Dear Readers,

To read the raw fact from Wikileaks Cables on Cambodia, please access them at the following link:

http://www.box.net/shared/bg8hakim7vm6mftxj2h1

Reference ID: 06PHNOMPENH586
Created: 2006-03-27 11:30
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh

VZCZCXRO2593
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0586/01 0861130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271130Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6359
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1365C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000586

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: TENSIONS AMONG PRO-DEMOCRACY ADVOCATES ON THE RISE


Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean; Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)
leader Kem Sokha and opposition party leader Sam Rainsy are
undergoing a period of tension that has the potential to
undermine Cambodian democratic consolidation. Kem Sokha
claims that Sam Rainsy is unnecessarily worried over Kem
Sokha's political aspirations and is seeking to damage CCHR's
work. Rainsy's party has withdrawn from future participation
in CCHR's public fora and has reportedly urged SRP followers
throughout the country to end support for Kem Sokha. The
bickering between potential rivals must be music to PM Hun
Sen's ears. End Summary.

Kem Sokha-Sam Rainsy Falling Out
--------------------------------


¶2. (SBU) On March 23, CCHR leader Kem Sokha visited the
Embassy to discuss continued speculation regarding his
political aspirations, as well as the Sam Rainsy Party's
(SRP) decision to withdraw participation from CCHR public
fora. Kem Sokha said that senior SRP official Son Chhay had
contacted him regarding a letter that party leader Sam Rainsy
had asked him to send to the CCHR leader. The letter
contained two points; first, SRP claimed that CCHR was not
behaving as a real NGO but was criticizing all the political
parties, including the SRP; and second, that the public fora
do not provide adequate time to SRP representatives. Kem
Sokha asked that Son Chhay not send the letter, and that he
(Kem Sokha) and Sam Rainsy should meet and discuss these
issues before a formal letter of complaint is sent.
Unfortunately, the CCHR continued, Son Chhay said that Rainsy
wanted the letter to go out, which was copied to IRI and
USAID. SRP members in the provinces reportedly were also
receiving it, added Kem Sokha. The CCHR leader noted that in
the past, this was the sort of criticism they would receive
from the CPP -- but not the SRP.

¶3. (SBU) Kem Sokha defended his public fora and said he
treated all parties fairly. The ten-minute limit for
speakers is to ensure that everyone gets a chance; otherwise,
people use their time to campaign on their party's behalf.
He noted that even he is subject to the ten-minute rule. On
the issue of establishing a political party, Kem Sokha said
that he had no intention of returning to politics before
2008, but did not rule out the possibility following the 2008
elections. He suspects that Rainsy is unhappy with him
because CCHR refused to participate in the Rainsy-proposed
Land Authority to resolve land disputes, in which Rainsy
wanted NGO representation. Kem Sokha said that the NGOs
should be independent of the body and have agreed to form a
working group and make recommendations. DCM advised Kem
Sokha not to engage in tit-for-tat struggles with the
opposition leader who has his own reasons for wanting to make
the Land Authority a success.

¶4. (U) The press on March 27 announced the differences
between the two pro-democracy leaders and the SRP's decision
to withdraw from the public fora. One paper quoted acting
SRP Secretary General Meng Rita accusing Kem Sokha of
hoarding funds in order to launch a political party, and of
using the organization's public forums to create a
personality cult. CCHR spokesperson Ou Virak considered the
accusations as groundless, noting that everyone is subject to
the ten minute limit at the public fora.

Comment
-------

¶5. (C) Kem Sokha used the first 40 minutes of the meeting
to try and convince us that he did not want to start of
political party, and the second 40 minutes explaining how he
was the best person to lead Cambodia in the future,
criticizing Rainsy as too confrontational and controversial a
figure. But it is unlikely Kem Sokha will try to form a
political party before 2008. There is inadequate time to
develop a party structure and the CCHR leader recognizes that
he would splinter the democratic vote, rather than act as a
unifying factor. But it's also clear that he and Rainsy are
seeing one another as competitors and are not eager to help
one another. Kem Sokha appears to be banking on Rainsy
re-entry into politics post-2008. Either way, the bickering
between the two prominent former critics of the government
must be music to PM Hun Sen's ears. We will continue to urge
Kem Sokha and Sam Rainsy to avoid undermining one another and
focus instead on supporting the democratic process. End

