KI Media: “Opposition Sam Rainsy's Visit to Montreal on June 05, 2011 - Event Program” plus 6 more |
- Opposition Sam Rainsy's Visit to Montreal on June 05, 2011 - Event Program
- Kem Sokha recognizes his voice on the tape, but claims that he is not Hun Xen’s puppet [-I smoked the CPP marijuana, but I did not inhale it]
- Secret document revealed the phone conversation between Hun Xen and Kem Sokha on 24 July 2007 at 10:55AM
- Sorry!
- Closing Order of Case 002 (Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith)
- Brother Number One - the Documentary about Kerry Hamill
- Cambodians Want Cases 003 and 004; Cases 001 and 002 Not Enough
| Opposition Sam Rainsy's Visit to Montreal on June 05, 2011 - Event Program Posted: 29 May 2011 05:08 PM PDT Dear Compatriots, Please consult the program below with respect to បុណ្យសង្រ្គោះជាតិមាតុភូមិខ្មែរ on the occasion of H.E. Sam Rainsy's Visit to Montreal on June 05, 2011. We hope that you will come out in support our country's greatest cause. Thank you for your caring and supports. Sincerely Yours, Pretty   | ||
| Posted: 29 May 2011 04:51 PM PDT
By Kim Peou Translated by Soy Radio Free Asia Click here to read the original article in Khmer The election season is not here yet, but politicians are attacking one another little by little already in order to seek popularity. On Sunday 29 May, a tape recorded showing the conversation between Kem Sokha, president of the HRP, and Hun Xen was distributed to several news media. The tape provided the conservation between Kem Sokha and Hun Sen that took place in 2007. Kem Sokha said that the tape is real but that he is not a puppet of the CPP. He claimed that the ruling party is scared about losing its support to the HRP, that's why it was releasing these issues. He said that these problems do not bring any concerns to him: "After destroying Funcinpec, they destroyed the Sam Rainsy Party, now they want to destroy the HRP also, so this is their timing only. Yesterday, they called me over the phone to tell me that they will do something, that is why they threatened me." Kem Sokha issued the comments above after a secret tape was posted by the Deum Ampil News revealing the entire length of the conservation between him and Hun Xen. The tape also showed the HRP's nakedness, and it also shows that the HRP is a party formed by Hun Xen to destroy the SRP. The conversation shows that Hun Xen praised the victory of the HRP through his financial support, as well Hun Xen's support by providing a venue for the HRP's congress at the Olympic stadium. Hun Xen also provided additional ideas to Kem Sokha so that the latter will use people from the SRP to work with him, etc… Kem Sokha claimed that he did reply as shown on the tape because he wanted to form the HRP so that he can hold a large party congress that can accommodate between 20 to 30,000 people, but he did not promise to serve the CPP at all. CPP MP Cheam Yeap denied that the CPP was not involved with the HRP. He claimed that the tape is not real: "I tell you, right now, the production can be imitated by computer due to modern technology." Regarding this issue, Yim Sovann, SRP Spokesman, said that this tape is not unusual. The SRP knows that the HRP is a party that was set up by the CPP in order to divide the voice of the opposition and this has been going on for a long time already: "This information is very regrettable, because it shows that Cambodian politicians are not truthful. The majority of them are puppets of the ruling party. I believe that the people will understand this issue clearly." The HRP was formed in 2007 after Kem Sokha, the former president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR), resigned from his position. The HRP received 3 seats during the 2008 election. Up to now, the HRP and the SRP have tried to reach an alliance, but the plan has failed.  | ||
| Posted: 29 May 2011 02:04 PM PDT 29 May 2011 By Soy Sopheap Translated by Soy DAP-News Phnom Penh – DAP-News is published below a 7-page secret document purporting the phone conversation between Hun Xen and Kem Sokha regarding the formation of the Human Rights Party. The phone conversation took place on 24 July 2007 at 10:55AM. The document was recently revealed by a government official closed to Hun Xen. The document shows that Kem Sokha's HRP was formed with the help from Hun Xen in 2007 in order so that it can compete in the 27 July 2008 election. Therefore, we can clearly find out about the secret between Kem Sokha and Hun Sen. The transcript of the conversation is provided below. http://www.box.net/shared/yqt7i24te0  | ||
| Posted: 29 May 2011 01:48 PM PDT Dear Readers, We apologize for the interruption for the last few days due to some technical problems faced by our team members in Phnom Penh. We hope to be back to normal again later today. Thank you! KI-Media team  | ||
| Closing Order of Case 002 (Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith) Posted: 29 May 2011 07:07 AM PDT In preparation for the start of trial hearings beginning on 27 June 2011 of Case 002 against the surviving Khmer Rouge senior leaders Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith, KI Media is starting a new series in posting installations of the public document of the Closing Order of Case 002. The Closing Order of the Co-Investigating Judges forms the basic document from which all the parties (Co-Prosecutors, Co-Lead Lawyers for all civil parties, Defense Lawyers) will be making their arguments before the Trial Chamber judges (one Cambodian President, 2 Cambodian Judges, 2 UN judges). Up until now, the hearings involving these four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been in the Pre-Trial Chamber over issues of pre-trial detention and jurisdictional issues. Beginning in June 2011, the Trial Chamber will hear the substantive arguments over the