day." Well, maybe a "no man's land" is not a viable idea today, as some might see that as conceding Thai territory - a definite non-starter. But why not simply leave the disputed area "disputed", and include it within a larger area administered by Unesco for the benefit of both countries? The earlier article also reported comments of Tharapong Srisuchat, director of the Fine Arts Department's Office of Archaeology. According to him, "Each World Heritage site must consist of its nucleus, core zone and buffer zone, which should be circular, but Preah Vihear in Cambodia's proposal is in the shape of a fan with the core zone at its lowest end. The temple's surroundings located in Thai territory... are also important and should go together with the sanctuary in the nomination." As it stands now, the temple remains closed, military forces are massed against one another, and both countries continue to lose out on the potentially immense benefits of tourism to the area. And over what? Is it not time to take a step back and focus on what the benefits can be to both countries, rather than continue to be influenced by Western concepts of boundaries? As pointed out by Mr Srisakra the anthropologist, "Ancient people just looked for a symbol before crossing from one zone to another but France drew the line for us to accept." Why not negotiate toward a joint management area, under the oversight of Unesco, into which visitors from both countries could freely enter, see the temple and its surrounding areas, and then return the same day to the country from which they came? It need not be a border crossing, and no need for a marked border, but only signs that read: "Welcome to the Preah Vihear Historical Park, a Unesco World Heritage Site." (Or maybe, on the Thai side, the sign could read, "Welcome to the Phra Viharn Historical Park.") To exit, visitors would follow signs that said either "To Thailand" or "To Cambodia" and, at the respective document checking posts, a sign would simply say, "Leaving the Preah Vihear (Phra Viharn) Historical Park. Thank You for Visiting." As for maps, both countries could continue to draw their respective boundary lines as they see fit, though it would make more sense to just have the lines end at the junction with the line surrounding the historical park, leaving the "real" boundary lines inside disputed. Both Thai and Cambodian flags, however, should be flown together as an equal pair throughout the park, regardless of whether a particular area of the park was or was not concededly a part of one country or the other. The one and only exception would be at the very summit of the temple itself, where a single Cambodian flag would be allowed to fly. After all, the International Court of Justice did declare that "This is Cambodia", albeit with greater grammatical correctness. --------- William Roth teaches international law at Chulalongkorn University.  | ||||
| Resolving border conflicts takes wisdom [-Thai opinion] Posted: 18 Feb 2011 06:20 PM PST 19/02/2011 By Kamol Hengkietisak Bangkok Post The clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops were inevitable. The deaths and injuries shared by the two sides is sad news as they occurred at the wish of the rulers of the two sides while ordinary people did not want them to happen, noted Virabongsa Ramangkura writing for Matichon. The use of force to settle conflicts is out of fashion these days for most countries except the US, which has appointed itself the world's policeman under the United Nations banner to use force to settle conflicts around the world in order to protect its interests. The US can do this as it is the only superpower left in the world. Mr Virabongsa, a well-known economist and former deputy prime minister, noted that to conduct international politics for whatever reason, the rulers should think in the long term about how to end conflicts and about how the international community will view any incidents. Mr Virabongsa advised both sides of the border conflict to look at the long-term interests of their countries and peoples. They must take into account historical facts, international law, being members of United Nations and Asean. In the eyes of the global community, Thailand and Cambodia are very small in terms of economic and military power. Mr Virabongsa then outlined three main problems concerning the present conflict. 1. Thailand demarcated the area around Preah Vihear temple after the World Court decided in 1962 that the temple belonged to Cambodia. Thanat Khoman, who was foreign minister at the time, reserved the right to raise the issue again if there was any new data. However, a long time has passed since then and Thailand has not brought up the issue in the World Court again. It is Cambodia that would like to revive the case. The Thai side does not want the UN Security Council to intervene in the dispute. Even if the UNSC decides to revive the case, the issue must be sent to the World Court to rule again in more detail what it means when it says Preah Vihear belongs to Cambodia according to the map drawn up by the French colonial ruler. Thailand must consider whether to allow the case to be reopened as it is not certain it will gain any advantage. What we should consider is not winning against Cambodia in a war as the Cambodian army is not as strong as the Thai army. What we should consider is how the international community will view the conflict and whether Thailand is the protagonist or the bad guy. Mr Virabongsa noted that