PHNOM PENH 00000586 002 OF 002


Comment.
Mussomeli

Reference ID: 06PHNOMPENH327
Created: 2006-02-17 09:20
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh

VZCZCXRO0714
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0327/01 0480920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170920Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6041
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2351
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2196
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0372
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0506
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0524
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3050
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1318C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000327

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM CB
SUBJECT: SAM RAINSY'S POLITICAL STRATEGY: PUSH HUN SEN,
THEN BEAT HIM AT THE POLLS

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Margaret McKean, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy says that
reconciliation with Hun Sen was the only way to improve his
party's position in upcoming national elections and provide
hope for the democratic future of Cambodia. Rainsy hopes
that his continued ability to move the government towards
desired reforms within important national institutions will
solidify democracy in Cambodia -- and his detractors (both
here and abroad) will recognize the wisdom of his actions.
Rainsy said that Hun Sen is a fact of life and his only hope
of helping democracy is to work with the PM to make changes
that will benefit Cambodians in the long run. The political
landscape is shifting, says Rainsy, and it is unclear which
parties will be standing for election in 2008; FUNCINPEC may
disappear, CPP could split, and there could be other
opposition parties that form between now and elections. The
Sam Rainsy Party, however, will continue to work on the side
of democracy and the Cambodian people and seek to eventually
become the ruling party in the future. End Summary.

Sam Rainsy Explains Himself
---------------------------



¶2. (C) On February 17, opposition leader Sam Rainsy,
accompanied by SRP Standing Committee member Mu Sochua, met
with the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief to outline his
political thinking that led to the rapprochement with Prime
Minister Hun Sen. Rainsy said that he has undertaken a
political reconciliation with Hun Sen, and described the
process as just beginning and therefore very fragile -- and
one that could be reversed. At the moment, the continuation
of the process depends on the mood of the PM and not on
existing democratic institutions. Hun Sen decides everything
in Cambodia, and the government institutions, e.g., the
courts, the parliament, are just a "facade," complained
Rainsy. If Cambodia is ruled by one man, then in order to
get anything done, one must begin by talking to that man,
said the opposition leader, who added it had been a difficult
choice. He noted that he risked the support of many friends
inside and outside Cambodia to put some trust into a dialogue
with Hun Sen, but hopes that dialogue will yield positive
results for Cambodia.

¶3. (C) Rainsy credited the international community's
interest and support over the past year, as well as the U.S.
Embassy's work on his behalf, as critical to arriving at the
situation in Cambodia today. In public, Rainsy said that he
uses the Prime Minister's rhetoric of the reconciliation
being a Khmer-Khmer solution, but in reality he knows that
Hun Sen never would have reached this stage without outside
pressure. He acknowledged that he has been criticized by
colleagues and friends for having given in, but Rainsy
insisted that he made the right choice for the right reasons.
In order to reach a democratic state in Cambodia, much needs
to happen but it all comes down to building democratic
institutions. That can only happen through a more
independent and transparent political process and elections
where average citizens are free to exercise their right to
vote without intimidation.

¶4. (C) Rainsy explained that Cambodians were afraid to be
associated with the Sam Rainsy Party because the CPP had told
them that Sam Rainsy is an enemy who cannot be allowed into
power without civil war breaking out. This strategy of
manipulating poor, uneducated peasants who value stability
after the 25 years of genocide and civil war hurt the SRP, he
stated. If Rainsy is seen to be working with the government
in a constructive way and the PM no longer characterizes
Rainsy as an enemy, people will be more willing to vote in
accordance with their beliefs. From Hun Sen's perspective,
if can he can work with the democrats like Rainsy and human
rights leader Kem Sokha, it will be politically advantageous
for him as well. Rainsy said Hun Sen wants better relations
with the West, particularly the United States, and recognizes
Rainsy can help him on that front.