criminal charges (e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity, penal code of 1956). Available in Khmer and French. Contact the ECCC for a copy for free. . . . CLOSING ORDER of Co-Investigating Judges You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, 15 September 2010 90. Based on reports from lower-ranking officials to their superiors, directives from superiors to subordinates, and requests for assistance of information that were discovered, among other evidence,254 it appears that the main inter-personal or inter-office communication was by letter, telegram and messenger. Official communication also took place in meetings and at gatherings at each administrative level as well as at larger rallies in Phnom Penh.255 Invitations to such official meetings were generally distributed by messenger or telegram. Furthermore, the CPK disseminated a number of directives and political education material throughout the country. Such material was sent from the centre to lower administrative ranks. Lower ranks would, in turn, disseminate the material among the population in the zones and sectors.256 Letters 91. Letters were sent from senior CPK leaders such as POL Pot, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary.257 Letters were reportedly delivered through messengers to zone and sector secretaries.258 One of the telegrams sent from the Central Zone (fomer North Zone) indicates that letters were sometimes carried in person by higher officials such as Zone Secretary Ke Pork himself.259 Messengers 92. Messengers were primarily used to deliver reports and telegrams from the radio telegraphic unit to ministries260 or for communicating information about arrests.261 Within the different zones, "Messengers carried correspondence by hand on bicycles and motorcycles. Messengers were very busy and spent only a short time in each location before returning to their home base. Messengers were not tied to one single link but worked all the different links serviced by their station".262 One witness states that messengers from the Centre would use a speed boat to get to Kratie in Autonomous Sector 505.263 Telegram Communication 93. After the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975, the central telegram unit that had operated in the "liberated areas" was moved to Phnom Penh.264 About 40 children were recruited from the provinces and were taught the basic working techniques of telegram communication (coding, typing, etc.) as well as sometimes French and English.265 On 9 October 1975 the Standing Committee decided on the functioning of the telegram unit.266 94. The telegram unit, which was divided into two sections (one responsible for transmitting and receiving the telegram, and the other for the encoding and decoding)267 was code named K-18 and was located in Phnom Penh at the old United States Embassy (now the Fishery Administration).268 Office K-18 was composed of an internal communications section with Oeun in charge and an external communications section with Rim in charge.269. Approximately 20 to 30 persons worked in each of the two sections. 270 Subsequent chairmen of the telegram unit were Yos271 (also mentioned as deputy chief2'2) and ,3 95. Within the zones, a telegram unit consisted of a telegram coder, a transmitter or operator and a typist or secretary. 96. Outgoing messages from the Centre were first sent to the telegram coding unit which was located at the Party Centre office K-1 to be encoded into number codes.275 The encoded message was then forwarded to the operation group at K-18 that transmitted the messages to the recipients in coded form, where they decoded it into plain text.276 Incoming telegrams from the zones arrived at K-18 and were written down by the typist group. The encoded message was then sent to K-1 for decoding and transmitted to the receiving Party cadre.277 Incoming telegrams were forwarded to other cadre upon the decision of Pol Pot and his staff, who received copies of all messages.278 Where the word "document" was attributed to a message, this implied that it was to be kept in the archive of the respective telegram translator.279 Copies of the coded and the text versions of the telegram had to be kept for six months before they were burnt.280 97. The following recipient code names were frequently used in telegrams: "Grand Uncle" for Pol Pot;281 "Grand Uncle Nuon" for Nuon Chea;282 "Grand Uncle Vann" for Ieng Sary;283 "Grand Uncle Vorn" for Vorn Vet;284 "Uncle Hem" for Khieu Samphan;285 "Respected Brother" for Pol Pot;286 "K-3" for Office of Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea;287 and "K-1" for Office of Pol Pot.288 98. The number "870" was identified by several witnesses as the code number of the Centre.289 Charged person Khieu Samphan states in this regard: "Pol Pot signed documents by writing 870".290 The word "M-870" was identified by witnesses as the code number for the Central Committee Office or for Nuon Chea and Pol Pot interchangeably. The word Committee 870 referred to the Central Committee.293 According to Charged person Duch: "Any fax or letter with the name "Pol" "870" or "Office 870" referred to Pol Pot".294 Political and Education Material Print Media 99. The Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth magazines were the most important CPK propaganda magazines and reflected the views of the senior Party leaders, in particular the views of the Standing committee, although there were also other magazines produced during the regime. They were produced in office K-25 295 by the Ministry of Propaganda.296 From April 1975 until his arrest in 1977, Hou Nim was the Minister of Propaganda.297 Following his arrest Yun Yat took control of the Ministry of Propaganda.298 100. Revolutionary Flag had existed as an underground "secret magazine" during the struggle prior to 1975,299 and