our ancestors taught us how the Thai people could win against the ancient Khmer empire and keep power in the Chao Phraya basin. This was because the ruling Thai elite knew how to accommodate various competing interests. Eventually the Khmer natives who tilled the land along the Chao Phraya basin were assimilated as Thai and many Chinese who migrated to Thailand also were eventually assimilated. What is most important as a nation is that Thailand could survive outside powers' hegemony by bending with the wind in dealing with China, Britain, France, Japan and the US, and may in the future have to deal with China again. Thai and Cambodian rulers come and go but the people on both sides have to deal with each other, especially on the Cambodian side where the people are poor and want to work and earn a living along the border and in Thailand. 2. Mr Virabongsa noted that Thailand and the French colonial rulers erected 73 border posts in 1909, from Chong Mae Sa-ngao in Si Sa Ket province to Baan Lek, Khlong Yai, in Trat. Sometimes the Khmer Rouge moved the border posts inside Cambodian territory, sometimes Thai capitalists moved the border posts inside Thai territory so they could fell trees. The facts have yet to be ascertained. The border demarcation can be implemented if neither side is greedy and specialists can easily do their job as long as politicians on both sides do not use this issue to stir up political fervour for their own gain. Mr Virabongsa advised the Thai media not to whip up nationalistic fever so that the issue could be resolved amicably. He cited an example of Thailand and Malaysia exchanging land along their border. A Chinese temple site was transferred to Thailand and a mosque site was given to Malaysia. The exchange was possible because the media did not cover the event and the people on both sides were satisfied. In the modern world, border demarcation is not a big issue if we do not make it so. Trade and economics are more important issues. Peace and stability are more important. Mr Virabongsa pointed to the history of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, who wanted to stay within the Federation of Malaysia, but Malaysian statesman Tunku Abdul Rahman was far-sighted and expelled Singapore to establish its own state. For the late Tunku Abdul Rahman, the peace of the newly established Malaysian federation was more important than gaining more territory. He had Thai blood as his mother was Thai. Then and now, nobody has blamed him for being responsible for Malaysia losing the territory of Singapore island. The rally cry of a certain mob "not to lose an inch of territory" can be interpreted as bitter feelings of being subjugated by a superior force like the colonial powers of the past. Mr Virabongsa advised that such feelings are of no use in this day and age when the world is now borderless under globalisation. Why not adapt to the tide and derive benefits from it? For the near- and long-term future, Thailand has Malaysia, Burma, Laos and Cambodia as neighbours. Further afield are Indonesia, India, Vietnam and China. All these countries have fertile land. If we live in peace with our neighbours, the importance attached to national border demarcation imposed by colonial powers will become less and less important. Europe and the US over 200 years ago have also suffered from nationalistic disputes until there was industrialisation, the League of Nations, the United Nations and flourishing trade. Then both small and large countries began to live in peace and prosper together. 3. The overlapping continental shelf previously posed no problem because the technology to extract natural resources from the sea was not advanced and petroleum, natural gas and seafood were abundant and inexpensive. In those days, the colonial powers decreed that each country could claim exclusive rights over the sea for a distance of three nautical miles, which was the distance a cannonball could be fired. Further than that, it was international waters. At the time, practically all countries accepted this proposal even though it would benefit the colonial powers the most. Later, when the continental shelf was extended to 200 nautical miles for exclusive exploited territory, the problem of the overlapping continental shelf occurred. As long as Thailand and Cambodia cannot settle on overlapping seabed areas, they cannot exploit the encompassing natural resources. Thailand and Malaysia were wise in agreeing not to demarcate the continental shelf between the two countries. They designated this a "joint development area" and cooperated in extracting petroleum and natural gas and dividing the resources. Why cannot Thailand and Cambodia do the same? Leave continental shelf demarcation alone and jointly develop natural resources in the overlapping area, advised Mr Virabongsa. Returning to the border clashes, Mr Virabongsa noted that regardless of who ignited them, or whether both sides are guilty, it is inevitable that the media in both countries will be used to rouse nationalistic fervour. Whether that happens depends on the people themselves. They must consume news with wisdom, otherwise we, the people, will force the hand of our political and military leaders and leave them no choice but to go with a tide that does not bode well for the country in the long term. Mr Virabongsa concluded by reminding readers that life is sacred, whether Thai or Cambodian. We must not be led astray.  |
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