¶5. (C) Rainsy allowed that his year in exile showed that he
cannot reform Cambodia's political institutions from the
outside as his party would only become more marginalized.
The PM has agreed to SRP representation in the Constitutional

PHNOM PENH 00000327 002 OF 002


Council and the National Election Commission; two crucial
institutions for delivering free and fair elections in 2008,
he noted. By being part of those institutions, the SRP will
be in a stronger position to stand for upcoming elections,
claimed Rainsy. Rainsy said that it has been helpful to his
political future for the Prime Minister to suggest that the
CPP would invite the SRP to join a coalition government with
them in 2008. Rainsy said he would also invite the CPP to
join him if the SRP wins. In either event, it shows the
populace that the parties are not enemies but constructive
partners for the betterment of Cambodia's future. If the SRP
can also show results to the population, that will also help
their chances, he said. Hun Sen has complained to Rainsy
about the poor governors, ministers and other public
officials within the system and asked that Rainsy help him
with necessary reforms. Already, the PM is taking my advice,
said Rainsy, referring to the PM's instructions to one of his
advisors to resolve a dispute between businessmen in Kampong
Thom and provincial authorities. Rainsy appealed to the PM
to assist in this matter as an advocate for the businessmen,
and the PM agreed. These results help the PM take credit but
Rainsy said that people will also see him as the catalyst for
change and credit him as well.

Future of the Political Parties
-------------------------------

¶6. (C) Rainsy described the political landscape in Cambodia
as shifting and one that could change dramatically before
¶2008. FUNCINPEC has been a poor partner to the CPP in
government, and Rainsy said that his political reconciliation
with Hun Sen has given the PM the opportunity to get rid of
FUNCINPEC. Rainsy noted that the Prime Minister is unhappy
with members of his own party -- the old guard whose
interests lean towards Vietnam and others whom Rainsy
characterized as the "mafia" types within the party. Rainsy
would not be surprised if Hun Sen split the CPP and created
his own party to rid himself of those people. Another factor
is the political future of Hun Sen's son, Hun Manet. Rainsy
noted that Hun Sen has political ambitions for his son, but
it remains to be seen if those are shared by others in the
CPP. Rainsy also does not believe FUNCINPEC will survive; he
speculated that FUNCINPEC supporters will move either towards
the CPP or the SRP. Any party that depends on handouts from
the CPP but has no interest in governing cannot survive,
summed up Rainsy; the SRP envisions itself as the governing
party someday -- if not 2008 then in the future.

¶7. (C) As far as the creation of other opposition parties,
Rainsy acknowledged that human rights leader and director of
the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), Kem Sokha, was
a factor and potential party leader in his own right. If the
Sam Rainsy Party falters, suggested Rainsy, Kem Sokha would
see an opportunity and likely form a party to assume the
mantle of the political opposition. However, if the SRP is
strong, Kem Sokha will not come forward, predicted Rainsy.


Comment
-------

¶8. (C) Rainsy has a clear strategy for his party's
political future and hopes to capitalize on his credibility
as a democrat to move the Prime Minister along the path of
democratic reform to the SRP's electoral advantage in 2008.
He also appears to have been influenced by the yawning
leadership void in the life of the political opposition in
Cambodia during his year in exile, and Kem Sokha's
aspirations to fill that void if Rainsy did not return. It
is still too soon to know if Kem Sokha (or others in the
political opposition) will remain on the political sidelines
or decide to start a new party. While it is possible that
FUNCINPEC will wither and splinter as a political party, not
so for the CPP, whose members recognize that one of the CPP's
biggest advantages is holding together as a unified party.
If the SRP does begin to gain more strength in the
countryside, the CPP will likely remain more unified, not
less so. But Rainsy is correct that the political landscape
in Cambodia has shifted dramatically in a short period of
time -- and may continue to do so between now and 2008.

Mussomeli

Would the US Founding Fathers turn in their graves if they learn that the US Ambassador is toasting with killers?

Reference ID: 02PHNOMPENH1361
Created: 2002-06-06 02:43
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh

R 060243Z JUN 02
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8519S E C R E T PHNOM PENH 001361

FOR INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2012
TAGS: CB PINR
SUBJECT: BIO: ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FOR HOR
NAMHONG, CAMBODIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

REF: PHNOM PENH 01099

CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE ALEXANDER A. ARVIZU. REASON 1.5(B)

THIS IS AN ADDENDUM TO BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION PROVIDED REFTEL.