remained the official Party publication during the CPK era.300 101. The Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth Magazines were a propaganda tool used to reflect the Party policy on a monthly basis.301 Only Party members had access to the magazines themselves and they were used to educate political and military cadres. They had to study the magazine, disseminate its policies to those under their charge and then implement them.304 They also had to attend study sessions on them. Revolutionary Youth was distributed among the members of the Youth League.305 102. The magazines influenced all channels of government public communication. The contents of radio broadcasts, for example, were drawn from articles.306 Copies of Revolutionary Flag were found in S-21 and at surrounding houses.307 Duch himself stated that he used Revolutionary Flag for information on the "general policy line of the Party ".308 Evidence also suggests that the magazines were received by 870 offices309 as well as being disseminated abroad to the Cambodian embassy in China.310 103. The magazines were also used for teaching purposes, in particular, by Nuon Chea311 and Ieng Sary.312 More general study sessions were held to rally the people and called for "young men and women to join the revolution".313 According to some witnesses, "the guidelines in the magazines were illustrated in a very sharp way and if a person would not adapt himself or herself to that, then this person automatically would be considered as an enemy"314 and a core message was that opponents to the Party would be considered as enemies.315 104. A witness states that in one incident, leaflets that were published at K-25 were dropped from planes in the East Zone and contained allegations against Sao Phim and appealed to the people to stay calm.316 Film and Photography 105. The CPK had a stringent policy on filming. The aim of the film was to present the success of the agricultural community. With this aim, film crews were established and clear directions were given: "What we should shoot? (We) must capture the movement of building up the country, country defense, especially building up of country's rural areas. We shoot (films) of their activities from start to finish".317 106. Filming was seen as an important way to involve the public in the policies of the Party as explained at a working meeting on 1 June 1976: "Generally speaking, filming is an important matter. The public really demand it. If they see the updated situation, they are happy because they show their masterpiece and they represent their own story ".318 107. Photography was seen as second to filming and the only guidance given was to take pictures of ceremonies, or foreign guests for documentary purpose.319 There was a photography and cinematography section at the Soviet Technological School under the Ministry of Propaganda.320 Public Radio 108. Radio was seen as the principal method to disseminate the revolutionary idea among the people by the leadership.321 In this regard, guidelines were given on interviewing people in the zones, on how news would be announced, and on what other programs would be aired.322 Chinese experts were consulted for the technical establishment of radio broadcasting.323
110. The Ministry of Propaganda there was a group of writers, the interview section, the writing section and the editing section.329 Radio broadcasts featured international news extracted from the international radio and domestic news published by the Ministry which circulated mainly around the praise of rural cooperatives and the achievements of the regime the Party line, the leadership of the Party and speeches, the defence of the country and followed an educational purpose.
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| Brother Number One - the Documentary about Kerry Hamill Posted: 29 May 2011 06:35 AM PDT  "Brother Number One" is a New Zealand documentary on the torture and murder of New Zealand yachtie Kerry Hamill by the Khmer Rouge in 1978. It follows the journey of Kerry's younger brother, Rob Hamill, an Olympic and Trans-Atlantic champion rower, who will travel to Cambodia to retrace the steps taken by his brother and John Dewhirst, speaking to eyewitnesses, perpetrators and survivors.  | ||
| Cambodians Want Cases 003 and 004; Cases 001 and 002 Not Enough Posted: 28 May 2011 10:01 PM PDT "What the Cambodian People Are Anticipating is Case 002, Not Cases 003 and 004!" (sic!) Political Analysis by Neth Pheaktra Phnom Penh Post Khmer, May 20, 2011 (Unofficial English translation from the Khmer article) Phnom Penh: "I would like to see the full completion of the trial proceedings for Case 002 against the four former senior Khmer Rouge leaders before starting to scrutinize Cases 003 and 004," a survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime commented, adding that Case 002 has great significance for Cambodia's history and for learning about the inner working of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on how it ordered and planned the killings of the Khmer people. This case will fill a gap in Cambodia's history because the question as to "why the Khmer Rouge savagely killed its own people?" has so far not provided an answer to all the victims. Furthermore, these four former senior Khmer Rouge leaders are currently very old and they are ridden with countless diseases. This clearly shows that what the Cambodian people consider as important and is of great interest to them is Case 002, but not Cases 003 and 004. In fact, the latter two cases are currently facing turmoil among the judicial staff of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal itself. The International Co-Prosecutor would like to pursue the prosecution of these cases, but the National Co-Prosecutor – Mrs. Chea Leang – had released a Press Statement clarifying her