¶1. (S) INR/B BIO FROM 1998 REPORTS THAT HOR NAMHONG'S
MINISTRY POSITIONS. IN 1992, INR/B DESCRIBED HIM AS AN
OPPORTUNIST WHO LACKED HIS OWN POWER BASES, BUT GAINED
POSITIONS BY SEEKING ALLIANCES AND DOING FAVORS FOR POWERFUL
SOC LEADERS.

¶2. (S) AN UNDATED, UNATTRIBUTED REPORT ON FILE AT THE EMBASSY
CLAIMS THAT: HOR NAMHONG CAME BACK TO CAMBODIA AFTER THE
KHMER ROUGE TOOK OVER, BUT WAS NOT KILLED BECAUSE HE WAS A
SCHOOLMATE OF IENG SARY. HE BECAME HEAD OF THE BENG TRABEK
CAMP AND HE AND HIS WIFE COLLABORATED IN THE KILLING OF MANY
PRISONERS. AMONG THE VICTIMS WERE THE QUEEN'S SISTER NANETTE
AND HER HUSBAND METEVI (A RELATIVE OF SIRIK MATAK). HOR
NAMHONG ALMOST KILLED CHEM SNGUON AND HIS FAMILY (INCLUDING
CHEM WIDHYA WHO WAS WITH HIS FATHER IN THE CAMP) BECAUSE
SOMEONE HEARD WIDHYA LISTENING TO A FRENCH RADIO BROADCAST.
THE VIETNAMESE INVADED JUST BEFORE THE CHEM FAMILY WAS TO BE
KILLED. HOR NAMHONG'S WIFE ASKED IENG SAR TO HELP THEIR
DAUGHTER WORK WITH THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME. SHE POINTED OUT
THAT SHE HELPED IENG SARY BRING BACK A LOT OF PEOPLE TO BE
KILLED. THE DAUGHTER CAME BACK. LATER, HOR NAMHONG'S WIFE
SAW HER DAUGHTER'S PICTURE ON THE WALL AT TUOL SLENG AND
FAINTED.


ARVIZU

Reference ID: 95PHNOMPENH3751
Created: 1995-11-14 10:28
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Phnom Penh

R 141028Z NOV 95
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1834
INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY BANGKOKS E C R E T PHNOM PENH 003751

E.O. 12598: DECL: 11/14/2025
TAGS: PGOV PINR CB
SUBJECT: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF HUN SEN'S MENTAL
STATE

REF: PHNOM PENH 3720

¶1. (S) SUMMARY. SECOND PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN
HAS CALLED FOR A FORMAL RCG INVESTIGATION INTO A
REPORT, PUBLISHED BY A LOCAL NEWSPAPER, OF A PLOT
TO ASSASSINATE HIM. THE REPORT, SOURCED TO
FUNCINPEC SECRETARY-GENERAL SIRIVUDH, IS MOST
LIKELY LITTLE MORE THAN UNFOUNDED RUMOR, POSSIBLY
FLOATED BY THE SOMETIMES MISCHIEVOUS SIRIVUDH TO
PROVOKE A REACTION FROM HUN SEN, WHO CONTINUES TO
SHOW A NEAR-OBSESSION WITH HIS PERSONAL SECURITY
(REFTEL). END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) THE NOVEMBER 11 ISSUE OF "NEW ANGKOR"
NEWSPAPER CONTAINED A STORY ABOUT A POSSIBLE PLOT
BY UNNAMED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO ASSASSINATE
SECOND PRIME MINISTER HUN SEN AS HE TRAVELED TO
THE NEARBY HUN SEN DEVELOPMENT ZONE OR VISITED THE
ROYAL PALACE (WHERE HIS BODYGUARDS USUALLY REMAIN
OUTSIDE). FUNCINPEC PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL AND
FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE NORODOM SIRIVUDH,
WHO, THE ARTICLE SAID, REVEALED THE PLOT TO THE
PAPER, SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED THAT HE KNEW ANYTHING
ABOUT IT. THREE DAYS LATER, HUN SEN DESCRIBED THE
ALLEGED PLAN IN A SPEECH AT A MILITARY TRAINING
CENTER NEAR PHNOM PENH, NOTING THAT THE ATTEMPT
WOULD OCCUR IN APRIL, 1996. HE DID NOT SPECULATE
WHO WAS BEHIND THE PLOT.