position by stating that the suspects in Case 003 are not senior Khmer Rouge leaders nor are they the most responsible individuals of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. Mrs. Chea Leang underscored in her Press Statement that: "The National Co-Prosecutor holds the position that the suspects in Case 003 do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for prosecution, and the prosecution of the defendants currently detained by the ECCC sufficiently fulfills the mandate of this Tribunal." What was raised by the National Co-Prosecutor clearly emphasizes the goal of national reconciliation and the protection of political stability in Cambodia which has experienced peace only in the past decade. The push for more prosecutions on former Khmer Rouge cadres by the International Co-Prosecutor for whatever reason can lead to a failure in the national reconciliation process through the Khmer Rouge cases as it would increase the number of prosecutions and create more complications. The Cambodian Premier stated in the past that he would rather see the Khmer Rouge Tribunal fail than allow Cambodia to return to a new civil war. Nevertheless, to prosecute or not to prosecute is a judicial matter. The Cambodian people want justice but they do not want a return to civil war or turmoil, nor do they want to see any secession zone created from the desire for justice. What the Cambodian people want is for National and International judicial officers to provide clear balance between justice and national reconciliation. Peace in Cambodia came at a heavy cost, financially and in terms of human lives. Therefore, the Cambodian people no longer want to see bloodshed and tragedy anymore. . . . . . Published in both English and Khmer editions of The Phnom Penh Post May 27, 2011
Dear Editor of The Phnom Penh Post: I am deeply troubled by Neth Pheaktra's analysis "What the Cambodian People are Anticipating is Case 002, Not Cases 003 and 004!" in the Khmer-language Phnom Penh Post, 20 May 2011. He attributes one quote to an unnamed victim saying that s/he would like to see Case 002 against the "four senior Khmer Rouge leaders fully tried first before moving on to scrutinizing cases 003 and 004", and goes on to defend the position of the National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang and Prime Minister Hun Sen against Cases 003 and 004, quoting the Prime Minister that he would rather see the Tribunal fail than allow for political upheaval. In response to the analysis, I'd like to raise three points: 1. Division of Labor. The 40-plus personnel in the Office of Co-Investigating Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers ("ECCC", or "Tribunal") can proceed with their investigation of Cases 003 and 004 without interfering in the progress of Case 002. These 40-plus personnel have no role or duties in the trial hearings of Case 002 beginning on June 27. Currently, they are sitting idle, collecting salaries in the range of US$250,000 per month. The numbering of the case files is sequential for purposes of management, but the work on these cases can be done concurrently, especially as they are at different stages in the ECCC process, without overlapping staff or venues. 2. The False Dilemma of Peace vs. Justice. Truth is a pre-condition of justice. Justice is an integral element of peace. There can be no genuine peace without justice; there can be no justice without truth. A fragile peace of temporary stability of the Pyongyang or Burmese ilk cannot last; it will only further imbed impunity, oppression and other social ills into iron-clad destructive mentality. A fragile peace or faux stability is a superficial façade over a boiling kettle of unresolved social injustices. Truth, justice and peace are mutually reinforcing of and not opposed to each other, as argued by Neth Pheaktra, Madam Chea Leang and Prime Minister Hun Sen. 3. Cambodians Demand QUALITY justice, not a figure. We know there is no magical figure as to how many should be tried or indicted. We know it is not practical nor desirable to try everyone with a bloody hand for crimes committed during the period of 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979. That would be in the hundreds if not thousands, and it would create social chaos and instability, working against the goals of reconciliation. That said, however, the current five is not enough and to push for another five is not unreasonable. Here, to argue social instability is to employ a false pretext, which is the current position of the National Co-Prosecutor and of the Government. In blocking further prosecutions, the Prime Minister is assuming the role of a prosecutor or co-investigating judge, an unacceptable overreach of his political position. Cambodians will not be satisfied with the current five indictees, especially in light of the US$200,000,000 already spent on this ECCC, for the deaths of 1,700,000 to 2,200,000 loved ones. And there's a real fear that only Duch and one or two of the senior KR leaders in Case 002 will live through the whole trial. This is not an equation that is acceptable to Cambodians—trying only five, with the real possibility that of these five, only three or four will live through the full legal proceedings and be the scapegoats of the KR regime. It's nonsensical math. In sum, to prosecute or not to prosecute is a judicial decision, not to be decided by politics, if we are to adhere to international standards. International standards of QUALITY JUSTICE of INTEGRITY FOR ALL, including poor Cambodians, not just for the Cambodian elites and people of the developed world. International standards of the United Nations, agreed upon by the Cambodian government for this ECCC. Theary C. Seng, Founding President CIVICUS: Center for Cambodian Civic Education  |
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