¶3. (S) CO-INTERIOR MINISTER YOU HOCKRY TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR DURING A NOVEMBER 14 FAREWELL LUNCH
THAT HUN SEN WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPORT AND
HAD, WITH FIRST PRIME MINISTER RANARIDDH'S
CONSENT, REQUESTED A FORMAL RCG INVESTIGATION. HE
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED THAT HOCKRY, RATHER THAN
HIS CPP COLLEAGUE AND SOMETIMES PERCEIVED RIVAL,
CO-INTERIOR MINISTER SAR KHENG, HEAD THE
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE.

¶4. (S) HOCKRY ALSO OBSERVED THAT EVEN BEFORE THE
ASSASSINATION RUMOR HUN SEN HAD BEEN ACTING MORE
CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SECURITY. WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE,
HE TRAVELS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, HE TAKES ABOUT 60
BODYGUARDS WITH HIM--MORE THAN ANY OTHER OFFICIAL.
(BY WAY OF COMPARISON, HOCKRY SAID HE TAKES SIX
PERSONS AND SAR KHENG UP TO FORTY.) AFTER "NEW
ANGKOR" PUBLISHED THE ASSASSINATION STORY, HUN SEN
CUT SHORT HIS VISIT TO SIEM REAP AND FLEW BACK TO
PHNOM PENH; IN A DEPARTURE FROM HIS NORMAL
ROUTINE, HE ASKED THAT HIS HELICOPTER PICK HIM UP
DIRECTLY FROM HIS HOTEL, ACCORDING TO HOCKRY.

¶5. (S) IN A POSSIBLY RELATED MATTER, FOREIGN
MINISTER UNG HUOT ASKED THE AMBASSADOR AT A
FAREWELL DINNER ON NOVEMBER 13 WHETHER THE USG HAD
ANY INFORMATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO
OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO.
HE CLAIMED THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WAS
"AWARE" OF THE INFORMATION. THE AMBASSADOR
INFORMED HUOT THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE REPORT.

¶6. (S) COMMENT: SIRIVUDH ONCE TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR THAT HE DELIBERATELY MADE PROVOCATIVE
STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS IN ORDER TO ELICIT
REACTIONS FROM PEOPLE AND THEN ASSESS WHERE THEY
TRULY STAND ON ISSUES. HE DENIED INFORMING THE
LOCAL PAPER OF THE ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT,
BUT WE WOULD NOT PUT IT PAST HIM SINCE HE HAS DONE
SIMILAR THINGS IN THE PAST. IN ANY EVENT, HUN SEN
HAS BEEN PROVOKED INTO REACTING, AND HIS REACTION
IS IN KEEPING WITH HIS INCREASED CONCERN, SOME
HERE CALL IT PARANOIA, ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY
(REFTEL). IN OUR VIEW, RUMORS SUCH AS THIS ARE
NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY HERE, AND THE STORY
PROBABLY HAS LITTLE OR NO BASIS IN FACT.


TWINING

Cable said Hun Sen had no claims to any Thai land

13/07/2011
Bangkok Post

07/13/2011
International Business Times

12 Jul 2011
Telegeography

Is this a pagoda model suggested by VRG?

CPP Comrade Nguon Nhel

12/07/2011

"POV: Enemies of the People." 11 p.m. -12:30 a.m. Tuesday. WPBT-PBS 2.

By Glenn Garvin
ggarvin@MiamiHerald.com
Miami Herald (Florida, USA)

Rural residents in Siem Raep Province, Cambodia (Photo: Amber de Bruin)

07.12.11
By DENIS D. GRAY
Associated Press

Tyres burn near an excavator operated by an employee of Shukaku Inc during a protest yesterday at Boeung Kak lake in central Phnom Penh. (Photo by: Mary Kozlovski)

Tuesday, 12 July 2011
Khouth Sophak Chakrya and Mary Kozlovski
The Phnom Penh Post

The prospects are not good for the residents unless international organisations ... intervene

Cartoon by Sacrava (on the web at http://politiktoons.blogspot.com and also at http://sacrava.blogspot.com)